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BACKGROUND:	 	 It	 has	 been	 claimed	 that	 the	 involvement	 of	 commercial	
companies	 in	 medical	 and	 health	 research	 poses	 risks	 relating	 to	 potential	
conflicts	 of	 interest.	 	 In	 response,	 many	 journals	 have	 developed	 conflict	 of	
interest	 policies,	 and	 there	 has	 been	 a	 proliferation	 of	 related	 guidance	 from	
publishers,	 professional	 associations	 and	 commercial	 companies,	 mostly	





AIM:	 	 This	 thesis	 examines	 how	 actors	 within	 medical	 journal	 publishing	
conceptualise	conflicts	of	interest.		It	analyses	their	understandings	of	conflicts	






interviews	with	 actors	working	 in	 a	 range	of	 roles	 related	 to	medical	 journal	
publishing.	 	 These	 data	were	 thematically	 analysed	 to	 illustrate	 how	medical	
journal	publishing	conceptualises	and	manages	conflicts	of	interest,	to	identify	
perceived	 strengths	 and	 weaknesses	 of	 current	 approaches,	 and	 to	 identify	
potential	opportunities	for	improvement.		
	
RESULTS:	 	There	 appears	 to	 be	 an	 established	 discourse	 around	 conflicts	 of	
interest,	which	emphasises	particular	stakeholders,	while	others,	who	also	have	
opportunities	 to	 influence	 journal	 content,	 are	 frequently	 absent	 from	 the	




conflicts	 of	 interest:	 for	 example,	 self-disclosure	 was	 regularly	 highlighted,	
despite	 the	 acknowledged	 weaknesses	 of	 this	 approach	 (Chapter	 6).	 	 The	
existence	of	 further	mechanisms	that	offer	 the	potential	 to	assist	 in	managing	
conflicts	 of	 interest	were	 identified,	 though	 findings	 suggest	 that,	 in	 practice,	
these	currently	have	limited	uptake	(Chapter	7).	 	 Interviewees’	suggestions	of	
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influence	 the	 prescribing	 behaviours	 of	 their	 peers.	 	 They	 may	 include	
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publishing.	 	 It	 highlights	 the	 contentious	 nature	 of	 debates	 about	 COIs,	 and	
demonstrates	the	fact	that	concerns	about	the	adequacy	of	current	mechanisms	
and	procedures	reach	the	upper	echelons	of	medical	publishing,	and	that	they	






Collaboration	 and	 lead	 author	 of	 a	 review,	 published	 in	 The	 Lancet,	 	 on	 the	
evidence	from	clinical	trials	and	observational	studies	involving	statins	(Collins	
et	al.,	2016),	has	a	vested	interest	in	the	debate	(Godlee,	2016).		Collins	and	his	
colleagues,	 and	 the	 editor	 in	 chief	 of	 The	 Lancet	 (Richard	 Horton)	 have	
responded	 by	 criticising	 the	 fact	 that	 a	 key	 member	 of	 the	 professional	
association	called	in	to	investigate	–	the	Committee	on	Publication	Ethics	(COPE)	
–	had	an	acknowledged	 (though	undisclosed)	COI,	 but	 that	 they	only	 recused	
themselves	 from	 investigations	 eight	 months	 after	 adjudicating	 on	 the	
submission	 and	 liaising	 with	 the	 subject	 (the	 BMJ)	 of	 the	 complaint,	 and	
determining	the	outcome	of	the	review	(Horton,	2016a,	Armitage	et	al.,	2016).	
	
After	 two	 years	 of	 exchanges,	 COPE	 said	 that	 it	would	 not	 act	 further,	
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stating	 that	 it	 is	 not	 a	 regulatory	 authority	 that	 can	 govern	 the	 practices	 of	
journals	 (Horton,	 2016b),	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 does	 actively	 investigate	
complaints	and	offers	advice	to	those	making	them	(COPE,	2016a).		The	alleged	









statins	 trials	 to	be	made	available	 for	wider	analysis	 (British	Medical	 Journal,	
2016d):	 if	such	data	were	made	more	widely	accessible,	 it	would	increase	the	
possibility	of	determining	whether	such	risks	were	indeed	over-emphasised,	or	
whether	 the	 original	 reports	 did	 in	 fact	misrepresent	 the	 findings.	 	 As	 Fiona	
Godlee,	EIC	of	the	BMJ,	explained	in	a	recent	radio	interview:	
‘The	 trials	do	under-report	adverse	events.	 	And	 in	many	of	 these	Statins	
trials	…	they	were	run	in	periods	where	people	who	experienced	side	effects	























This	 thesis	 aims	 to	 examine	 how	 COIs	 are	 conceptualised	 in	 medical	
journal	 publishing:	 which	 groups	 of	 actors	 are	 understood	 to	 have	 potential	
conflicts	 that	 require	 management,	 what	 types	 of	 interests	 may	 cause	 these	
conflicts,	and	how	it	is	felt	that	they	should	be	handled.		In	doing	so,	it	looks	at	
whether	these	existing	perceptions	help	to	prevent	resulting	COIs	from	affecting	
the	 medical/health	 research	 literature,	 or	 instead	 enable	 them.	 	 The	 statins	
debate	 cited	 above	 illustrates	 the	ways	 in	which	COIs	 can	potentially	 affect	 a	
range	 of	 actors	 within	medical	 journal	 publishing,	 including	 authors,	 journal	
editors,	and	 those	sitting	on	 the	boards	of	professional	associations	 that	have	
some	 degree	 of	 responsibility	 for	 investigating	 allegations	 of	 malpractice.	 	 It	
demonstrates	 the	 weaknesses	 of	 a	 key	 professional	 publishing	 association	
(COPE),	which	is	heavily	relied	upon	in	this	regard,	and	as	such,	it	points	more	





The	ways	 in	which	 the	 commercial	 funding	 of	 research	 can	 impact	 on	
medical/health	 journals	 is	 heavily	 focused	 on	 in	 the	 literature	 on	 COIs.	 	 In	
particular,	 the	 potential	 conflicts	 that	 can	 arise	 from	 the	 relationships	 of	
academic	researchers	with	the	pharmaceutical	and	tobacco	industries	have	been	
highly	contested	and	debated,	with	the	literature	more	developed	on	these	than	
other	 commercial	manufacturing	 industries.	 	 As	 such,	 I	 focused	 on	 these	 two	
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industries	 in	 my	 research	 when	 considering	 the	 COIs	 that	 can	 arise	 from	
connections	with	this	sector.	 	 It	 is	also	particularly	interesting	to	compare	the	









and	 Shamoo,	 1997,	 Duvall,	 2006,	 Bodenheimer,	 2000).	 	 Academic	 and	
government	researchers,	doing	basic	science,	can	identify	new	potential	targets	
for	 drugs	 and	 new	 strategies	 for	 treatment,	 as	well	 as	 targeting	 therapies	 at	
patients	who	will	most	benefit	from	them,	while	avoiding	particular	treatments	
for	patients	who	are	at	high	 risk	of	 adverse	 side	effects.	 	The	pharmaceutical	
industry	 has	 good	 manufacturing	 processes,	 experience	 with	 drug	 approval	
processes	 and,	 critically,	 the	 finance	 to	 develop	 drugs	 (Lo	 and	 Field,	 2009).		
However	COIs	can	occur	when	the	interests	of	private	gain	clash	with		the	two	
key	values	of	medical	ethics:	beneficence	(the	primary	responsibility	to	patients	
and	 research	 participants)	 and	 nonmaleficence	 (ensuring	 the	 least	 harm	
possible	to	achieve	a	beneficial	outcome)	(Rule	and	Shamoo,	1997).		As	such,	they	
have	 been	 identified	 by	 some	 authors	 as	 presenting	 a	 potential	 concern	 in	
medical	and	health	research	(Solyom,	2004).			
	
COIs	 arising	 from	 collaborations	 between	 researchers	 and	 the	 tobacco	
industry	have	been	an	area	of	concern	since	the	1950s,	with	tobacco	setting	the	
groundwork	 for	 the	problem	of	COIs	as	we	understand	 it:	 arguably,	 the	steps	
taken	 to	 form	 relationships	 with	 scientific	 researchers	 have	 informed	 other	
commercial	 industries’	 approaches	 to	 shaping	 scientific	 and	medical	 research	
(Brandt,	2012,	White	and	Bero,	2010).		In	attempting	to	discredit	the	scientific	
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evidence	around	 the	dangers	of	 smoking,	 the	 tobacco	 industry	sought	 to	 take	
control	 of	 science,	 influencing	 and	 engineering	 it	 to	 produce	 results	 that	
supported	 its	 aims	 (Brandt,	 2012).	 	 Prior	 to	 this	 period,	 there	was	 a	 general	
perception	 that	 scientific	 practice	 was	 immune	 to	 influence	 from	 external	
pressures	 (ibid).	 	 However,	 faced	 with	 increasing	 evidence	 regarding	 the	








which	 portrayed	 themselves	 as	 independent	 organisations,	 yet	 they	 allowed	















their	 research	and	 thus	directly	profit	 from	 it	 financially	 (Korn,	2000,	Lo	and	
Field,	 2009,	 Sharpe,	 2002).	 	 These	 laws	 provided	 incentives	 for	 clinicians,	








per	cent	of	 funding	for	clinical	 trials	came	from	industry	(Sharpe,	2002).	 	The	
introduction	of	 financial	 incentives	 (for	both	 individuals	and	 institutions)	has	
been	seen	by	some	commentators	as	having	a	negative	impact	upon	the	ethical	





A	 new	 research	 model	 also	 emerged	 in	 the	 1980s	 and	 1990s:	 the	




in	1998,	while	 the	CRO	market	 size	 rose	 from	US$1	billion	 in	1992	 to	US$7.9	
billion	in	2001	(Mirowski	and	Van	Horn,	2005).		These	private	companies	offered	
increased	 efficiency	 and	 cost-savings	 by	 employing	 researchers	 who	 were	
willing	 to	 focus	on	 tailoring	 their	work	 to	meet	 regulatory	 requirements,	 and	
could	 work	 faster	 than	 their	 academic	 counterparts.	 	 They	 also	 allowed	 the	








It	 can	 be	 legitimate	 for	 researchers	 to	 have	 secondary	 interests	 and	
indeed,	they	are	often	unavoidable.		Further,	as	stated	at	the	start	of	this	section,	
collaborations	 between	 the	 pharmaceutical	 industry	 and	 academia	 can	 be	
beneficial	 to	 the	advancement	of	medicine	and	ultimately	 in	 improving	public	
health:	 new	 and	 improved	 treatments	 may	 be	 developed	 as	 a	 result	 of	 such	
collaborations	(Duvall,	2006,	Lo	and	Field,	2009).		Lo	and	Field	(2009)	cite	as	an	
example	 the	 therapies	 that	 were	 developed	 to	 treat	 HIV	 as	 a	 result	 of	
partnerships	 between	 academia	 and	 the	 pharmaceutical	 industry,	 which	
transformed	a	previously	fatal	illness	into	a	chronic	disease	that	people	are	now	
able	 to	 live	 with.	 	 However,	 problems	 can	 occur	 if	 secondary	 interests	 take	
priority	over	primary	ones,	which	may	affect	actors’	ability	to	effectively	protect	
research	 participants	 or	 conduct	 research	 impartially.	 	 The	 latter	 could	
potentially	lead	to	biased	results,	and	consequently	inaccurate	evaluations	of	the	
effectiveness	 of	 treatments	 (Warner	 and	 Gluck,	 2003).	 	 These	 risks	 have	 the	
potential	to	undermine	trust	in	the	research	enterprise	(ibid).	
	
This	 increased	 commercialisation	 of	medical	 research,	which	 has	 seen	
biomedical	 researchers	 and	 physicians	 working	 with	 private	 companies,	 has	
thus	led	to	a	greater	potential	for	COIs	to	arise.		Physicians’	professional	primary	
interest	is	to	provide	beneficial	patient	care,	and	researchers’	main	objective	is	














not	 the	 only	 potential	 cause	 of	 conflicting	 interests.	 	 Funding	 from	 the	 third	
sector,	 or	 government,	 also	 has	 the	 possibility	 of	 leading	 to	 conflicts	 (Smith,	
2010,	 Dreger,	 2015).	 	 Personal	 gain,	 either	 financial	 (such	 as	 through	
shareholdings,	consulting	fees,	or	intellectual	property	interests),	or	other,	non-
financial	 interests	 (for	 example,	 prestige	 and	 career	 advancement),	may	 also	
present	 researchers	with	 secondary	 interests	 that	 conflict	with	 their	 primary	
ones	 (Hurst	 and	 Mauron,	 Johnston	 2010,	 Resnik	 2000).	 	 Literature	 in	 the	





a	 topic	 of	 concern.	 	 Journals	 have	 responded	 by	 developing	 policies	 which	
attempt	to	manage	COIs.		A	series	of	high	profile	lawsuits	against	pharmaceutical	





et	 al.,	 2013,	 Vedula	 et	 al.,	 2012,	 Fugh-Berman,	 2010,	 Krumholz	 et	 al.,	 2011,	
Jureidini	 et	 al.,	 2008,	 Steinman	 et	 al.,	 2006).	 	 This	 can	 be	 done,	 for	 example,	
through	multiple	publication	of	positive	results	(Lexchin	et	al.,	2003,	Melander	
et	 al.,	 2003,	 Johansen	 and	 Gøtzsche,	 1999)	 or	 suppressing	 the	 publication	 of	
negative	studies	(Lexchin	et	al.,	2003,	Schott	et	al.,	2010,	Ross	et	al.,	2009).		This	
is	referred	to	as	‘publication	bias’	(Dickersin,	1990,	Ross	et	al.,	2012).	 	Tobaco	
industry	 documents,	 also	 released	 in	 litigation	 (UCSF	 Library	 and	 Center	 for	














conceptualise	 COIs	 (who	might	 have	 conflicts	 that	 require	management,	 and	
what	types	of	 interest	or	relationship	can	pose	a	conflict),	 the	impact	of	these	




ii. What	 are	 the	 implications	 of	 this	 conceptualisation	 on	 the	 effective	
management	of	COIs?	
iii. What	 alternative	 or	 additional	 systems	 could	 be	 employed	 to	 further	
manage	COIs,	and	what	appear	to	be	the	barriers	to	their	implementation?	
By	 exploring	 the	 very	 conceptualisation	 of	 COI	 within	 the	 medical	 journal	














2.2	 for	 more	 on	 the	 definition	 of	 COIs).	 	 This	 means	 that	 the	 evidence	 they	
present,	upon	which	public	health	decisions	may	be	made,	is	potentially	biased	
and	possibly	incorrect.		For	example,	research	sponsored	by	Roche,	which	was	





and	psychiatric	 events	 in	 adults,	 and	vomiting	 in	 children,	 and	 that	 it	 had	no	
protective	 effect	 on	 mortality	 on	 patients	 with	 2009A/H1N1	 influenza	
(Heneghan	 et	 al.,	 2016).	 	 Yet	 Tamiflu	 had	 already	 earnt	 Roche	 over	
US$18bn/£11bn	in	sales	for	the	company	since	1999,	with	the	U.K.	government	
stockpiling	65	million	 treatments	 for	a	cost	of	US$1.3bn	(Abbasi,	2014).	 	This	
example	therefore	demonstrates	how	COIs	can	result	in	inaccurate	research	and	





(Lo	 and	 Field,	 2009).	 	 A	 loss	 of	 trust	 in	 medical	 research	 and	 publishing	 is	
extremely	 problematic	 (and	 even	 dangerous)	 as	 it	 will	 leave	 policy-makers,	
prescribers	and	the	public	uncertain	with	regards	to	making	medical	decisions.		
An	example	of	a	loss	in	trust	is	 in	the	case	of	Andrew	Wakefield	and	his	1998	
article	 in	The	 Lancet	 (2014),	 which	 contended	 that	 the	Measles,	 Mumps	 and	
Rubella	(MMR)	vaccination	was	linked	to	autism.		It	transpired	that	Wakefield	
had,	in	fact,	undisclosed	COIs,	with	his	research	being	funded	by	personal-injury	




research;	 this	has	 led	 to,	 for	example,	outbreaks	of	measles	amongst	 children	




in	 those	 involved	 in	 medical	 research,	 and	 for	 the	 latter	 to	 themselves	 be	
deserving	of	 that	 trust	 (Brody,	2007).	 	Lo	et	al.	argue	that	 the	purpose	of	COI	
policies	 is	 ‘maintaining	 the	 integrity	 of	 professional	 judgment	 and	 sustaining	
public	 confidence	 in	 that	 judgment’	 (2009,	 p.	 49).	 	 As	 discussed	 above,	 COIs	
threaten	 the	 integrity	 of	 medical	 research	 and	 its	 representation	 in	 peer	
reviewed	 journals,	 and	 thus	 reduce	 trust	 in	 the	 enterprise	 as	 a	 whole.	 	 It	 is	
therefore	 crucial	 to	 have	 effective	 policies	 and	 processes	 in	 place	 to	manage	
potential	or	real	COIs,	to	both	prevent	(or	at	least	limit)	the	likelihood	of	their	







the	 theoretical	 literature	 on	 COIs	 and	 their	 management	 that	 has	 developed	
within	social	science	disciplines,	such	as	psychology,	business,	law	and	sociology,	
as	 well	 as	 articles	 written	 on	 COIs	 and	 their	 regulation	 in	 the	 area	 of	
medical/health	research	and	journal	publishing.		It	also	provides	a	summary	of	

















this	 research,	 with	 reflections	 on	 this	 process.	 	 A	 description	 is	 given	 of	 the	
research	 strategy,	with	 the	 epistemological	 stance	 of	 critical	 realism	outlined	
and	an	explanation	given	as	to	why	it	is	particularly	applicable	to	the	primary	




journal	 publishing.	 	 The	 sampling	method	 and	 analytical	 approach	 (thematic	




examines	 how	 actors	within	 the	 institutional	 environment	 of	medical	 journal	
publishing	conceptualise	COIs:	which	actors	are	understood	to	potentially	have	
conflicts	 that	could	affect	 the	content	of	medical	 journals	and	as	such	require	
management,	 and	what	 types	 of	 interest	 are	 considered	 to	potentially	 pose	 a	



























PhD,	 the	 following	 chapter	outlines	 the	 literature	of	 relevance	 to	 this	project.		
Databases	from	both	the	social	sciences	and	medical	fields	were	searched:	Web	
of	 Science,	 PubMed	 Central,	 Biomed	 Central,	 Medline,	 Science	 Direct,	 IBSS,	
JSTOR,	USE	and	SCOPUS.		Searches	were	carried	out	on	combinations	of	terms	
central	 to	 the	 topic.	 	Reference-mining	was	also	undertaken,	whereby	 further	













COIs	 in	 medical	 research,	 their	 impact	 on	 the	 peer	 reviewed	medical/health	






have	 emerged	 in	 attempting	 to	 define	 COIs	 and	 concerns	 regarding	 resulting	
bias,	 and	 considers	 why	 they	 are	 deemed	 problematic.	 	While	 there	 is	 some	








potential	biases	 that	 could	 impact	on	medical/health	 journals,	 and	how	 these	
conflicts	might	arise.		The	focus	is	on	researchers/authors,	and	several	examples	
of	 authors	 with	 undisclosed	 ties	 to	 industry	 are	 given,	 highlighting	 the	
problematic	 nature	 of	 such	 relationships.	 	 To	 a	 slightly	 lesser	 extent,	 the	
potential	 conflicts	 of	 journal	 editors	 and	 owners	 are	 also	 looked	 at	 in	 the	
literature,	and	this	section	discusses	several	cases	involving	the	firing	of	editors	
from	their	positions	at	high	profile	journals	as	a	result	of	conflicts	that	arose	with	
their	 journal	 owners;	 these	 illustrate	 the	 difficult	 positions	 editors	 can	 find	






publication	 decisions	 can	 be	 affected	 by	 the	 COIs	 involved	 in	medical/health	
journal	publishing.		The	focus	of	the	literature	on	this	topic	is	on	the	engagement	








Industry	 documents	 released	 during	 litigation,	 involving	 both	 the	
pharmaceutical	 and	 tobacco	 industries	 and	 medical/health	 journals,	 have	
offered	 insights	 into	 how	 these	 industries	 have	 engaged	 in	 the	 practices	
described	 in	 this	 chapter,	 and	 Section	 2.4	 looks	 at	 studies	 that	 have	 been	
conducted	on	such	cases.	 	The	practices	described	here	are:	 the	use	of	ghost-





as	 it	 is	 in	 these	 fields	 that	 studies	 on	 these	 practices	 have	 been	 principally	
conducted.		This	section	examines	debates	on	the	effectiveness	of	such	practices:	
their	 strengths	 and	 weaknesses.	 	 The	 discussion	 of	 disclosure	 continues	 in	
Section	 2.5.2	 by	 relating	 it	 specifically	 to	 medical	 journals,	 and	 provides	 an	
overview	of	the	studies	that	have	been	conducted	to	date	on	COIs	and	disclosure	
policies	 in	 such	 journals.	 	 These	 all	 employ	 different	 methods	 and	 selection	





apparent	 that	 it	 is	 a	 relatively	 recent	 concept:	 in	 his	 brief	 overview	 of	 the	
emergence	of	the	term,	Luebke	(1987)	found	no	use	of	it	at	all	before	the	1930s	
and	no	use	of	 it	 in	a	court	case	before	1949,	when	 it	was	used	 in	a	case	on	a	
complex	bankruptcy	reorganization	of	one	of	 the	world’s	most	valuable	office	








studies	 and	 sociology,	 over	 the	nature	 of	 COIs,	 their	 influence	 on	professions	











However,	 there	 is	a	 lack	of	agreement	amongst	COI	scholars,	 including	
those	 within	 the	 field	 of	 medical	 research	 over	 what	 constitutes	 a	 relevant	
‘interest’	 that	 requires	 management.	 	 Luebke	 (1987,	 1993),	 who	 considers	
‘interests’	to	be	situational	–	that	is,	they	can	be	objectively	determined		–	refers	
only	to	‘material	interests’	(i.e.	financial)	as	having	the	potential	to	conflict	with	
professional	 ones.	 	 According	 to	 him,	 broadening	 the	 understanding	 of	 what	
constitutes	 an	 ‘interest’	 weakens	 the	 application	 of	 this	 term,	 and	 the	 focus	






Davis	 (1982,	 1993)	 and	 Friedman	 (1992)	 agree,	 arguing	 that	 ‘interests’	
encompass	all	those	influences	that	can	affect	one’s	judgement;	focusing	only	on	












journals.	 	 	 The	 following	 section	 looks	 at	 the	 literature	 to	 explore	 who	 is	
perceived	to	have	COIs,	and	how	these	are	understood	to	potentially	impact	on	
those	publications.		As	this	section	shows,	the	focus	in	the	literature	is	primarily	




Scientists	 conducting	 research	 and	 writing	 medical	 articles	 –	 both	 those	
employed	by	 industry	and	 those	working	 in	academia	–	may	have	COIs	 (both	













have	 demonstrated	 that	 COIs	 arising	 from	 financial	 ties	 have	 an	 influence	 on	
biomedical	research,	affecting	the	conclusions	of	articles	(Smith,	1998,	Barnes	
and	Bero,	 1996,	 Gross	 et	 al.,	 2003).	 	 There	 is	 evidence	 that	 researchers	with	
financial	links	to	the	tobacco	and	pharmaceutical	industries	are	more	likely	to	
either	 downplay	 the	 risks	 or	 overstate	 the	 benefits	 of	 products	 in	 the	






In	 the	 U.S.,	 between	 2004	 and	 2010,	 Senator	 Grassley	 conducted	 a	
number	of	Congressional	investigations	into	undisclosed	relationships	between	
academic	 researchers	and	physicians,	and	pharmaceutical	and	medical	device	
companies;	 this	 paved	 the	 way	 for	 the	 Physician	 Payments	 Sunshine	 Act,	
requiring	that	drug	and	device	manufacturers	disclose	payments	over	US$100	
made	 annually	 to	 physicians	 and	 teaching	 hospitals	 (Chimonas	 et	 al.,	 2012).		
Amongst	 the	 cases	 uncovered	 by	 Senator	 Grassley’s	 was	 that	 of	 Charles	
Nemeroff.		In	2002,	Nemeroff	published	a	review	paper	in	Nature	Neuroscience	
arguing:	 1)	 for	 the	 use	 of	 a	 transdermal	 patch	 for	 the	 delivery	 of	 lithium	 for	
patients	with	depression;	2)	 that	 the	emerging	aspects	of	 the	neuroscience	of	
mood	 disorders	 suggested	 that	 mifepristone	 might	 be	 a	 useful	 treatment	 of	
psychotic	 depression;	 and	 3)	 that	 milnacipran	 might	 be	 helpful	 to	 treat	
fibromyalgia.2		He	failed	to	disclose	on	this	paper	that	he	held	a	patent	on	such	a	
transdermal	patch,	 that	 he	was	 a	member	of	 the	 Scientific	Advisory	Board	of	
Corcept	Therapeutics	who	were	conducting	trials	on	mifepristone,	or	that	he	was	
Director	and	Chairman	of	the	Psychopharmacology	Advisory	Board	of	Cypress	
















have	 a	 profitable	 journal),	 and	 there	 is	 therefore	 an	 incentive	 for	 them	 to	
produce	 reprints	 and	 supplements	 (see	 section	 2.4.3)	 as	 they	 are	 large	 and	
valuable	sources	of	income	for	them	(Marcovitch,	2010,	Lexchin	and	Light,	2006,	
Lundh	et	al.,	2010,	Elliott	and	Landa,	2010,	Smith,	2006).		Journal	supplements	
are	 collections	 of	 articles	 discussing	 a	 particular	 topic,	 and	 are	 published	 as	




grant’,	 a	 supplement	 entitled	 ‘Advancing	 the	 Treatment	 of	Mood	 and	Anxiety	
Disorders:	 The	 First	 10	 Years’	 Experience	 with	 Paroxetine’	 in	 the	 journal	
Psychopharmacology	Bulletin	(edited	by	Charles	Nemeroff).		The	papers	in	this	
supplement	featured	Key	Opinion	Leaders	(KOLs)	in	psychiatry	–	those	who	are	
considered	 influential	 leaders	 in	 their	 field.	 	 There	 is	 no	 statement	 declaring	






shows	 that	 the	 scientific	quality	of	 the	 former	 is	 lower	with,	 for	example,	 the	
	 22	
methodological	 sections	 of	 randomised	 controlled	 trials	 in	 such	 publications	
being	of	 inferior	quality	to	those	published	in	the	latter	(Rochon	et	al.,	1994a,	
Cho	 and	 Bero,	 1996).	 	 Supplements	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 favour	 the	 sponsor’s	
product	and	contain	promotional	content,	and	industry	funding	is	also	less	likely	
to	be	acknowledged	(Bero	et	al.,	1992,	Lexchin	et	al.,	2003,	Rochon	et	al.,	1994a,	












so	 profitable	 (2003),	 so	 they	 will	 be	 unlikely	 to	 adopt	 such	 a	 policy.	 	 Some	
journals,	 such	 as	The	 Lancet	 have	 decided	 that	 to	 publish	 supplements	 at	 all	






and	 distributed	 freely	 to	 prescribers	 in	 the	 form	 of	 ‘reprints’	 (Smith,	 2005).		
While	many	 individuals	 and	 organisations	may	 request	 reprints,	 high	 reprint	
orders	 are	 associated	with	 articles	 of	 research	 funded	 by	 the	 pharmaceutical	









as	 journals	are	often	reluctant	 to	release	 this	 information	(Marcovitch,	2010).		
They	 have	 also	 been	 shown	 to	 boost	 citations,	 thus	 improving	 a	 journal’s	 IF	
(Lundh	 et	 al.,	 2010).	 	 Reliance	 on	 reprints	may	 thus	 constitute	 a	 COI	 for	 the	
journals	 involved,	 which	may	 be	 more	 willing	 to	 accept	 articles	 of	 industry-
















journal,	 and	 four	 of	 them	 raised	 almost	 as	 much	 revenue	 from	 drug	
advertisements	as	they	did	from	membership	fees	and	other	assessments.		This	
heavy	 reliance	on	 advertising	means	 that	 journal	 owners	 and	editors	may	be	
reluctant	to	publish	articles	that	are	critical	of	the	products	produced	by	those	
companies	 buying	 advertising	 space.	 	 For	 example,	 in	 2004,	 Dialysis	 and	




There	 have	 been	 several	 instances,	 at	 high	 profile	 journals,	 of	 editors	
being	fired	by	the	journal	owners	because	of	conflicts	between	the	two	parties’	
interests.		In	1992,	a	paper	published	in	Annals	of	Internal	Medicine	by	Michael	
Wilkes,	 with	 an	 accompanying	 editorial	 by	 the	 journal	 editors,	 critically	
examined	the	scientific	accuracy	of	drug	advertisements	in	10	leading	medical	
journals.	The	journal	subsequently	lost	$1.5	million	in	advertising	revenue.		This	
led	 to	 tension	 between	 the	 editors,	 Robert	 and	 Suzanne	 Fletcher,	 and	 the	
journal’s	 publisher,	 the	 American	 College	 of	 Physicians,	 and	 ultimately	 the	
Fletchers’	resignation	in	1993	(Tsai,	2003,	Weerasinghe,	2009,	Willinsky	et	al.,	
2007,	Lexchin	and	Light,	2006).		In	1999,	the	editor	for	17	years	of	JAMA,	George	
Lundberg,	was	 fired;	 this	 coincided	with	his	publication	of	an	article	on	what	
constitutes	 sex	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 President	 Clinton’s	 impeachment	 trial	
(Hopkins,	1999,	Willinsky	et	al.,	2007).		The	journal’s	publishers,	the	American	
Medical	Association	(AMA),	said	it	was	because	he	had	lost	their	confidence	and	





as	 editor	 in	 chief	 from	 the	NEJM	 by	 the	 journal’s	 owners,	 allegedly	 after	 he	
refused	 to	 exploit	 the	 journal’s	 name	 and	 logo	 for	 spin-off,	 commercially-
lucrative	publications	(Mitka,	1999,	Tsai,	2003);	while	this	was	not	an	issue	of	



















have	 on	 editorial	 independence.	 	 In	 2016,	 the	 CMA	 fired	 its	 new	 editor,	 John	
Fletcher,	 while	 simultaneously	 disbanding	 the	 organisation’s	 instrument	 that	
supposedly	protected	editorial	independence,	its	Journal	Oversight	Committee	
(JOC)	(see	Chapter	Seven,	Section	7.2.3	for	more	on	this).	 	The	reasons	for	the	





































Reviewers	 of	 articles	 also	 potentially	 have	 COIs	 that	 could	 affect	 their	
commentaries.		As	with	other	actors,	these	can	be	financial	(such	as	shares	in	a	
company	 whose	 drug	 is	 under	 discussion),	 or	 other	 (such	 as	 academic	
competition	 or	 personal	 friendships	with	 the	 authors	 of	 the	 article,	 religious	










clinical	 research.	 	 Significant	 numbers	 of	 respondents	 to	 their	 study	based	 in	
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units	with	industry	support	noted	compromises	to:	research	initiatives	(35%),	
publication	 (28%),	 interpretation	 of	 data	 (25%),	 and	 overall	 scientific	
advancement	 (20%).	 	While	 this	 thesis	 focuses	 upon	 COIs	 in	medical	 journal	
publications,	 those	publications	depend	upon	 the	work	 that	 they	contain,	and	
therefore	the	way	in	which	conflicts	can	bias	the	research	studies	must	also	be	
considered	 (Bero	and	Rennie,	 1996).	 	The	 following	 section	 thus	 looks	 at	 the	





research,	 conducted	 by	 conflicted	 parties,	 can	 impact	 on	 the	 literature,	 for	
example	 through	 the	 clinical	 relevance	 of	 the	 research	 questions	 and	 the	





as	 discussed	 above,	 this	 is	 not	 always	 the	 case,	with	 factors	 such	 as	 industry	
funding	leading	to	inappropriate	research	practices.		There	are	various	ways	in	
which	study	designs	can	be	adjusted	to	achieve	desired	results.	 	For	example,	
asking	 research	 questions	 that	 are	 too	 narrow	 may	 provide	 incomplete	 and	
misleading	information,	and	thus	not	adequately	inform	a	prescriber	which	drug	
to	offer	their	patient	(Bero	and	Rennie,	1996).		While	it	is	not	only	researchers	
sponsored	 by	 industry	 who	 may	 allow	 bias	 to	 frame	 their	 studies,	 several	
systematic	reviews	and	other	studies	have	provided	substantial	evidence	that	
clinical	 trials	with	 ties	 to	 the	pharmaceutical	 industry	are	more	 likely	 to	have	
results	 that	 favour	 their	 sponsor	 than	 those	without	 such	 ties	 (Lo	 and	 Field,	
2009,	Yank	et	al.,	2007).		The	pharmaceutical	industry	is	not	alone	in	engaging	in	







insignificant	 results	 as	 clinically	 important;	 and	 switching	 primary	 and	
secondary	endpoints	around	(Boutron	et	al.,	2010).		Methodologies	can	also	be	
adjusted	to	benefit	the	drug	sponsor	in	various	ways.	 	Using	unrepresentative	
study	 patients	 is	 one,	whereby	 drugs	 are	 tested	 in	 healthier	 populations	 (for	




1998,	 Bodenheimer,	 2000).	 	 Rochon	 et	 al.	 (1994b)	 found	 that,	 in	 trials	 for	
nonsteroidal	anti-inflammatory	(NSAIDs)	drugs,	only	2.1	per	cent	of	the	subjects	
were	65	years	or	older,	despite	 the	 fact	 that	 these	drugs	are	more	commonly	
used,	and	have	more	side	effects,	in	elderly	populations.		They	also	found	that	in	
48.2	per	cent	of	the	trials,	a	higher	dose	of	manufacturer-associated	drug	was	
found	to	be	given	 than	 that	of	 the	comparison	drug.	 	Not	 truly	blinding	study	
subjects	 and	 researchers	 to	 treatment	 allows	 bias	 towards	 the	 therapy	 being	
tested:	in	a	study	on	NSAID	trials,	Gøtzsche	(1989a)	found	that	eight	per	cent	of	
trials	that	claimed	to	be	double-blind	were	probably	not	truly	so,	while	Colditz	










the	 COIs	 of	 those	 actors	 involved	 in	 medical	 publishing.	 	 There	 are	 various	
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practices	that	constitute	publication	bias;	for	more	detail	see:	Begg	and	Berlin	
(1988),	 Bero	 and	 Rennie	 (1996),	 Edmond	 (2008),	 Martinson	 et	 al.	 (2005),	
Melander	et	al.	(2003),	Roberts	(2009),	Smith	(2005).		These	practices	are	seen	
by	 some	 as	 having	 the	 potential	 to	 distort	 the	 literature	 (Ross	 et	 al.,	 2012):	
through	multiple	publication	of	positive	studies,	and	the	concealment	of	negative	
ones,	 any	 further	 systematic	 reviews	 or	meta-analyses	will	 be	 skewed.	 	 This	
could	ultimately	have	a	detrimental	effect	on	decisions	made	by	policy-makers	
and	 doctors,	 could	 be	 costly	 for	 health	 services	 and	 could	 potentially	 harm	
patients	(Turner	et	al.,	2008).		
	
Practices	 associated	 with	 publication	 bias	 include	 the	 suppression	 of	
negative	 results.	 	 A	 systematic	 review	 by	 Lexchin	 et	 al.	 (2003)	 found	 that	
pharmaceutical	industry-sponsored	research	is	less	likely	to	be	published	than	
studies	funded	by	other	sources,	indicating	the	suppression	of	negative	studies;	
stipulations	 in	 some	 contracts	 with	 researchers	 allow	 pharmaceutical	
companies	to	refuse	to	have	results	published	(Schott	et	al.,	2010).		For	example,	




of	clinical	 trials	managed	by	 the	National	Library	of	Medicine	 in	 the	U.S.)	had	




Another	 practice	 associated	 with	 publication	 bias	 is	 that	 of	 multiple	
publication	(publishing	the	same	study	in	more	than	one	article).		Lexchin	et	al.	
(2003)	found	that	studies	sponsored	by	commercial	companies	were	more	likely	
to	 have	 positive	 results	 favouring	 them	 than	 companies	 with	 other	 types	 of	
funders:	Rochon	et	al.’s	review	of	61	published	industry-sponsored	randomised	












Practices	 relating	 to	 publication	 bias	 have	 been	 linked	 particularly	 to	








other	motivations	were	 at	 play	 that	 were	 not	 related	 to	 commercial	 funding	
(Horta	et	al.,	2007).		Stell	(2010)	alleged	that	the	authors	of	a	study	examining	
treatment	for	mild	gestational	diabetes	during	pregnancy	(Landon		et	al.,	2009)	







of	 research.	 	 Gieyrn	 has	 discussed	 how	 other	 intellectual	 activities,	 such	 as	
political	 ideologies,	 can	 conflict	with	 the	 scientific	 process	 (1983).	 	 Academic	
scientists	also	 face	professional	pressures	 to	get	papers	published	 in	 journals	
























made	 a	 substantial	 contribution	 to	 the	 research	 or	 writing	 of	 a	 manuscript’	
(2008,	 p.	 1800).	 	 Evidence	 shows	 that	 both	 the	 pharmaceutical	 and	 tobacco	
industries	have	employed	undisclosed	professional	writers	to	develop	articles	
(e.g.	Ross	et	al.,	2008,	Grassley,	2010,	McHenry	and	Jureidini,	2008,	Landman	and	
Glantz,	 2009,	 Grüning	 et	 al.,	 2006,	Muggli	 et	 al.,	 2003,	 Hong	 and	 Bero,	 2002,	
Rampton	and	Stauber,	2002).		Such	articles	are	often	‘authored’	by	‘Key	Opinion	







(Moffatt	 and	 Elliott,	 2007)	 typically	 receive	 payment	 (Anekwe,	 2009).	 	 Their	
involvement	gives	the	research	the	appearance	of	credibility	and	objectivity,	yet	
the	literature	published	under	their	names	strengthens	the	industry’s	position	
and	 may	 undermine	 opposing	 research	 (Liesegang,	 2008,	 Matheson,	 2008,	




being	described	above.	 	 Less	 extreme,	but	 still	 problematic,	 examples	 include	
allowing	a	study’s	commercial	sponsor	to	collect	and	hold	the	trial	data;	solely	
using	a	sponsor’s	statistician;	and	permitting	a	sponsor	to	draft	a	manuscript	or	
control	 its	 content	 and	 conclusions	 (Moffatt	 and	 Elliott,	 2007).	 	 The	 use	 of	
company	statisticians	to	perform	analyses	has	been	included	in	studies	on	ghost	










that	 it	 is	 restricted	 to	 the	 documents	 that	 have	 been	made	 available	 in	 these	
lawsuits	(Davis,	2008).		However,	they	do	offer	some	insights	into	the	practices	





There	 have	 been	 concerns	 over	 the	 practice	 of	 ghost-writing	 in	
medical/health	 journal	 publishing	 since	 the	 1990s,	 before	 the	 release	 of	 the	
industry	documents.		In	1998,	Flanagin	et	al.	conducted	the	first	study	into	the	
practice,	attempting	to	establish	its	prevalence	across	the	board.	 	The	authors	
used	 three	 high-circulation	 journals	 with	 the	 highest	 IF	 (Annals	 of	 Internal	
Medicine,	JAMA,	and	the	New	England	Journal	of	Medicine),	together	with	three	
low-circulation	 journals	 which	 had	 been	 known	 to	 publish	 supplements	
(American	 Journal	 of	 Cardiology,	American	 Journal	 of	 Medicine,	 and	American	
Journal	 of	 Obstetrics	 and	 Gynecology).	 	 They	 found	 that	 out	 of	 809	 articles	
surveyed	 (original	 research	 reports,	 review	 articles	 and	 editorials),	 156	 had	
evidence	of	guest	authors;	93	demonstrated	evidence	of	the	involvement	of	ghost	
authors;	and	13	articles	had	evidence	of	both.	 	They	did	not	 find	a	significant	
difference	 on	 the	 use	 of	 guest	 authors	 between	 the	 high-	 and	 low-circulation	
journals;	in	terms	of	ghost	authors,	the	low-circulation	ones	were	more	likely	to	
use	 ghost	 authors	 for	 review	 articles	 and	 less	 for	 research	 ones.	 	 However,	
because	of	 the	relatively	 low	response	rate,	as	well	as	 the	dependence	on	 the	




companies,	 further	 detailed	 investigations	 into	 the	 practices	 of	 such	
organisations	 have	 since	 been	 undertaken,	 using	 the	 company	 documents	
released	 in	 the	 litigtion	(see	UCSF,	n.d.).	 	 In	particular,	 these	help	 to	 illustrate	
how	ghost	writers	have	been	utilised	in	order	to	produce	articles	for	publication	
in	medical/health	journals	that	portray	drugs	in	a	positive	light,	while	hiding	the	




Amongst	 these,	 several	 highlight	 how	 particular	 journals	 published	
ghost-written	 articles.	 	 Elliott	 (2004)	 examined	 documents	 on	 Wyeth’s	
marketing	 of	 its	 anti-obesity	 drug,	 dexfenfluramine	 (Phen-Fe),	 which	 was	
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a	 medical	 writing	 company,	 Excerpta	 Medica,	 to	 ghost-write	 articles	 which	
portrayed	 the	 drug	 positively	 and	 downplayed	 the	 risks	 of	 side	 effects;	







Industry	 documents	 have	 also	 demonstrated	 the	 ways	 in	 which	
SmithKline	Beecham3	 (SKB)	used	medical	 journal	articles	 to	promote	 its	SSRI	
drug	Paroxetine	(Paxil/Seroxat).	 	The	marketing	of	Paxil	for	unapproved	uses,	
including	 via	 publications	 in	medical	 journals,	 resulted	 in	 the	 company	being	
fined	US$3	billion	in	July	2012	for	research	fraud,	of	which	this	was	a	part.		Public	
relations	 firm	 Ruder	 Finn	 was	 hired	 by	 SKB	 to	 work	 with	 its	 marketing	
department	 in	 response	 to	Eli	Lilly’s	 attempts	 to	discredit	Paxil,	 and	 industry	
documents	portray	how	Ruder	Finn	prepared	papers	for	medical	journals	which	
included	ghost-written	letters	to	The	Journal	of	Clinical	Psychiatry	(Jureidini	et	
al.,	 2008,	 McHenry,	 2005,	 McHenry	 and	 Jureidini,	 2008,	 McHenry,	 2010)	
Documents	show	SKB’s	concerns	over	references	included	in	the	letters,	fearing	



















tobacco	industry.	 	However,	 internal	 industry	documents	do	show	similarities	
between	 it	 and	 the	 pharmaceutical	 industry’s	 use	 of	 publications	 and	 ghost	
writers	 (Rampton	 and	 Stauber,	 2002).	 	 Rather	 than	 using	 medical	 writing	
companies,	law	firms	were	employed	to	liaise	between	the	tobacco	companies	
and	 scientists	 (Drope	 and	 Chapman,	 2001,	 Muggli	 et	 al.,	 2003)	 and	 organise	
publications	(Hong	and	Bero,	2002,	Rampton	and	Stauber,	2002).		Hong	and	Bero	





of	 those	who	qualified	 for	authorship	were	named	on	the	by-line.	 	A	study	by	
Fields	and	Chapman	(2003)	documents	the	ways	in	which	the	tobacco	firm	Philip	










As	 well	 as	 the	 use	 of	 ghost	 writers,	 which	 hides	 the	 involvement	 of	
commercial	 companies	 from	 readers,	 it	 has	 also	 been	 found	 that	 researchers	
who	are	sponsored	by	industry	have,	at	times,	failed	to	acknowledge	on	research	
published	 under	 their	 name	 the	 source	 of	 that	 funding.	 	 This	 thus	 gives	 the	
articles	 the	 deceptive	 appearance	 of	 being	 free	 of	 involvement	 of	 the	
manufactures	 of	 the	 product	 under	 discussion.	 	 For	 example,	 in	 1988,	 Philip	
Morris	hired,	via	 lawfirm	Covington	and	Burling,	 three	scientists	who	already	
worked	 for	 the	 company	 as	 Nordic	 Environmental	 Tobacco	 Smoke	 (ETS)	






the	 report	 from	 the	 laboratory,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 resulting	 paper	 by	 Malmfors,	
Thorburn	and	Westlin.	 	Drafts	of	this	paper	were	circulated	to	senior	industry	
scientists,	and	industry	scientists	and	lawyers	were	involved	in	revising	it.		The	
final	 article,	 published	 in	 Environmental	 Technology	 Letters	 (Malmfors	 et	 al.,	






supported	 the	existing	 standards	on	 the	pesticide	phosphine	 (McDaniel	 et	 al.,	
2005).		Sciences	International	was	headed	by	Elizabeth	Anderson,	who	was	also	
editor	of	the	journal	Risk	Analysis.	 	The	consultancy	took	further	funding	from	
the	coalition	to	 turn	their	research	 into	a	peer-reviewed	 journal	article	which	
was	published	in	Risk	Analysis	(Ibid),	acknowledging	only	that	 ‘This	work	was	
supported	 by	 the	 Phosphine/Metal	 Phosphide	 Coalition,	 consisting	 of	 the	




Companies	have	 also	been	 found	 to	have	 removed	 researchers’	 names	
from	 articles,	 when	 the	 latter	 have	 expressed	 concerns	 over	 the	
misrepresentation	 of	 their	 data.	 	 For	 example,	 the	 principal	 investigator	 of	 a	
study	in	1991/1992	examining	the	effects	of	Environmental	Tobacco	Smoke	was	
E.	 Yano.	 	He	provided	 an	 employee	of	 Covington	 and	Burling,	Dr	Christopher	
Proctor	(later	head	of	British	American	Tobacco’s	Science	and	Regulation),	with	















required	 to	 ensure	 that	 they	 are	 properly	 managed.	 	 This	 thesis	 is	 most	
concerned	with	how	COIs	are	managed	in	peer-reviewed	medical/health	journal	
publications.	 	 The	 strategy	most	 commonly	 used	 in	 a	 range	 of	 fields	 such	 as	
business,	 government,	 media,	 academia	 and	 medicine	 to	 manage	 COIs	 is	
voluntary	disclosure	of	any	potential	conflicts	to	recipients	of	 the	 information	
(Loewenstein	et	al.,	2011,	Cain	et	al.,	2005b).		This	is	also	the	primary	mechanism	
used	 in	medical	 journal	 publishing,	which	will	 be	discussed	 in	more	detail	 in	
Section	2.5.2.	(Resnik,	1998,	Sharpe,	2002).		There	are	strengths	to	this	process,	






Church	 and	 Kuang	 (2009)	 suggest	 that	 disclosure	 is	 appealing	 to	
regulators	as	 it	 is	a	 low-cost	 solution	 that	 requires	no	considerable	change:	a	
2005	 editorial	 by	 the	 then	 editors	 of	 JAMA	 argued	 that	 the	 process	 offers	
transparency	and	arguably	improves	honesty	and	trustworthiness	(Fontanarosa	






















consequences	 that	 can	 arise	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 practice:	 ‘moral	 licensing’	 and	
‘strategic	 exaggeration’.	 	 Having	 dispensed	 of	 their	 ethical	 duty	 by	 disclosing	
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their	COIs,	 the	 ‘moral	 licensing	effect’	sees	people	unconsciously	 feel	 that	 it	 is	
acceptable	for	them	to	act	in	a	more	self-serving	way	than	they	would	have	done	




than	 having	 a	 positive	 influence,	 disclosure	may	 perversely	make	 a	 situation	
worse	(2008).			
	




had	 on	 the	 information	 that	 they	 receive	 (Elliott,	 2008,	 Kassirer,	 2009b).		
Research	on	the	effects	of	disclosure	on	recipients	of	 information	gives	mixed	




fact	 be	 influenced	 by	 information,	 even	when	 it	might	 be	 in	 their	 interest	 to	
ignore	 it:	 this	 is	 known	 as	 the	 ‘curse	 of	 knowledge’.	 	 They	 ‘anchor’	 on	 to	 it	









prevent	 COIs	 leading	 to	 biased	 information	 is	 through	 the	 avoidance	 of	 them	
altogether	(e.g.	Kassirer,	2009b).		Even	with	disclosure,	COIs	(and	any	resulting	
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(ICMJE)	 revised	 its	 Uniform	 Requirements	 for	 Manuscripts	 Submitted	 to	
Biomedical	 Journals	Studies,	 stating	that	authors	should	acknowledge	 financial	
and	material	 support,	 and	disclose	 relationships	 that	may	pose	 a	COI	 (ICMJE,	
1997).		The	following	section	looks	at	11	studies	that	have	been	conducted	on	

















in	 the	 inclusion	 of	 COI	 policies;	Krimsky	 and	Rothenberg	 found	 that	 in	 1997,	





to	 provide	 published	 COI	 policies	 than	 lower	 IF	 ones,	 with	 the	 frequency	 of	
policies	dropping	linearly	with	IF	ranking;	in	2008	Blum	et	al.	found	that	most	




biomedical	 categories	 of	 the	 Journal	 Citation	 Index	 (JCI),	 on	 their	 publicly	
available	 information	 regarding	 COIs	 and	 disclosure,	 Bosch	 et	 al.	 (2013)	 also	
found	that	journals	with	a	higher	IF	(in	the	first	decile	of	the	JCI)	were	more	likely	
to	have	disclosure	policies	on	authors’	financial	and	non-financial,	and	editors’	












that	 64	 per	 cent	 required	 all	 authors	 of	 a	 manuscript	 to	 sign	 a	 statement	
disclosing	any	possible	COIs;	61	per	cent	asked	for	disclosure	of	funding	support;	








to	 inconsistencies	 in	 what	 is	 declared:	 89	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 journals	 had	 COI	
policies;	54	per	cent	required	authors	to	sign	a	COI	statement;	and	77	per	cent	
provided	definitions	of	COIs	(which	were	mostly	limited	to	financial	interests).		
Ancker	 and	 Flanagin	 (2007)	 found	 many	 journal	 policies	 were	 not	 readily	
available	to	submitting	authors,	and	lacked	clear	definitions	or	information	on	








increase	 from	 only	 two	 in	 1995),	 while	 10	were	 vague.	 	 Krimsky	 and	 Sweet	




















had	been	released	 in	 litigation	between	1996	and	2010	to	 identify	physicians	
and	 scientists	 who	 had	 been	 accused	 of	 having	 financial	 relationships	 with	
defendant	manufacturers.		They	then	searched	Medline	for	articles	authored	by	
these	 researchers	 in	 the	 following	 three	 years	 and	 found	 that,	 out	 of	 the	 39	
authors	 identified	 as	 conflicted,	 who	 had	 published	 a	 total	 of	 404	 relevant	
articles,	only	15	per	cent	provided	an	adequate	disclosure	statement,	as	per	the	
ICMJE’s	requirements	for	disclosure.		The	study	does	not	make	it	clear	whether	





100	 disclosed	 support	 from	 industry,	 69	 of	 these	 included	 the	 nature	 of	 the	














articles,	 but	 not	 on	 others	 by	 the	 same	 author.	 	 This	 could	 be	 because	 the	
interests	 which	 conflict	 on	 certain	 studies	 do	 not	 on	 others;	 because	 of	
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inconsistency	in	what	journals	require	to	be	disclosed;	or	because	of	deliberate	



























per	 cent,	 and	 non-financial	 disclosures	 by	 70.2	 per	 cent,	 of	 the	 journals.		
However,	only	38.8	per	cent	of	journals	required	disclosures	from	editors.		In	the	
most	recent	study	included	in	this	section,	Shawwa	et	al.	(2016)	looked	at	the	




at	 least	 one	 form	 of	 non-financial	 COI,	 disclosure	 of	 financial	 COI	 of	 family	






by	providing	 an	overview	of	 the	 existing	 theoretical	 debates	 surrounding	 the	
conceptualisation	of	COIs.		It	then	continued	by	looking,	in	Section	2.3,	in	more	
detail	 at	 how	 the	 literature	 suggests	 that	 COIs	 can	 affect	 medical	 journal	
publications.	 	 While	 they	 may	 have	 some	 positive	 outcomes,	 the	 increase	 in	








necessary,	 and	 various	 studies	 have	 been	 conducted	 on	 the	 COI	 policies	 of	
journals.		In	Section	2.5.2,	these	were	critically	examined.	
	
This	 chapter	 demonstrates	 that,	 while	 there	 is	 in	 general	 agreement	
amongst	scholars	on	what	broadly	constitutes	a	COI,	namely	with	it	being	‘a	set	
of	conditions	in	which	professional	judgment	concerning	a	primary	interest	…	
tends	 to	be	unduly	 influenced	by	a	 secondary	 influence’	 (Thompson,	1993,	p.	
573),	 there	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 lack	 of	 consensus	 regarding	 details	 such	 as	 how	
‘interest’	 should	 be	 defined.	 	 The	 literature	 tends	 to	 focus	 on	 financial	 COIs,	
demonstrating	 how	 these	 are	 considered	 to	 be	 the	 main	 types	 that	 are	 of	
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concern.	 	 The	 studies	 examined	 in	 Section	 2.5.2	 indicate	 that	 there	 is	 overall	
more	 focus	 given	 to	 financial	 interests	 in	 journal	 policies	 and	 guidance.		
However,	as	shown	in	this	chapter,	other,	non-financial	types	of	interests	may	
also	arguably	result	in	conflicts.		Understandings	of	what	can	constitute	COIs	in	
medical/health	 journal	 publishing	 will	 be	 explored	 in	 greater	 depth	 in	 this	
research,	and	the	implications	of	these	examined.	
	








It	 has	 been	 shown	 in	 this	 chapter	 that	 disclosure	 is	 the	main	method	




including	 unintended	 consequences	 such	 as	 ‘moral	 licensing’	 and	 ‘strategic	
exaggeration’	(Cain	et	al.,	2005b),	which	result	in	the	opposite	of	the	intended	
consequences,	demonstrating	that	on	its	own,	it	is	not	a	reliable	solution.		This	is	
born	 out	 in	 Section	 2.5.2,	 which	 examines	 existing	 studies	 that	 have	 been	
conducted	on	disclosure	policies	in	medical	journals.		These	quantitative	studies	
assess	 a	 variety	 of	 aspects	 of	 journal	 disclosure,	 and	 use	 a	 mix	 of	 selection	
criteria,	so	it	is	hard	to	draw	definitive	conclusions	on	what	they	show;	however,	
certain	 themes	 emerge	 from	 which	 inferences	 regarding	 the	 process	 can	 be	
drawn.	 	 	They	show	that,	while	 there	has	been	an	 increase	 in	the	existence	of	
journal	 disclosure	 policies	 over	 the	 time	 period	 in	 which	 the	 studies	 were	
conducted	 (from	 1997	 until	 2016),	 and	 that	 there	 are	 some	 aspects	 of	 them	
which	 are	 helpful	 in	 the	 management	 of	 COIs,	 such	 policies	 are	 far	 from	
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providing	 an	 entirely	 effective	 solution	 to	COIs	 in	medical	 journal	publishing.		
This	 thesis	 will	 explore	 in	 greater	 depth	 this	 reliance	 upon	 disclosure,	 and	
whether	it	can	be	improved.	
	
The	 focus	 of	 the	 studies	 discussed	 in	 Section	 2.5.2	 is	 on	 authors,	with	
limited	 attention	 given	 to	 other	 actor	 groups,	 such	 as	 editors,	 reviewers	 and	
contributors.	 	 Yet,	 as	 shown	 in	 Sections	 2.3.1.2	 and	 2.3.1.3,	 editors,	 journal	
owners	 and	 reviewers	 can	 all	 potentially	 have	 interests	 that	 could	 result	 in	







and	 resulting	 journal	 publications	 with	 a	 problem.	 	 Bias	 can	 affect	 both	 the	
conduct	of	research	and	its	presentation	within	the	journals.		For	the	integrity	of	
the	medical/health	journal	literature	to	be	restored	and	protected,	COIs	need	to	






on	 this,	 taking	 a	 qualitative	 approach	 in	 order	 to	 critically	 examine,	 in	more	
depth,	a	wider	variety	of	publishing	policies	and	guidance	on	COIs,	as	well	as	48	
original	 interviews.	 	 This	 allow	 us	 to	 explore	 and	 develop	 a	 greater	
understanding	 of	 how	 COIs	 are	 conceptualised	 within	 the	 institutional	















industry:	 ‘the	 institutional	 environment’	 (Furusten,	 2013).	 	 This	 kind	 of	
institutional	 environment	 ‘determines	 the	 conditions	 that	 organizations	 and	
their	managers	must	adapt	to	and	manage	in	order	to	be	regarded	as	legitimate	
actors	in	the	type	of	business	they	conduct’	(Furusten,	2013,	p.	6).		In	the	case	of	
this	 research,	 the	 institutional	 environment	 is	 a	 broad	 sector,	 including:	
publishing	 houses,	 professional	 associations,	 medical	 writing	 companies,	
corporate	actors	 interested	 in	medical	research	(in	 this	 thesis,	 the	 focus	 is	on	
companies	 from	 the	 pharmaceutical	 and	 tobacco	 industries,	 given	 concerns	
about	COIs	relating	to	these	sectors	in	particular),	and	the	individuals	working	
within	 each	 of	 these	 sectors	 (such	 as	 editors,	 publishers,	 medical	 writers,	
medical/health	researchers/authors,	and	those	involved	in	publications	within	
the	 pharmaceutical	 companies).	 	 Drawing	 on	 information	 gathered	 through	
analyses	of	business	reports,	industry	news	articles	and	interviews,	this	chapter	
seeks	 to	map	out	 this	 environment.	 	 It	 provides	 a	 critical	 introduction	 to	 the	
organisations	and	businesses	 involved	 in	developing	policies	and	guidance	on	
the	managagement	of	COIs	 in	medical	 journals,	 and	 the	key	 individual	 agents	
working	within	them.		In	doing	so,	it	highlights	how	the	relationships	between	
the	 different	 actor	 groups	 can	 present	 potential	 COIs,	 such	 as	 the	 reliance	 of	










ethics	 (in	 particular,	 on	 COIs)	 that	 have	 been	 developed	 by	 the	 sample	
organisations,	form	part	of	the	data	analysed	in	this	research,	as	do	interviews	
with	 the	 individual	agents.	 	 Section	3.4	offers	an	outline	of	 these	policies	and	

















Medical/health	 journals	 are	 owned	 by	 a	 variety	 of	 organisations,	 such	 as:	
commercial	 publishers,	 commercial	 societies	 and	 associations,	 and	 not-for-






themselves	 publish	 them,	 or	 alternatively	 employ	 commercial	 publishing	
companies	to	manage	the	process.		The	majority	of	journals	are	published	by	a	
few	 large,	 multinational	 publishing	 companies,	 with	 the	 top	 five	 publishers	
producing	almost	35	per	cent	of	journals	(Ware	and	Mabe,	2015).		These	large	














One	of	 the	main	revenue	streams	generated	by	 journals	 is	 institutional	
subscriptions,	 which	 are	 sold	 in	 packages	 to	 library	 consortia;	 due	 to	 non-
disclosure	agreements	signed	by	the	libraries,	the	exact	amount	paid	by	them	for	
these	 is	hard	 to	uncover	 (Van	Noorden,	2013).	 	However,	a	2012	memo	 from	
Harvard	University’s	Library	gave	an	indication:	it	stated	that	they	were	paying	




US$40,000	 (The	 Faculty	 Advisory	 Council,	 2012).	 	 Some	 revenue	 is	 also	









make	30	per	 cent	 of	 the	 research	published	by	Dutch	 researchers	 in	Elsevier	
journals	open	access	by	2018	(Bohannon,	2015).			
	
Other	 sources	 of	 revenue	 for	 medical	 journals	 include	 reprints,	
supplements	 and	 advertisements	 (often	 paid	 for	 by	 companies	 in	 the	
manufacturing	 sector),	 although	 how	 much	 journals	 earn	 from	 such	 specific	
revenue	 sources	 is	 hard	 to	 determine	 as	 they	 do	 not	 routinely	 report	 this	
information	 in	 their	annual	reports	 (Lexchin	and	Light,	2006).	 	Revenue	 from	
manufacturers	can	present	potential	COIs	for	the	journals	(and	their	owners	and	
publishers),	 as	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 Two,	 Section	 2.3.1.2,	 and	 Chapter	 Five,	














Many	public	 sector	 funding	agencies	globally	now	require	 that	 articles	
resulting	 from	 research	 they	 have	 funded	 be	 made	 Open	 Access	 (OA)	 (for	
example,	the	Medical	Research	Council	and	the	Wellcome	Trust	in	the	UK,	and	
the	 National	 Institute	 of	 Health	 in	 the	 US).5	 	 This	 allows	 such	 articles	 to	 be	
accessed	without	payment.	 	The	sharing	of	data	also	arguably	leads	to	greater	
scientific	transparency	and,	it	has	been	argued,	progress	(Parker,	2013).		There	





elapsed;	 and	 Green	 OA	 allows	 authors	 to	 post	 a	 pre-print	 version	 of	 the	
manuscript	on	a	website	or	in	an	institutional	or	subject-area	repository,	which	
can	be	viewed	after	a	certain	period	of	time	has	elapsed	(Hubbard,	n.d.,	Björk,	
2014).	 	Other	OA	 journals	may	be	 funded	 through	advertising	or	sponsorship	
from	 the	 manufacturing	 sector,	 internal	 subsidies	 from	 their	 publisher	 or	





These	 include	 the	 emergence	of	 further	 sources	of	 potential	 COIs	 (Salem	and	
Boumil,	2013):	for	example,	those	journals	that	rely	on	author	fees	may	be	less	
stringent	 in	 their	 requirements	 for	 articles	 they	 publish	 (including	managing	
authors’	potential	COIs)	(Salem	and	Boumil,	2013),	and	there	has	been	a	rise	in	
so-called	 ‘predatory’	 OA	 journals,	 which	 present	 themselves	 as	 legitimate	
journals,	but	 in	reality	have	 low	standards	of	 selection,	providing	 the	authors	












My	 interview	 sample	 included	 representatives	working	 in	 a	 range	 of	 roles	 at	




































after	 the	 day-to-day	management	 of	 the	 journal	 (Smith,	 1997,	Hannan,	 2002,	
Kerr,	 2014).	 	 There	 is	 much	 variation	 in	 the	 specific	 duties	 and	 levels	 of	
responsibility	that	MEs	have,	depending	in	part	on	the	level	of	involvement	of	







Another	 organisational	 actor	 within	 the	 medical	 journal	 publishing	 industry,	
which	 is	 of	 relevance	 to	 this	 research,	 is	 the	 manufacturing	 sector.	 	 This	
comprises	 those	 companies	 that	 are	 involved	 in	 the	 medical	 research	
surrounding	 their	 products.	 	 This	 thesis	 focuses	 on	 the	 pharmaceutical	 and	
tobacco	industries	for	reasons	outlined	in	Chapter	One,	although	other	relevant	








that	 are	 responsible	 for	 overseeing	 the	 publications	 that	 result	 from	 this	
research;	 for	 example,	 GlaxoSmithKline	 has	 a	 department	 of	 Medical	
Communications	Quality	and	Practice,	and	Pfizer	has	a	Publications	Management	
team.		There	is	very	little	information	available	on	the	roles	of	the	staff	on	such	




in	 such	 roles.	 	 The	 tasks	 of	 those	 working	 in	 this	 area	 typically	 involve:	
monitoring	 publication	 programmes;	 managing	 the	 involvement	 of	 external	








many	 medical	 and	 health	 journals,	 through	 purchasing	 reprints	 of	 articles,	
sponsoring	 supplements	 and	 buying	 advertising	 space;	 some	 journals	 are	
financially	dependent	upon	 these	 revenue	streams	 to	 survive,	 and	can	charge	
high	fees	for	them	(Elliott	and	Landa,	2010)	(see	Chapter	Two,	Section	2.3.1.2	for	
more	 on	 this).	 	While	many	 individuals	 and	 organisations	may	 also	 purchase	
reprints	of	articles	(for	example,	to	use	as	an	educational	tool	by	giving	out	copies	
at	 conferences),	 the	 pharmaceutical	 industry	 is	 thought	 to	 be	 the	 main	
purchaser,	using	them	as	marketing	material	(Handel	et	al.,	2012,	Smith,	2006).		
Companies	also	often	fund	journal	supplements	that	have	been	developed	out	of	







pharmaceutical	 industry,	 such	 as	 public	 relations	 and	 advertising,	 regulatory	
affairs	 (for	 example,	 developing	 clinical	 trial	 documents	 and	 new	 drug	
applications),	and	working	on	publications	(including	conference	presentations	
and	journal	articles)	(Moon,	2015,	Adamson	et	al.,	2008).		They	can	therefore	be	
involved	 at	 all	 stages	 of	 a	 drug’s	 development.	 While	 these	 companies	 are	
involved	 in	 the	 medical	 sector	 (working	 for	 the	 pharmaceutical	 and	
biotechnology	 industries),	 the	 tobacco	 industry	 has	 employed	 law	 firms	 in	 a	








CommonHealth	 Worldwide,	 which	 offers	 ‘scientific	 communications	 and	
publications	 services	 (WPP,	 2011a).	 	 Sudler	 &	 Hennessey	 also	 comes	 under	
WPP’s	 Healthcare	 and	 Communications	 group.	 	 One	 of	 the	 world’s	 leading	
healthcare	 communication	 firms	 (WPP,	 2011b),	 subsidiaries	 of	 Sudler	 &	
Hennessey	 include	 IntraMed	 Educational	 Group	 and	 Current	 Medical	
Communications.			
	
Other	 MCCs	 are	 independent	 organisations.	 	 One	 such	 company,	
Complete	Healthcare	Communications,	founded	in	1996,		is	a	‘strategic	medical	
communications	 agency	 that	 specialises	 in	 publication	 planning’	 (Complete	
Healthcare	 Communications,	 2009).	 	 Another	 independent	 MWC,	 	 Scientific	
Therapeutics	Information,	was	established	in	1985	and	is	a	‘full-service	medical	
publishing	group’	and	promises	to	‘develop	meaningful,	motivational	messages	
that	differentiate	your	product	 from	the	rest	of	 the	 industry	…	 if	you	want	 to	
create	something,	you	have	to	be	creative’	(Scientific	Therapeutics	Information	
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Inc.,	 n.d.).	 	 Both	 Complete	 Healthcare	 Communications	 and	 Scientific	








provider	 of	 clinical	 publications,	 scientific	 communications,	 and	 medical	
education’	(Springer	Healthcare,	2010).		Elsevier	used	to	own	Excerpta	Medica	





During	 this	 period,	 Excerpta	Medica	 also	 published	 several	 ‘fake	 journals’	 on	
behalf	 of	 Merck,	 which	 were	 reported	 as	 having	 the	 look	 and	 feel	 of	 peer	









in	 medical	 journal	 publishing	 in	 at	 least	 two	 ways.	 	 Firstly,	 because	 of	 the	





issue	 surrounding	 authorship	 is	 precisely	 the	 opposite	 problem,	 whereby	
individuals	who	have	been	involved	in	the	research	and	write-up	are	not	named	
for	 strategic	 reasons:	 this	 practice	 is	 referred	 to	 as	 ‘ghost	 authorship’,	 and	 is	
discussed	in	Chapter	Two,	Section	2.4.		To	deal	with	these	issues,	the	professional	
publishing	 associations	 (an	 overview	 of	 which	 is	 given	 in	 Section	 3.3)	 have	
attempted	to	clarify	what	needs	to	be	done	to	acquire	authorship	status,	with	the	
International	Committee	of	Medical	Journal	Editors’	(ICMJE)	criteria	appearing	













in	Section	3.2.4),	 for	a	wide	 range	of	publications,	 including	medical	 journals.		
Their	job	is	to	present	the	information	they	are	provided	with	by	researchers	in	
an	appropriate	format	for	its	audience.		Their	role,	however,	often	goes	beyond	
simply	 writing	 the	 articles:	 medical	 writers	 can	 be	 involved	 with	 the	
development	 of	 the	 communication	 strategy	 and	 publication	 plan	 for	 a	 drug,	
which	is	produced	in	tandem	with	its	clinical	development	and	marketing	(Moon,	
2015).	 	 The	 involvement	 of	 medical	 writers	 has	 thus	 been	 contested,	 with	





In	 the	 majority	 of	 publishing	 policies	 and	 guidance	 analysed	 in	 this	
research,	medical	writers	 are	 generally	 considered	 to	 be	 one	 sub-category	 of	
contributors,	 with	 no	 distinction	 made	 between	 the	 different	 types.	 	 The	
commonly	used	authorship	criteria	by	the	ICMJE,	referred	to	in	Section	3.2.5,	are	
quite	stringent	regarding	who	qualifies	as	an	author.		These	state	that	those	who	
are	 involved	 in	medical	 journal	 articles,	 but	 who	 do	 not	meet	 these	 criteria,	
should	be	labelled	‘contributors’.		This	includes	those	involved	with	‘acquisition	
of	 funding;	general	 supervision	of	a	 research	group	or	general	administrative	
support;	 and	 writing	 assistance,	 technical	 editing,	 language	 editing,	 and	
proofreading’	(ICMJE,	2015d,	p.	3).		However,	given	the	prominence	of	the	debate	











produce	 information	 and	 rules	 about	 organisations.	 	 There	 are	 a	 number	 of	
professional	 associations	 that	 represent	 and	 provide	 resources	 for	 those	
working	directly	 in	the	various	sectors	comprising	the	medical/health	 journal	










of	 websites,	 discussions	 in	 interviews	 and	 attendance	 at	 conferences	 and	











There	 are	 several	 professional	 associations	 that	 have	 been	 set	 up	 to	
represent	those	actors	working	on	peer-reviewed	journals.		These	include:	The	
International	Committee	of	Medical	Journal	Editors	(ICMJE),	the	Committee	on	










Founded	 in	 1979,	 the	 ICMJE	 is	 a	 key	 professional	 publishing	 association	 and	
perhaps	the	most	prominent;	its	guidance	on	authorship,	found	in	its	Universal	





Its	 website	 states	 that	 it	 is	 not	 an	 ‘open	 membership’	 organisation	 (ICMJE,	
2015b),	so	while	many	other	medical	journals	(both	general	and	specialist)	have	
signed	up	to	demonstrate	their	adherence	to	the	ICMJE’s	recommendations	(see	
ICMJE,	 2015c	 for	 a	 list	 of	 these	 journals),	 they	 have	 no	 input	 into	 the	
recommendations	 as	 they	 are	 not	 ‘members’,	 and	 the	 organisation	 does	 not	
consult	externally.	 	The	association	occasionally	accepts	new	members	 if	 they	
feel	 such	 additional	 journals	 or	 organisations	 would	 add	 a	 new	 and	 needed	
perspective	 (ICMJE,	 2015b).	 	 However,	 despite	 the	 organisation	 being	 so	
influential	in	the	field,	the	ICMJE’s	website	gives	no	indication	of	how	decisions	
are	made.	 	The	management	of	the	organisation	is	opaque	(for	example,	there	
are	 no	 records	 of	 minutes	 of	 meetings	 on	 its	 website),	 and	 it	 has	 no	 formal	






journals	 (COPE.,	n.d.),	 it	now	serves	 journals	 from	all	disciplines.	 	COPE	has	a	















(primarily	 publishers,	 EICs	 and	MEs),	 its	 quarterly	meetings	provide	 a	 forum	









Board	 of	 Directors	 and	 six	 committees.	 	 Its	 aim	 is	 to	 support	 members	 and	
promote	ethical	scientific	publication.		According	to	one	interviewee	who	sits	on	
one	of	 the	committees,	 it	was	set	up	 to	provide	a	more	egalitarian	and	global	
alternative	to	the	ICMJE;	like	COPE,	it	is	more	democratic,	with	its	officers	elected	
by	its	members.	 	 	 	Its	Executive	Board,	Directors	and	Committee	members	are	
listed	on	 its	website	(WAME,	2016c)	and	are	comprised	of	editors,	publishers	
and	medical	 writers.	 	 Unlike	 COPE,	 however,	 these	 individuals’	 COIs	 are	 not	
declared.		With	more	than	1,915	members	representing	over	1,000	journals	from	
92	countries,	it	is	a	much	larger	organisation	than	the	ICMJE,	with	all	decision-










et	 al.,	 2013,	WAME	Editorial	 Policy	 and	Publication	Ethics	Committees,	 2009,	
WAME	 Editorial	 Policy	 Committee,	 2007,	 WAME	 Editorial	 Policy	 Committee,	









800	 members	 who	 work	 in	 various	 editorial	 capacities	 on	 scientific	
communications.		It	is	comprised	of	a	number	of	committees	(made	up	primarily	
of	 editors	 and	 medical	 writers)	 and	 its	 aim	 is	 to	 provide	 networking	 and	
educational	opportunities	for	career	development	(including	seminars	on	COIs	
held	at	its	annual	meeting),	and	resources	to	assist	in	the	implementation	of	best	
editorial	 practice	 (including	 on	 the	 management	 of	 COIs),	 such	 as	 its	 White	
Paper,	 developed	 by	 its	 Editorial	 Policy	 Committee	 (CSE	 Editorial	 Policy	
Committee,	2012).		Its	members	elect	the	board	of	directors9	who	are	also	a	mix	






There	 are	 also	 professional	 associations	 that	 have	 been	 set	 up	 to	 represent	
medical	writers.		The	most	established	and	prominent	of	these	are	the	European	






in	 1989,	 with	 its	 first	 official	 meeting	 in	 1992	 (European	 Medical	 Writers	
Association,	2015a).		It	now	has	more	than	1,000	members	who	work	as	medical	
writers	 in-house	 or	 as	 freelancers	 for	 pharmaceutical	 companies,	 MWCs,	
research	institutes	and	in	the	field	of	scientific	journalism	(Ibid).		Reflecting	the	
global	 nature	 of	 the	 medical	 writing	 trade,	 members	 of	 EMWA	 are	 from	 39	
countries,	 including	 12	 outside	 Europe	 (Ibid).	 	 Its	 stated	 aim	 is	 to	 offer	
professional	development	 to	members	 in	order	 to	promote	high	 standards	 in	







membership	 became	 increasingly	 comprised	 of	 those	 specifically	 pursuing	
careers	 in	 medical	 writing	 (Losi,	 1987).	 	 Similar	 to	 EMWA,	 it	 has	 a	 global	
membership,	 with	 almost	 5,000	 members	 in	 the	 US,	 Canada	 and	 30	 other	
countries.		Like	those	who	belong	to	EMWA,	members	of	AMWA	also	work	for	
pharmaceutical	companies,	universities	and	medical	schools,	hospitals,	not-for-
profit	 organisations,	 government	 agencies	 and	 journals	 (American	 Medical	





The	 International	 Society	 of	 Publication	 Planners	 (ISMPP),	 a	 not-for-profit,	
professional	 member	 association,	 was	 formed	 in	 2005	 and	 now	 has	 a	
membership	 of	 over	 1,400	 individuals,	 consisting	 of	 actors	 involved	 in	 the	
publication	of	medical	research	(ISMPP,	2011).		These	members	come	from	the	
manufacturing	 sector	 (such	 as	 pharmaceutical,	 biotechnology	 and	 device	
companies),	MWCs,	publishers	and	editors	(ISMPP,	2011).		Its	governing	board	
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is	 elected	 and	 consists	 of	 a	 number	 of	 individuals	 from	 the	 pharmaceutical	






the	 pharmaceutical	 industry	 and	 rebuild	 reputations	 after	 high	 profile	 cases	
involving	the	hiding	of	data.	
	




(Ibid).	 	 Given	 that	 ISMPP	 itself	 also	 consists	 of	 these	 same	 pharmaceutical	
companies,	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 two	 associations	 is	 not	 entirely	 clear.		
MPIP’s	 website	 also	 says	 that	 the	 organisation	 aims	 to	 promote	 better	
partnerships	 between	 research	 sponsors	 and	 journals	 in	 order	 to	 improve	
standards	in	medical	publishing	and	increase	access	to	research	results	(Ibid).		
As	such,	it	has	teamed	up	with	editors	from	leading	journals,	for	example	from	










Six	 and	 Seven.	 	 These	 resources	 contribute	 significantly	 to	 the	 very	
	 68	
conceptualisation	 of	 COIs	 within	 the	 institutional	 environment	 of	 medical	








My	 data	 sample	 demonstrates	 that	 publishers	 provide	 varying	 levels	 of	
information	to	their	users	on	publishing	ethics	in	medical	research	and	journal	
publishing,	 including	on	COIs.	 	For	example,	Wiley	has	produced	an	extensive,	






















editors,	 authors	 and	 reviewers,	 while	 other	 journals,	 such	 as	 Clinical	







The	 ICMJE’s	 ‘Uniform	Requirements	 for	Manuscripts	Submitted	 to	Biomedical	
Journals’	 (URM),	 first	produced	 in	1978	as	a	way	of	standardising	manuscript	
format	 and	 preparation	 across	 journals,	 outlines	 the	 organisation’s	 views	 on	
what	 constitutes	 best	 practice	 in	medical	 journal	 publishing,	with	 the	 ethical	
standards	that	should	be	met	in	the	conducting	and	reporting	of	research	and	
other	material	 published	 in	medical	 journals.	 	 The	 latest	 version	 of	 the	 URM	
(renamed	 ‘Recommendations	 for	 the	 Conduct,	 Reporting,	 Editing,	 and	
Publication	of	Scholarly	Work	in	Medical	Journals’),	was	published	in	December	
2015	 (ICMJE,	 2015d).10	 	 It	 contains	 guidance	 on	 a	 range	 of	 ethical	 matters	
relating	 to	 medical	 journal	 publishing,	 including	 authorship/contributorship,	
editorship,	 peer-review,	 COIs,	 clinical	 trial	 registration	 and	 reporting	























even	 if	 they	 are	 not	WAME	members,	which	will	 provide	 a	 free	 consultation.		
Details	of	the	cases	are	anonymised	and	discussed	by	the	committee	members	
via	email;	occasionally	they	are	referred	on	to	COPE	for	additional	consultation.		
These	 cases	 and	 their	 corresponding	 advice	 are	 then	 summarised	 on	 the	
organisation’s	website,	which	the	member	journals	have	access	to.		Therefore,	as	
with	 COPE,	 members	 can	 see	 how	 particular	 issues	 could	 be	 best	 handled.		
WAME	 also	 has	 a	 listserv	 where	 members	 can	 discuss	 issues	 amongst	





(WAME	 Editorial	 Policy	 and	 Publication	 Ethics	 Committees,	 2009).	 	 Other	
policies	 and	 guidance	 cover	 how	 relationships	 between	 editors	 and	 journal	
owners	 should	 be	 handled	 (WAME	 Editorial	 Policy	 Committee,	 2009),	 ghost-









step	 information	 on	 how	 journals	 could	 develop	 or	 revise	 their	 COI	 policies	
(Council	of	Science	Editors,	2005),	based	on	their	analysis	of	procedural,	ethical,	
legal,	and	economic	policies,	 relating	 to	 the	editing,	 review	and	publication	of	
manuscripts	in	books	and	journals.		These	aim	to	bring	clarity	to	the	often	vague	










The	 former	 advises	 medical	 writers	 to	 keep	 up-to-date	 with	 journal	 COI	
requirements;	 the	 latter	 also	 includes	 a	 section	 on	 the	 acknowledgement	 of	
















actors	 interviewed	as	part	of	 this	research.	 	 It	also	outlined	the	main	types	of	
organisations	 involved:	 publishers,	 journals	 and	 manufacturing	 sector	
companies,	 while	 Section	 3.3	 offered	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 professional	
associations	 that	 represent	 them	 with	 regards	 to	 their	 journal	 publishing	
activities.		Section	3.4	then	proceeded	to	discuss	the	policies	and	guidance	these	
actors	 have	 developed	 on	 publication	 ethics,	 in	 particular	 on	 COIs,	 which	








all	 of	 the	 data,	 and	 presenting	 the	 results	 in	 a	 coherent	 fashion.	 	 It	 also,	
significantly,	presents	difficulties	for	the	users	of	such	guidance:	they	are	faced	
with	perhaps	an	overabundance	of	information	and	suggestions	from	different	
organisations,	 which	 is	 not	 always	 consistent,	 and	 there	 are	 no	 overarching,	
definitive	policies.		The	results	and	discussion	chapters	analyse	these	numerous	




















they	offer;	 this	plays	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 informing	 the	guidance	and	policies	
produced	by	the	publishers	and	journals	themselves,	and	the	understandings	of	
critical	 issues	 by	 those	 actors	working	within	 them.	 	 They	 therefore	 play	 an	
important	 role	 in	 the	way	 in	which	 the	 topic	 of	 COIs	 and	 its	management	 is	



























methods	 and	 analytical	 approach	 taken	 to	 answer	 my	 primary	 research	
question:		
To	 what	 extent	 does	 the	 institutional	 environment	 of	 medical	 journal	
publishing	inform	actors’	conceptualisation	and	management	of	conflicts	of	
interest	and	their	consideration	of	alternative	approaches?			
By	 transparently	 detailing	 my	 research	 design	 here,	 and	 offering	 some	
methodological	 reflections,	 it	 is	 hoped	 that	 readers	 will	 be	 able	 to	 better	
understand	the	data	presented	in	the	following	results	and	discussion	chapters.		
The	chapter	begins,	in	Section	4.2,	by	providing	a	brief	background	to	the	funding	
of	 the	PhD.	 	 Section	4.3	 gives	 an	overview	of	 the	process	 of	 ethical	 approval.		
Section	 4.4	 then	 outlines	 the	 epistemological	 philosophy	 that	 guided	 my	
approach:	critical	realism.		This	underpins	my	research	question,	as	well	as	my	





of	 organisations	 across	 the	 institutional	 environment	 of	 medical	 journal	
publishing,	and	transcripts	from	interviews	conducted	with	48	actors	working	













original	 title	 of	 this	 PhD	 was	 ‘Communication	 Ethics	 in	 Medical	 Journal	
Publications’,	and	was	initially	based	in	the	Sociology	department	in	the	Faculty	










my	 research	 questions	 were	 refined,	 I	 decided	 that	 they	 would	 be	 better	
answered	 by	 looking	 at	 the	 management	 of	 COIs	 in	 the	 wider	 institutional	
environment	 of	 medical	 journal	 publishing,	 rather	 than	 focusing	 on	 just	 one	
journal.	 	 My	 research	 was	 therefore	 instead	 primarily	 conducted	 at	 the	
university.		
	
My	 professional	 background	 meant	 that	 I	 had	 a	 dual	 identity	 when	
conducting	 this	 research:	 I	was	 both	 an	 insider	 (as	 someone	who	worked	 in	
medical	 publishing)	 and	 an	 outsider	 (a	 researcher	 looking	 critically	 in	 at	
industry	practices),	and	this	 likely	had	an	 impact	on	my	research	design.	 	For	
example,	 the	 former	meant	that	 I	came	to	my	project	with	an	extremely	well-
developed	understanding	of	the	publishing	industry	–	its	working	practices	and	
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interviewees,	who	it	 is	 likely	 felt	more	comfortable	speaking	to	someone	they	









felt	 overall	 that	 my	 ‘dual	 identity’	 benefitted	 the	 research;	 however,	 it	 also	
undoubtedly	presented	some	challenges.	 	For	example,	 I	was	part	of	 the	very	
‘institutional	environment’	that	I	was	studying,	which	made	it	difficult	to	always	
maintain	 a	 critical	 distance	 from	 the	 research.	 	Also,	my	own	understandings	
were	 likely	 to	 some	 extent	 constrained	 by	 the	 very	 institutionaisation	 I	 was	
exploring.		My	key	finding	–	that	there	is	an	institutionalisation	of	ideas	–	would	








This	 detailed	 how	 I	 would	 comply	 with	 the	 School’s	 ethical	 policies	 and	
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unethical,	 thereby	 potentially	 damaging	 their	 credibility.	 	 However,	 all	
documents	used	were	in	the	public	domain,	and	I	stated	on	the	form	that	care	
would	be	taken	not	to	go	beyond,	them	or	to	overly	personalise,	them,	with	the	
research	 focusing	more	 on	 organisational	 than	 individual	 practices.	 	 Further,	
interviewees	were	offered	the	option	of	anonymity.		I	received	approval	from	the	
Committee	 in	 April	 2013,	 with	 it	 being	 acknowledged	 that	 all	 ethical	 issues	





Bhaskar	 (Bhaskar,	 2008,	 Bhaskar,	 2009),	 emerged	 from	debates	 between	 the	
two	epistemological	poles	of	realism	and	social	constructivism	(see	also	Archer	
et	 al.,	 1998,	 Sayer,	 2000,	 Fairclough	et	 al.,	 2004).	 	 Critical	 realists	 accept	 that	
there	is	a	world	that	exists	independently	of	our	perceptions	and	theories,	with	
existing	 underlying	 structures	 and	mechanisms.	 	 	 Yet,	 unlike	 realist	 thinkers,	
they	believe	that	our	understanding	of	reality	is	inevitably	constructed	from	our	
own	 different	 perspectives	 of	 it;	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 have	 any	 one,	 certain,	
objective	 knowledge	 of	 the	 world:	 ‘Ontology	 must	 be	 distinguished	 from	
epistemology,	and	we	must	avoid	the	‘epistemic	fallacy’	of	confusing	the	nature	
of	reality	with	our	knowledge	of	reality.’	(Fairclough,	2005,	p.	922)		Thus,	while	
critical	 realists	 do	 accept	 the	 existence	of	 a	 ‘real’	world,	 independent	 of	 their	
perceptions,	theories	and	constructions,	they	also	believe	that	it	is	possible	for	
there	 to	 be	 alternative	 valid	 accounts	 and	 interpretations	 of	 phenomena	




are	 in	 general	 invariant	 to	 our	 knowledge	 of	 them;	 they	 are	 real	 things	 and	
structures,	mechanisms	and	processes,	events	and	possibilities	of	the	world;	and	
for	the	most	part	they	are	quite	independent	of	us.’	(Bhaskar,	2008,	p.	22)		The	
transitive	 domain	 includes	 theories	 and	 discourse	 as	 scientific	 resources	
(although	as	part	of	the	social	world,	these	too	can	be	objects	of	study)	(Sayer,	
2000).	 	By	making	 this	distinction,	Bhaskar	 indicates	 that	 the	empirical,	 ‘real’	
world	should	be	differentiated	from	our	experience	of	it;	this	can	be	extended	to	
the	social	world:	there	is	a	real	social	world,	and	there	is	also	the	knowledge	that	
arises	 from	 investigations	 of	 it	 (Law	 and	 Urry,	 2004).	 	 Thus,	 critical	 realism	
allows	 one	 to	 distinguish	 between	 the	 ‘real’,	 ‘natural’	 world,	 which	 exists	
independently	of	our	knowledge	of	 it,	 and	 the	social	one,	which	 is	dependent	
upon	human	knowledge	and	is	socially	constructed.			
	
In	 his	 writings	 on	 science,	 Bhaskar	 (2008)	 describes	 ‘two	 sides	 of	
knowledge’	(p.	21).		In	the	natural	sciences,	he	argues,	there	exist	objective	facts	
(the	 intransitive	 domain).	 	 Yet	 the	 production	 of	 knowledge	 is	 socially	
constructed,	 and	 thus	 those	 facts	 are	 subject	 to	 interpretation	 (the	 transitive	
realm).	 	 Bhaskar’s	 epistemological	 philosophy	 of	 critical	 realism	 informs	 this	
research	 in	 several	ways.	 	 It	 can	help	 to	 explain	how	actors’	 perceptions	 and	
experiences	 can	 affect	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 interpretations	 of	 scientific	
(specifically,	medical/health	 research)	 data	 are	 constructed:	 this	 is	 of	 central	
importance	to	the	topic	underpinning	this	study.		For	example,	it	has	been	shown	
that	medical/health	studies	and	data	can	be	framed	in	journals	in	certain	ways	










In	 line	with	 this	critical	realist	epistemology,	while	 this	 thesis	assumes	
that	 research	 publications	 can	 only	 ever	 be	 representations	 of	 reality,	 it	 also	
assumes	that	particular	approaches	can,	and	do,	get	us	closer	to	that	reality	than	
others.	Accordingly,	this	thesis	uses	the	term	‘bias’	to	mean	situations	in	which	
‘systematic	 error’	 has	 been	 introduced	 into	 the	 research	 and/or	 publication	

















informed	 my	 prior	 understanding	 of	 the	 topic	 and	 underpinned	 my	 initial	
research	 questions.	 	 My	 original	 supervisors	 at	 the	 University	 of	 Strathclyde	
were	influenced	by	theories	of	Neomarxism.		They	introduced	me	to	Herman	and	
Chomsky’s	propaganda	model	(1994);	according	to	this,	those	in	power	use	the	
media	–	 i.e.	 ‘effective	and	powerful	 institutions’	(p.	306)	–	to	manufacture	the	
consent	 of	 society	 through	 the	 use	 of	 propaganda.	 	 This	 way	 of	 thinking	












COIs	 are	 prioritised,	while	 others	 are	 ignored	 or	 blocked	 (e.g.	 Sinclair,	 1986,	
Birkland,	2011).		Ultimately,	however,	I	felt	that	theories	of	institutionalism	and	
deinstitutionalism	(e.g.	 	Mahoney	and	Thelen,	2010,	Scott,	2014,	Peters,	2012,	

































Prior	 (2008)	 writes	 that,	 traditionally,	 social	 researchers	 have	 viewed	
documents	as	static	objects,	which	simply	serve	as	containers	of	evidence	(e.g.	
Scott,	 1990).	 	 He	 argues,	 however,	 that	 they	 are	 not	 merely	 receptacles	 of	
information:	they	are	also	active	agents	and	can	therefore	be	considered	as	data	
in	their	own	right,	rather	than	just	supporting	other	data;	analysis	needs	to	look	
at	 how	 realities	 are	 (re)produced	 through	 text	 (Atkinson	 and	 Coffey,	 2004).		
Discourse	arguably	does	not	simply	reflect	social	reality;	it	also	plays	a	role	in	
actively	constructing	it	(ibid),	and	the	function	of	written	texts	as	active	agents	
in	 this	 process	 should	 be	 considered.	 	 In	 the	 case	 of	 this	 research,	 the	
descriptions	 of	 COIs	 within	 the	 policies	 and	 guidance	 inform	 their	
conceptualisation	 by	 actors	 within	 medical	 journal	 publishing;	 these	
understandings	in	turn	become	recognised	as	being	the	reality.		As	such,	from	a	
critical	realist	perspective,	I	wanted	to	examine	the	various	policies	and	guidance	
that	 the	 organisations	 within	 the	 medical	 journal	 publishing	 industry	 have	




number	 of	 policies	 and	 guidance	 available,	 I	 mainly	 followed	 a	 ‘purposeful’	
	 83	
approach	 in	 my	 document	 sampling	 (Patton,	 1990,	 pp.	 169-86),	 selecting	 a	
manageable	 number	 of	 ‘information-rich’	 cases	 from	 across	 the	 industry.		
Specifically,	I	followed	the	approach	described	by	Patton	(1990)	as	‘typical	case	
sampling’	 (p.	 173).	 	 The	 aim	 of	 this	 sampling	 method	 is	 to	 get	 data	 that	 is	
characteristic	 of	 the	 field	 as	 a	 whole.	 	 I	 sampled	 policies	 from	 the	 various	
different	 types	 of	 organisations	 involved	 in	 the	 medical	 journal	 publishing	
industry:	journals,	publishers,	professional	associations	and	companies	from	the	












high	 impact	 factor	 (IF)	 journals.	 	 A	 number	 of	 the	 editorial	 staff	 on	 these	





were	 consistently	 more	 likely	 to	 have	 published	 COI	 policies,	 and	 that	 this	
dropped	linearly	with	IF	ranking;	this	finding	has	been	supported	by	two	other	
studies:	Blum	et	al.	(2008)	and	Weinfurt	et	al.	(2008)	(for	more	on	these	studies,	









considered	ethically	problematic.	 	To	select	 this	sample,	 I	used	 those	 journals	
that	were	referred	to	in	Section	2.4	of	Chapter	Two.		These	are	referred	to	in	this	




medical	 journal	 publishing.	 	 Tables	 4.1	 and	 4.2	 provide	 lists	 of	 the	 journals	
included	in	the	sample.		I	searched	each	journal’s	website	for	their	COI	policies,	
and	also	tested	their	disclosure	processes	during	submission	to	see	if	any	further	
guidance	 was	 provided	 at	 this	 stage.	 	 Appendix	 I	 lists	 the	 guidance	 on	 COIs	




Table 4.1: Top 10 medicine (general and internal) journals, measured by 














Table 4.2: ‘Contentious cases’ journals (*IF = Impact Factor 2012) 














































































documents	produced	by	 the	 journals.	 	 I	 therefore	also	wanted	to	examine	 the	
sections	on	COIs	 in	 the	guidance	and	policies	of	other	relevant	organisational	
actors,	as	identified	in	Chapter	Three:	publishers	and	professional	associations.		
The	 professional	 associations,	 listed	 in	 Table	 4.3	 (together	 with	 the	





those	 commercial	 publishers	 responsible	 for	 the	 journals	 in	 my	 sample	 (see	
Table	4.4),	and	similarly	thoroughly	searched	their	websites	for	the	information	
they	provide	regarding	COIs.	 	I	did	not	include	society	publishers	(such	as	the	
American	 Medical	 Association,	 which	 publishes	 JAMA)	 as	 their	 journal	




























































Table 4.4: The publishers’ policies/guidance 





































































complete	understanding	of	 the	 field	 (Wolf,	 2004,	Atkinson	 and	Coffey,	 2004).		
Thus,	as	discussed	above,	I	also	conducted	48	semi-structured	interviews	with	
actors	 working	 within	 the	 institutional	 environment	 of	 medical	 journal	
publishing.	 	 While	 it	 has	 become	 a	 popular	 method,	 effective	 qualitative	
interviewing	–	that	produces	informative	answers	–	is	a	difficult	task	(Fontanna	
and	Frey,	1994),	and	although	I	had	previously	conducted	research	interviews	
as	 part	 of	 my	 professional	 work	 in	 the	 publishing	 industry,	 these	 were	 of	 a	







gain	 an	 insight	 into	 the	 subjective	 knowledge	 of	 those	 who	 produced	 the	
documents,	as	well	as	those	who	use	them	to	inform	their	own	understandings	
(Brinkmann,	 2013,	 Kvale,	 2006,	 Kvale,	 1996).	 	 Humans	 are	 conversational	
beings,	 and	 it	 is	 through	 conversations	 that	 we	 primarily	 interact	 with	 one	
another.	 	 As	 such,	 interviews	 –	 which	 are	 essentially	 conversations	 with	 a	
structure	and	purpose	–	have,	 since	 the	1980s,	become	a	key	method	of	data	
collection	used	in	the	social	sciences	(Kvale,	1996,	Kvale,	2006).		They	act	as	a	







of	 the	 field	 than	 an	 analysis	 of	 documents	 alone	 would	 do.	 	 As	 discussed	 in	
Section	4.4,	I	took	a	critical	realist	stance	in	my	approach	to	this	research,	and	
while	I	held	the	position	that	interests	are	real	and	objective,	I	wanted	to	explore	
how	 the	 subjective	 experiences	 of	 those	 working	 within	 the	 medical	 journal	
publishing	industry	affect	their	interpretations	of	those	interests,	and	how	those	
understandings	 subsequently	 come	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 being	 the	 reality.	 	 By	
conducting	 48	 in-depth	 interviews,	 I	 was	 able	 to	 explore	 further	 the	 social	
worlds	of	those	working	within	the	institutional	environment	of	medical	journal	





as	 well	 as	 to	 collect	 basic	 information	 about	 the	 topic	 (Gilbert,	 2008).	 	 I	
conducted	five	pilot	interviews	fairly	early	on	in	the	project:	one	medical	writer12		
(who	 I	met	 at	 an	 industry	 conference)	 and	 four	 ‘medical	 publishing	 critics’13	
(who	have	conducted	research	and	published	articles	on	topics	related	to	this	
thesis).	 	 These	 enabled	me	 to	 gain	 a	 greater	 insight	 into	 the	 field	 and	 issues	
affecting	 it	 than	reading	the	 literature	on	 its	own	would	have	achieved.	 	They	





















with	 the	 documents,	 I	 targeted	 a	 cross-section	 of	 those	 involved	 in	
medical/health	journal	publishing	to	produce	data	that	were	typical	of	the	field.		





the	 professional	 associations	 whose	 guidance	 I	 had	 included.	 	 In	 addition,	 I	
wanted	 to	 speak	 to	 researchers/authors	 who	 had	 experience	 of	 publishing	




pharmaceutical	 and	 tobacco	 companies	 who	 work	 on	 the	
publication/communication	teams,	but	I	received	only	a	limited	response	from	
them.		Finally,	I	held	interviews	with	five	people	who	have	been	involved	broadly	
in	 researching	 the	 field	 of	 publishing	 ethics,	 particularly	 in	 relation	 to	
pharmaceutical-	 and	 tobacco-funded	 research,	 in	 order	 to	 gain	 insights	 from	
their	 expert	 knowledge	 and	perspectives	on	 the	 topic	under	 study	 (these	 are	
termed	 ‘medical	 publishing	 critics’	 in	 this	 thesis).	 	 It	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 a	
number	of	 the	 interviewees	fitted	multiple	role	categories:	 for	example,	many	
editors	were	also	representatives	of	professional	associations,	editors	were	also	







individuals	within	each	that	 I	had	identified	for	 inclusion.	 	These	people	were	
then	emailed	with	a	request	for	an	interview	at	a	mutually	convenient	time	and	











With	 regards	 to	 the	 journals,	 it	 was	 generally	 easier	 to	 get	 interviews	 with	
representatives	 from	 those	 in	 the	 high	 IF	 category	 than	with	 those	 from	 the	




also	 have	 had	 more	 time,	 due	 to	 having	 greater	 resources,	 than	 their	
counterparts	on	smaller	journals:	most	medical	journals,	other	than	those	with	
a	 high	 IF,	 generally	 have	 a	 small	 staff	 with	 part-time	 editors	 who	 juggle	 the	
journal	 alongside	 other	 work	 commitments	 (this	 was	 an	 issue	 that	 came	 up	
frequently	in	interviews).		Representatives	of	the	‘contentious	case’	journals	may	
also	have	been	wary	of	the	research,	due	to	the	fact	that	the	majority	of	them	had	




via	 ‘convenience	 sampling’	 (Bryman,	 2008,	 Patton,	 1990),	 with	 additional	






purposeful	nor	strategic.	 	However,	 I	 felt	 that	 it	was	helpful	as	 it	did	 to	 some	
extent	allow	me	to	make	up	for	the	gap	created	by	the	limited	response	from	the	
‘contentious	 case’	 journals,	 in	 terms	 of	 offering	 me	 further	 insight	 into	 the	














identified	 either	 by	 establishing	 contact	 during	 attendance	 at	 industry	
conferences	(such	as	those	held	by	the	European	Medical	Writers	Association),	
or	 through	 introductions	 from	 mutual	 contacts.	 	 As	 mentioned	 above,	
representatives	of	professional	associations	simultaneously	fulfilled	additional	





I	 experienced	 some	 difficulties	 in	 recruiting	 interviewees	 from	 other	
areas	 of	 the	 medical	 journal	 publishing	 industry,	 such	 as	 participants	 from	
pharmaceutical	 and	 tobacco	 companies	 (those	 involved	 in	 the	 publication	




those	 involved	 in	 publication	 policy	 development).	 	 I	 was	 persistent	 within	
reason	(after	my	initial	email	request,	I	sent	several	weekly	reminder	emails),	




the	 fact	 that	 the	 focus	 of	 my	 research	 is	 perhaps	 a	 sensitive	 area	 for	 these	
organisations,	 could	 have	 contributed	 to	 my	 difficulties.	 	 Indeed,	 one	 of	 the	
publishing	houses	that	I	interviewed	insisted	that	the	Head	of	Global	Corporate	
Relations	 sit	 in	 on	 the	 (telephone)	 interview.	 	 Additionally,	 some	 busy	
individuals	may	simply	not	have	felt	it	worth	their	time	to	speak	to	a	PhD	student.		
The	 project	 might	 also	 have	 benefitted	 from	 more	 interviews	 with	



















































































































and	 interpretations	 (Gilbert,	2008).	 	As	 such,	 they	allow	us	 to	 see	how	actors	
construct	 their	 social	worlds	 through	 the	 language	 they	use.	 	Semi-structured	
interviews,	 however,	 provide	 the	 interviewer	with	 greater	 control	 than	 those	
that	are	completely	open-ended:	the	interviewer	can	use	an	interview	guide	to	
orient	themselves,	but	has	freedom	of	movement	in	allowing	the	interviewee	to	
cover	 topics	 in	 a	 more	 natural	 fashion	 as	 the	 conversation	 develops,	 and	 in	
probing	particular	areas	of	interest	(Hopf,	2004).		It	also	provides	interviewees	
with	greater	opportunity	to	expand	and	elaborate	than	a	structured	interview	
would	 (Aldridge,	 1995).	 	 I	 developed	 an	 interview	 schedule	 based	 on	 my	







were	asked,	and	I	was	able	to	delve	 into	 interesting	responses	 further,	asking	
additional	questions	that	were	not	necessarily	in	the	schedule.		This	also	allowed	





to	carrying	out	 interviews.	 	On	each	occasion,	 I	researched	my	participants	to	
ensure	my	 interview	schedule,	and	the	way	that	 I	approached	them,	reflected	
their	 particular	 backgrounds	 and	 experiences.	 	 The	 interview	 schedules	 I	
employed	therefore	varied	slightly	depending	on	the	interviewees,	although	they	
broadly	 covered	 the	 same	 topics	 and	questions.	 	After	 the	 interviews,	 I	made	
notes	on	any	specific	issues	surrounding	the	interview	(such	as	the	setting,	the	
manner	of	the	interviewee	and	any	interruptions	that	occurred,	which	formed	
part	 of	my	 data),	 as	well	 as	 on	 any	 new	 areas	 raised	 that	warranted	 further	
investigation.		
	


















a	 unique	 number	 (to	 distinguish	 them	 from	 others	 in	 the	 same	 role).	 	 Some	
interviewees,	 who	 had	 originally	 agreed	 to	 be	 named,	 requested	 during	 the	
interview	 that	 certain	 comments	 be	 made	 anonymous,	 which	 I	 agreed	 to;	 I	
therefore	subsequently	ensured	that	any	such	comments	were	not	attributed	to	
anyone	in	my	writing	up	of	the	analysis	(but,	where	necessary,	their	role	and	a	












where	 appropriate,	 so	 that	 the	 research	 focused	 instead	 on	 organisational	
practices.			
	
Fourteen	 of	 the	 interviews	 were	 conducted	 face-to-face,	 mainly	 at	
conferences	and,	on	a	couple	of	occasions,	at	participants’	offices.		However,	the	
majority	 took	place	over	 the	 telephone	and	Skype.	 	There	 is	discussion	 in	 the	
methodological	 literature	 about	 the	 strengths	 and	 weaknesses	 of	 conducting	
interviews	 in	 this	 way	 (e.g.	 Chapple,	 1999,	 Irvine	 et	 al.,	 2012,	 Novick,	 2008,	
Gillham,	 2006,	 Sturges	 and	 Hanrahan,	 2004,	 Mikecz,	 2012,	 Stephens,	 2007,	
Fielding	 and	 Thomas,	 2008).	 	 Traditionally,	 methodological	 textbooks	 have	
advised	against	them,	arguing,	for	example,	that	it	is	harder	to	build	up	a	rapport	





be	 more	 easily	 distorted	 (Gillham,	 2006).	 	 Mikecz	 (2012)	 described	 his	
experience	 of	 conducting	 both	 telephone	 and	 in-person	 interviews,	
acknowledging	 the	 cost	 advantages	 of	 telephone	 interviews	 (both	 time	 and	
money),	but	arguing	that	 it	 is	harder	to	develop	trust	 in	them,	or	to	probe	for	
more	detailed	answers.		Sturges	and	Hanrahan,	however,	found	from	a	study	on	
face-to-face	 versus	 telephone	 semi-structured	 interviews	 that	 there	 were	 no	
significant	differences	in	the	data	collected	via	each	technique	(2004).		
	




had	 an	 international	 reach,	 with	 a	 number	 of	 participants	 based	 overseas	
(primarily	the	U.S.,	with	some	in	Australia),	as	well	as	in	various	locations	around	
the	U.K..		As	such,	it	would	have	been	impossible	to	interview	them	face-to-face.		
Further,	 generally	 my	 interviewees	 were	 extremely	 busy	 people,	 and	





had	 met	 several	 of	 them	 previously	 at	 conferences	 and	 had	 thus	 already	

























There	 were	 some	 problems,	 with	 participants	 perhaps	 not	 taking	 the	
interviews	as	seriously	as	they	might	have	done	in	a	more	formal	 face-to-face	
setting.	 	 Hermanowicz	 warns	 that:	 ‘breakdowns	 and	 misunderstandings	 in	
communication	easily	arise	simply	by	being	apart.	 	Consequently	the	ability	to	





some	of	 the	 in-person	 interviews	 that	were,	 by	 necessity,	 often	 held	 in	 noisy	






Some	 researchers	 have	 argued	 that	 interviews	 with	 ‘elites’	 can	 be	
problematic,	with	the	interviewee	exerting	power	over	the	interviewer	(Mikecz,	
2012).		Not	all	of	my	interviewees	were	in	such	positions	of	power.		However,	I	










in	 the	 field.	 	 We	 were	 therefore	 very	 much	 in	 an	 environment	 in	 which	 the	
interviewee	was	more	powerful	 than	me,	 rather	 than	 in	a	neutral	 space.	 	The	
interviewee	 appeared	 wary	 of	 my	 research	 focus,	 insisted	 on	 looking	 at	 my	
interview	schedule,	and	dismissed	it	by	stating	that	it	was	impossible	to	conduct	
such	 research	 using	 qualitative	 methods.	 	 After	 the	 brief	 conversation	 that	
followed,	I	agreed	that	I	would	write	up	my	notes	(as	I	had	been	unable	to	record	
the	meeting)	and	email	these	to	them	for	their	approval.		After	ignoring	my	email	
for	 several	 weeks,	 I	 received	 a	 very	 abrupt	 response	 stating	 that	 the	 person	
wished	to	‘withdraw	from	the	research’.		This	unpleasant	experience,	between	a	
PhD	student	and	a	senior	medical	doctor	running	a	leading	medical	journal	left	
me	 feeling	 temporarily	 disempowered,	 and	 demonstrates	 clearly	 the	ways	 in	
which	power	can	be	exploited	by	the	interviewee	over	the	interviewer.		In	all	the	





Considering	 the	 number	 and	 length	 of	 the	 interviews,	 transcription	 was	
extremely	time-consuming,	but	doing	it	myself	did	enable	me	to	get	to	know	my	
data	 well	 and	 begin	 to	 identify	 themes	 for	 the	 analysis	 (see	 Section	 4.7).	 	 I	









myself	 in	 the	 data.	 	 Further,	 as	 the	 creation	 of	 transcripts	 is	 a	 theory-laden	
process	–	one	of	 interpretation	or	 ‘translation’	(Hermanowicz,	2002,	p.	497)	–	
with	 the	 transcriber	deciding	what	 to	 include	and	what	 to	 leave	out	 (Gillham,	













read	over	 the	 the	 transcripts	several	 times,	ensuring	 that	 they	were	accurate.		
The	transcriber	was	required	to	sign	a	confidentiality	form.			
	
While	 interviews	 are	 constructions	 of	 interviewees’	 social	 worlds,	 the	
transcripts	 are	 themselves	 selective	 constructions	 reflecting	 the	 researcher’s	
theoretical	goals	(Ochs,	1979).		Keeping	this	in	mind,	I	decided	to	transcribe	the	





















Some	 researchers	 recommend	 sharing	 interview	 transcripts	 with	
interviewees	(Herzog,	1995),	arguing	that	doing	so	allows	participants	to	check	
the	accuracy	of	the	transcript,	correct	errors	and	provide	clarification	if	needed.		
However,	 a	 study	by	Hagens	et	 al.	 (2009)	 found	 that	providing	 transcripts	 to	
interviewees	 entails	 risks,	 such	as	bias	being	 introduced	by	 inconsistent	data	
sources	(if	only	some	transcripts	are	checked,	they	may	contain	more	thoughtful	
and	time-considered	responses	than	those	that	are	not),	or	valuable	data	being	






Thematic	 analysis	 is	 a	 flexible	method	 that	 can	 be	 conducted	 in	 a	 number	 of	




proponents	 argue	 should	 ensure	 thoroughness	 of	 practice.	 	 Bryman	 suggests	










the	 importance	of	 being	 clear	 and	 explicit	 about	 the	 approach	 taken,	 and	 the	








Themes	 (codes)	 can	 arise	 both	 a	 priori/deductively	 (from	 an	
investigator’s	 prior	 theoretical	 understanding	 of	 the	 topic	 being	 studied)	 and	
inductively	(from	the	data	itself).		The	former	can	emerge	from	characteristics	of	
the	 phenomenon,	 topics	 identified	 in	 a	 literature	 review,	 common	 sense	
constructs,	 and	 researchers’	 own	 values,	 experiences	 and	 the	 theoretical	
framework	within	which	they	work.	 	Inductive	themes	emerge	from	empirical	






Patton	 (1990)	argues	 that	 the	analytical	process	begins	with	 the	collection	of	
data,	and	while	I	was	conducting	interviews	and	collecting	documents,	I	noted	
down	ideas	that	emerged	(Burnard,	1991).		When	it	came	to	coding	the	data,	I	
followed	 an	 abductive	 approach	 (Blaikie,	 2009),	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 developing	
theory	from	the	data,	while	also	accepting	that	some	of	my	own	theoretical	pre-







approach	 fitted	my	 research	 questions,	 which	wanted	 to	 explore	 how	 actors	
working	 within	 the	 institutional	 environment	 of	 medical	 journal	 publishing	
conceptualise	 and	 construct	 realities	 around	 COIs	 and	 their	management.	 	 A	
difficulty	noted	by	Burnard	(1991)	is	that	this	approach	assumes	that	comments	
made	by	one	 interviewee	can	be	compared	with	 those	of	another	–	 that	 their	
worldviews	can	be	linked.		While	Burnard	does	not	propose	a	solution	for	this,	
he	 recommends	 keeping	 it	 in	 mind	 as	 an	 intrinsic	 problem	 in	 this	 sort	 of	
analytical	 approach.	 	 Ritchie	 and	 Spencer’s	 ‘Framework	 approach’	 (1994)	
advises	initial	familiarisation	with	the	data,	as	do	Burnard	(1991)	and	Braun	and	
Clark	(2006).		This	allows	us	to	enter	the	life	world	of	the	respondents.		As	I	had	




had	 emerged	 during	 data	 collection,	 this	 process	 allowed	 further	 themes	 to	
emerge	from	the	data	(Lapadat,	2010).		Further,	as	I	had	a	large	corpus	of	data,	
it	allowed	me	to	remove	sections	that	I	felt	were	not	of	relevance	to	my	research	
questions.	 	 For	 example,	 journals’	 ‘Instructions	 for	 Authors’	 typically	 contain	
information	 on	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 matters	 beyond	 COI,	 such	 as	 manuscript	
preparation,	 and	 interviewees	 sometimes	went	off	on	unrelated	 tangents	 (for	
example,	 on	 one	 telephone	 interview,	my	 interviewee	 got	 distracted	 by	 their	
















them	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 that	 new	 themes	 were	 captured	 and	 coded	 where	
applicable.		The	resulting	final	key	themes	are	summarised	in	Table	4.7.		
	






medical	 journal	 publishing	 as	 an	 external	 reality.	 	 The	 codes	were	developed	
along	the	same	lines	as	those	for	the	interview	data,	being	based	on	my	research	
questions	and	 thoughts	 that	had	emerged	during	data	 collection;	 a	 list	of	key	
codes	 is	 provided	 in	 Table	 4.8.	 	 Tables	 on	 particular	 topics	 of	 interest	 in	 the	
documents	were	then	developed	within	which	I	put	relevant	coded	text,	such	as:	
which	 actor	 group	 was	 required	 to	 disclose	 conflicts;	 when	 and	 how	 should	
actors	disclose;	and	what	were	they	required	to	disclose.		While	I	primarily	used	
a	 CAQDAS	 (Computer-Aided	 Qualitative	 Data	 Analysis	 Software)	 (discussed	
below)	to	organise	my	data,	I	found	that	these	tables	allowed	the	relevant	data	













assist	 me	 in	 the	 tasks	 of	 organising,	 retrieving,	 comparing	 and	 linking	 them	
(Patton,	1990).		As	such,	all	of	the	data	(both	interviews	and	documents)	were	
imported	 into	NVivo	 for	qualitative	analysis	and	 the	codes	were	added	 to	 the	
project	 there.	 	 This	 allowed	 me	 to	 easily	 locate	 coded	 themes	 and	 compare	
sections	of	data.	 	 I	had	attended	a	 two-day	course	on	using	NVivo,	run	by	the	
University	of	Surrey,	which	helped	me	in	setting	up	the	project	initially,	as	well	
as	 teaching	 me	 how	 to	 manage	 my	 data	 and	 about	 the	 software’s	 different	
functions.		I	was	also	guided	by	Bazeley	and	Jackson’s	manual	on	NVivo	(2013).		
While	 NVivo	 can	 be	 used	 to	 assist	 in	 more	 complex	 analytical	 tasks,	 both	
qualitative	 and	 quantitative,	 for	 this	 project	 it	 was	 used	 in	 a	 relatively	 basic	








































































































completed,	 I	went	 back	 and	 revised	my	 literature	 review;	 as	 the	 project	 had	
grown,	 altered	 and	 developed	 to	 focus	 specifically	 on	 COIs	 and	 their	
management,	 I	wanted	to	ensure	 that	 I	had	 looked	at	and	discussed	all	of	 the	
writing	 relevant	 to	 the	 topic.	 	 I	 was	 also	 able	 to	 complete	 this	 methodology	
chapter	to	include	all	the	details	of	my	approach	to	the	project.	
	

























equip	 myself	 with	 the	 necessary	 tools,	 along	 with	 attending	 the	 course	 on	
interviewing	techniques,	referred	to	in	Section	4.6.2,	I	also	completed	the	module	
‘Analysing	Qualitative	Data’	 in	 the	School	of	Social	and	Political	Science	at	 the	
University	of	Edinburgh,	and	attended	a	two-week	course	in	2012,	‘Qualitative	
Text	Analysis’,	 at	 the	University	of	Essex’s	Summer	School.	 	Ensuring	 that	my	

















across	 the	 medical	 journal	 publishing	 industry,	 as	 has	 been	 outlined	 in	 this	
chapter,	was	innovative.		It	therefore	provides	an	original	insight	into	the	topic	
of	how	COIs	are	conceptualised	within	the	institutional	environment	of	medical	




collection	 and	 analysis	 that	 I	 used,	 this	 chapter	 has	 also	 provided	 reflections	
upon	 these	methods.	 	 It	has	discussed	some	of	 the	 strengths	and	weaknesses	
relating	 to	 the	 epistemological	 stance	 of	 critical	 realism	 that	 I	 have	 taken.		












Chapter	 Four	 mapped	 the	 institutional	 environment	 of	 medical	 journal	
publishing,	both	 in	 terms	of	 individual	agents	and	organisational	actors.	 	This	
chapter	explores	how	this	institutional	environment	understands	COIs,	both	in	
terms	of	what	it	considers	to	be	relevant	COIs,	and	which	actors	it	presents	as	
potentially	 having	 conflicts	 that	 require	 management.	 	 It	 examines	 these	
constructions,	 both	 by	 individual	 agents	 (through	my	 interview	data)	 and	 by	






The	 chapter	 begins,	 in	 Section	 5.2,	 by	 examining	 how	 particular	 actor	
groups	 are	 construed	 as	 having	 potential	 conflicts	 that	 are	 particularly	
problematic	and	require	regulation,	while	others	are	absent	from	the	debate	and	
thus	generally	 remain	beyond	 the	 remit	of	existing	 regulatory	approaches.	 	 It	
continues,	 in	 Sections	5.3	 and	5.4,	 by	 looking	 at	 different	 types	 of	 interests	 –	
personal	 financial,	 funding	 and	 non-financial	 –	 and	 examines	 how	 specific	
relationships	 are	 portrayed	 as	 being	 especially	 challenging,	 and	 therefore	










There	 is	a	diverse	range	of	actors	working	 in	medical	 journal	publishing	who	
may	have	potential	COIs	that	could	affect	the	content	of	peer-reviewed	medical	
journals.	Chapter	Two	showed	how	the	research	literature	has	explored	various	





identify	which	 groups	 of	 actors	 are	 focused	 on	 in	 relation	 to	 COIs	within	 the	











the	 use	 of	 medical	 writers	 in	 producing	medical	 publications	 when	 they	 are	
undisclosed	(a	practice	termed	as	‘ghost-writing’;	see	Chapter	Two,	Section	2.4),	
one	might	have	expected	that	potential	conflicts	relating	to	this	group	would	be	






Table 5.1 References in the sample professional associations policy/guidance to actor groups’ COIs (shaded boxes 
represent no reference to an actor group)  
















































• Journal	Editors	 	 	 	 	 	





The	 guidance	 and	 policies	 provided	 on	 the	 websites	 of	 my	 sample	
publishers	 appear	 to	 be	 mainly	 aimed	 at	 authors,	 editors	 and	 reviewers.	 	 I	
analysed	them	to	see	which	actors	they	discuss	in	relation	to	COIs	(see	Table	5.2).		
Three	of	the	five	refer	explicitly	to	the	potential	COIs	of	authors,	reviewers	and	
editors,	 while	 two	 only	 mention	 authors’	 and	 reviewers’	 COIs.	 	 None	 of	 the	





Table 5.2 Reference to actors’ COIs in the sample publishers’ guidance 
(shaded boxes represent no reference to an actor group 
Publisher	 Authors	 Reviewers	 Editors	




















Table 5.3 Reference to actors’ COIs in sample journals’ guidance (High IF journals are those marked with an asterisk; shaded 
boxes represent no reference to an actor group) 
Journal	 High	IF	or	
Contentious	Cases	





NEJM*	 HIF	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	Lancet*	 HIF	 	 	 	 	 	 	
JAMA*	 HIF	 	 	 	 	 	 	
BMJ*	 HIF	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
PLoS	Medicine*	 HIF	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Annals*	 HIF	 	 	 	 	 	 	
BMC	Medicine*	 HIF	 	 	 	 	 	 	
CMAJ*	 HIF	 	 	 	 	 	 	
JIM*	 HIF	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Mayo	Clinic	
Proceedings*	
HIF	 	 	 	 	 	 	
AJC	 CC	 	 	 	 	 	 	
AJM	 CC	 	 	 	 	 	 	




Birth	Defects	 CC	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Clinical	
Therapeutics	
CC	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Environmental	
Technology	
CC	 	 	 	 	 	 	
IAOEH	 CC	 	 	 	 	 	 	
JAACAP	 CC	 	 	 	 	 	 	
JCP	 CC	 	 	 	 	 	 	
JNCI	 CC	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Risk	Analysis	 CC	 	 	 	 	 	 	








mixed	with	 respect	 to	 the	 attention	 given	 to	 other	 actor	 groups.	 	Despite	 the	
discussion	of	 reviewers’	and	editors’	potential	conflicts	 in	 the	guidance	of	 the	
professional	 associations	 aimed	 at	 editors	 (COPE,	 CSE,	 ICMJE	 and	 WAME),	
reference	to	them	in	the	journals’	policies	is	more	limited.		Reviewers’	potential	
COIs	are	mentioned	by	two	thirds	of	the	sample	journals	(14	out	of	21,	nine	of	
which	were	 from	 the	 high	 IF	 sample),	 and	 under	 half	 (nine)	 discuss	 editors’	
potential	COIs	(seven	of	which	are	from	the	high	IF	sample).	 	There	is	also	no	
mention,	in	the	journal	guidance	publicly	available,	of	how	the	potential	COIs	of	
journal	 owners	 are	 managed	 by	 any	 of	 the	 journals	 in	 the	 information	 they	
provide	 online.	 This	 is	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 have	 been	 several	 cases	 of	
editors	 in	 chief	 on	 high	 IF	 journals	 being	 fired	 by	 their	 owners	 (see	 Section	
2.3.1.2,	Chapter	Two),	 and	 the	CSE	advising	 that	 ‘The	 journal	 should	 institute	
procedures	 that	 guard	 against	 potential	 conflicts	 involving	 the	 editor	 or	 the	
journal	owner’	(CSE	Editorial	Policy	Committee,	2012,	p.	43)	(see	Chapter	Seven,	
Section	7.2.2.3	for	more	on	the	management	of	COIs	between	editors	and	journal	











reference	 to	 medical	 writers	 and	 their	 potential	 COIs.	 	 The	 journals	 in	 my	
‘contentious	cases’	 sample	 that	were	 included	due	 to	controversies	over	 their	






considered	 to	 be	 ‘contributors’	 rather	 than	 ‘authors’	 to	 disclose	 COIs	 in	 their	
guidance.		Although	a	number	of	journals	do	discuss	who	should	be	mentioned	
in	the	acknowledgements	of	articles,	the	majority	do	not	specifically	suggest	that	




In	 addition	 to	 analysing	 the	 policy	 and	 guideline	 documents,	 I	 also	 asked	
interviewees	 who	 they	 felt	 may	 potentially	 have	 COIs	 that	 could	 affect	 the	
content	of	medical/health	journals	and	should	be	disclosed.		In	response	to	this	
question,	along	with	analysing	the	responses	throughout	the	interviews,	I	was	




























Associate	editor	(1)	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
Author	(9)	 9	 3	 3	 0	 0	 1	 0	 	
Editor	in	chief	(6)	 6	 3	 3	 1	 0	 0	 1	
Executive	editor	(3)	 3	 0	 	 2	 0	 	 2	 0	 1	
Manufacturing	company	
representative	(2)	
2	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 	
Managing	editor	(8)	 8	 6	 7	 1	 1	 0	 1	
Medical	writer	(4)	 4	 3	 2	 0	 1	 1	 1	
Publisher	(3)	 3	 2	 2	 0	 0	 0	 1	
Medical	publishing	critic	
(6)	
6	 1	 4	 0	 1	 0	 0	




Industry	consultant	(1)	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	





a	 general	 consensus	 within	 the	 institutional	 environment	 of	 medical/health	
journal	publishing	that	authors	may	have	COIs	that	could	impact	on	the	content	
of	medical	journals,	and	this	was	supported	by	the	interviewees.		Likewise,	this	










talk	 about	 the	 potential	 COIs	 that	 journals	 and	 their	 owners	 may	 face	 with	
regards	 to	 supplements,	 reprints	and	advertising	paid	 for	by	 their	 companies	
(see	Section	5.4.1	and	5.4.2	of	this	chapter	for	more	on	this).		This	is	despite	the	
fact	that	this	has	been	a	topic	of	concern	(see	Section	2.3.1.2	of	Chapter	Two).		




Reflecting	 the	 sample	 policies	 and	 guidance,	 there	was	 also	 extremely	
limited	 discussion	 by	 interviewees	 regarding	 contributors’	 COIs	 (i.e.	 those	
involved	in	the	development	of	a	paper	but	who	do	not	qualify	for	authorship).		
Only	two	journal	representatives	said	that	their	journals	do	require	contributors	
to	 disclose	 (and	when	 I	 examined	 the	 online	 policies,	 this	 did	 not	 appear	 to	
actually	be	the	case	for	one	of	these	interviewee’s	journals).		On	the	whole,	when	
representatives	of	journals	did	mention	contributors,	they	made	it	clear	that	it	is	






Table 5.5 Quotes regarding the disclosure of contributors’ COIs 
Interviewee	 Quotes	
P1	 ‘We’d	 certainly	 ask	 that	 all	 people	 associated	 with	 the	





‘We	 ask	 for	 a	 contributorship	 statement,	 so	 the	 authors	
have	to	say	who	did	what	to	produce	this	article.		And	that	





























As	 mentioned	 earlier	 in	 this	 section,	 there	 are	 specific	 types	 of	
contributors	who	can	have	a	notable	impact	on	the	content	of	journal	articles,	in	
particular	medical	writers.		As	with	the	journal	guidance	and	policies,	however,	
most	 interviewees	did	not	 bring	up	 the	potential	 COIs	 of	 this	 actor	 group,	 as	
Table	5.4	shows,	and	 there	are	 limited	requirements	 for	 them	to	disclose	any	
potential	 conflicts	 (see	 also	 Chapter	 Six,	 Section	 6.3.4).	 	 It	 is	 particularly	
interesting	 to	 note	 that	 only	 one	 of	 the	 four	 medical	 writers	 interviewed	

















by	 two	 interviewees,	 but	who	 are	 rarely	mentioned	 in	 the	 policies/guidance.			
JAMA	previously,	under	the	editor	in	chief	Catherine	DeAngelis,	acknowledged	in	
published	 commentaries	 (as	 recently	 as	 2010)	 that	 statisticians’	 bias	 could	
potentially	influence	research.	 	The	journal	implemented	a	policy	in	2005	that	
required	 an	 independent	 biostatistician,	 employed	 by	 either	 an	 academic	 or	
government	research	 institution,	 to	perform	analysis	on	any	type	of	 industry-
sponsored	 study	 in	 which	 the	 data	 analysis	 had	 only	 been	 conducted	 by	
statisticians	 employed	 by	 the	 research	 sponsor	 (DeAngelis	 and	 Fontanarosa,	
2010,	 Fontanarosa	 et	 al.,	 2005).	 	 However,	 in	 2013,	 under	 the	 leadership	 of	
Howard	Bauchner	(who	became	editor	in	chief	in	2011),	the	journal	reversed	the	




with	 proposed	 regulations	 that	 require	 that	 companies	 seeking	 new	 product	
approvals	 provide	 complete	 access	 to	 clinical	 trial	 datasets.17	 	 Yet,	 in	 an	
interview	 that	 I	 conducted	 in	 2013	 (when	 the	 policy	 was	 still	 in	 force),	 a	









coming	 to	 JAMA	 because	 of	 that’.	 	 The	 reversal	 of	 this	 policy	 thus	 perhaps	
highlights	 a	 conflict	 for	 the	 journal	 editorial	 office	 itself:	 that	 fear	 of	 losing	
industry	 papers	 may	 cause	 them	 to	 produce	 policies	 that	 are	 attractive	 to	
industry.18	 	 	Statisticians	may	also	be	 involved	in	the	analysis	of	studies	other	
than	clinical	trials,	to	which	the	safeguarding	measures	listed	by	Bauchner	would	
not	apply.	 	When	another	editor	 in	 chief	 (of	 a	 ‘contentious	 case’	 journal)	was	
asked	whether	 statisticians	 (or	other	 contributors)	had	 to	disclose	COIs,	 they	
replied,	‘No	…	often	we	don’t	even	know	who	those	people	are.		They’ll	just	be	in	the	



































Table 5.6: Types of relationships that might lead to COIs for authors, as referred to by journals in their guidance for authors 
(High IF are those marked with an asterisk; shaded boxes represent no reference to an actor group) 





NEJM*	 Y	 Y		 N	 N	
The	Lancet*	 Y	 Y	 N	 Y	
JAMA*	 Y	 Y	 N	 Y	
BMJ*	 Y	 Y	 Y	 Y	
PLoS	Medicine*	 Y	 Y	 N	 Y	
Annals*	 Y	 Y		 N	 Y	
BMC	Medicine*	 Y	 Y	 N	 Y	
CMAJ*	 Y	 Y	 N	 Y	
JIM*	 Y	 Y	 N	 N	 	
Mayo	Clinic	Proceedings*	 Y	 Y	 N	 N	
AJC	 Y	 Y	 N	 Y	
AJM	 Y	 N	 	 N	 N	
AJOG	 Y	 Y	 N	 N	 	
Birth	Defects	 Y	 N	 	 N	 Y	




Environmental	Technology	 Y	 Y	 N	 N	 	
IAOEH	 Y	 Y	 N	 Y	
JAACAP	 Y	 Y	 N	 	 Y	
JCP	 Y	 Y	 Y	 Y	
JNCI	 Y	 Y	 N	 Y	











roles,	 such	 as	 giving	 presentations,	 undertaking	 consultations,	 sitting	 on	
advisory	 boards,	 or	 receiving	 patents.	 	 The	 latter	 relates	 to	 study-	 or	
organisation-level	 relationships,	where	 the	money	does	not	 go	directly	 to	 the	
individual.		The	BMJ’s	guidance	makes	this	distinction,	as	shown	in	Box	5.1.	
	






directly	 to	 an	 individual,	whether	 as	 a	 salary	 or	 as	 fees	 or	
honoraria;	 or	where	 an	 individual	 receives	benefits	 from	a	
third	 party	 who	 is	 not	 their	 main	 employer,	 such	 as	 a	
fellowship,	equipment,	writing	or	administrative	assistance,	












make	 this	 distinction	 in	 their	 guidance	 and	 disclosure	 processes,	 and	 simply	
have	the	categories	 ‘financial’	 (incorporating	both	personal	 financial	COIs	and	
funding/grants	in	the	examples	of	interests	that	they	give)	and	‘non-financial’.		
Although	both	 are	 ‘financial’,	 this	 difference	 is	 important	 in	 terms	of	 offering	
clarity	regarding	the	types	of	interests	that	could	affect	research	and	resulting	













































































government	 and	 third-sector	 funding.	 	 It	 is	 also	 curious	 that	 charitable	
foundations	(the	exact	definition	of	which	varies	from	country	to	country)	are	
considered	here	to	be	a	public	funding	source,	and	also	that	they	and	academic	
institutions	will	 never	 be	 affected	 financially	 by	 the	work	 they	 support.	 	 The	
CSE’s	White	Paper,	on	the	other	hand,	advises	that	authors	should	‘disclose	all	
sources	 of	 funding	 (government,	 corporate,	 other)’	 (CSE	 Editorial	 Policy	
Committee,	2012,	p.	25).	 	WAME	also	takes	the	position	that	research	funding	
from	 ‘government	 agencies,	 charities	 (not-for-profit	 organizations),	 and	
professional	 and	 civic	 organizations,	 which	 also	 have	 agendas	 that	 may	 be	
congruent	 or	 at	 odds	 with	 research	 findings’	 (WAME	 Editorial	 Policy	 and	
Publication	 Ethics	 Committees,	 2009)	 should	 be	 declared.	 	 Some	 journals	 do	
request	 that	non-commercial	 funding	also	be	disclosed:	 JIM	 specifically	 states	
that	 authors	 should	 list	 ‘governmental,	 industrial,	 charitable,	 philanthropic	
and/or	personal	sources	of	funding’,	and	JNCI	makes	reference	to	‘commercial	or	
other	sources	of	 funding’	 in	 its	Author	Instructions.	 	Conversely,	 IAOEH	 states	
specifically	 that	 it	 only	 requires	 commercial	 funding	 to	 be	 disclosed,	without	
explaining	why.		
	









Table 5.7: Illustrative quotes from interviewees on the potential vested 
interests of charities 
Interviewee	 Quotes	illustrating	the	potential	vested	interests	of	
charities	
A5	 ‘I	 think	 there	 is	 a	 naïve	 view	 that	 these	 disease	 advocacy	
organisations,	 unlike	 drug	 companies,	 have	 very	 pure	 motives:	
‘Find	 the	 cure	 to	 diabetes’,	 how	 could	 that	 be	 a	 bad	 thing?	 	 As	
opposed	to	drug	companies:	they’re	obviously	pushing	their	drug	
over	 other	 drugs.	 	 How	 can	 a	 group	 that	 is	 pushing	 diabetes	
awareness,	or	diabetes	cure,	how	could	that	be	a	bad	thing?		Well,	
that’s	a	bad	 thing	 if	 you’re	misallocating	resources	…	 If	diabetes	
accounts	for	20%	of	the	morbidity	and	mortality	of	a	population,	
but	 is	 getting	 50%	 of	 the	 national	 healthcare	 spending	 dollars,	
that’s	probably	not	good,	and	the	diabetes	association	isn’t	going	
to	 complain	 if	 they’re	 getting	 too	 big	 a	 share	 of	 the	 pie	 …	 The	










MW2	 ‘Another	 reason	 that	 I	 don’t	 like	 conflict	 of	 interests	 that	 just	








The	majority	 of	 interviewees,	 however,	 appeared	 to	 feel	 that	 research	
funded	by	manufacturing	sector	companies	was	more	 likely	to	be	biased	than	
that	which	is	funded	by	the	public/voluntary	sector.		The	‘profit-motive’	(MPC3)	
and	 the	 requirement	 to	 satisfy	 shareholders	 were	 cited	 by	 interviewees	 as	








Table 5.8: Illustrative quotes from interviewees on research funded by 
manufacturing sector companies 
Interviewee	 Quotes	illustrating	greater	scepticism	by	interviewees	of	
research	funded	by	manufacturing	sector	companies	
A4	 ‘Anything	 that’s	 funded	 by	 industry,	 I	 automatically	 build	 in	 a	









MPC3	 ‘There’s	a	profit	motive.	 	The	government	 funded	research,	 they	


















Table 5.9: Illustrative quotes of interviewees’ bias against articles written by 













the	 people,	 and	 then	 read	 if	 there	 are	 any	 conflicts	 of	 interest.		









that	 the	 view	 expressed,	 particularly	 on	 policy	 research,	 is	 going	 to	 be	
independent’	(EIC3).			
	






not	 overtly	 challenge	 the	beliefs	 and	 interests	 of)	 their	 funders	 (Smith,	 2010,	
Dreger,	2015)	(see	Chapter	Two,	Section	2.3.3).	 	 Indeed,	certain	types	of	non-
commercial	funding	(for	example,	charity	or	advocacy	funding)	can	lead	to	very	
particular	 types	 of	 conflict,	 such	 as	 vested	 interests	 in	 promoting	 particular	




















non-financial	 COIs.	 	 It	 divides	 them	 into	 four	 distinct	 categories:	 academic	
commitments;	 personal	 relationships;	 political	 or	 religious	 beliefs;	 and	
institutional	 affiliations	 (WAME	 Editorial	 Policy	 and	 Publication	 Ethics	
Committees,	2009).		While	the	ICMJE’s	Universal	Recommendations	argue	that	
financial	COIs	are	 ‘the	most	 likely	 to	undermine	 the	credibility	of	 the	 journal’	


















not	 referring	 to	 them	 at	 all.	 	 While	 the	 guidance	 and	 policies	 generally	 give	
examples	 of	 what	 can	 lead	 to	 financial	 COIs,	 this	 is	 often	 not	 the	 case	 with	




Table 5.10: Examples of journals’ guidance regarding non-financial COIs  
Journal	 Information	given	in	guidance	regarding	non-financial	COIs	
(emphasis	added)	
AJC	 All	 authors	 must	 disclose	 any	 financial	 and	 personal	
relationships	 with	 other	 people	 or	 organizations	 that	 could	
inappropriately	 influence	 (bias)	 their	 work’	 (The	 American	
Journal	of	Cardiology,	2016)	





























A	 minority	 of	 my	 sample	 journals	 (primarily	 those	 from	 my	 high	 IF	
journal	 sample)	do	give	examples	of	what	 can	 lead	 to	non-financial	COIs	 (see	
Table	5.11),	but	these	vary	in	detail	and	specificity,	with	the	majority	being	quite	
vague.	 	Their	utility	 is	 therefore	questionable.	The	publisher,	PLoS,	 is	alone	in	
providing	 a	 comprehensive	 set	 of	 examples	 with	 explanations	 for	 all	 of	 its	
journals	(including	PLoS	Medicine).		This	demonstrates	that,	while	non-financial	
relationships	 that	may	pose	COIs	 are	more	nebulous	 than	 financial	 ones,	 it	 is	
possible	to	provide	a	clear	list	of	examples.		Such	information	could	assist	actors	
in	 understanding	 what	 sort	 of	 non-financial	 interests	 may	 cause	 them	 to	 be	
conflicted.	
	
Table 5.11: Examples sample journals give of non-financial activities or 























































to	provide	 ‘an	example	of	a	non-financial	conflict’	 (ME1).	 	A	senior	editor	on	a	
high	IF	journal	was	also	vague:	





However,	while	 some	 interviewees	were	dismissive	of,	 or	unsure	about,	 non-
financial	 COIs,	 others	 did	 acknowledge	 that	 they	 too	 can	 be	 problematic:	 see	
Table	5.12.		These	interviewees	argued	that	such	conflicts	can,	in	fact,	potentially	
be	 more	 influential	 than	 financial	 ones:	 as	 EIC3	 argued,	 personal	 situations,	
experiences	and	fundamental	beliefs	can	have	more	of	an	effect	than	whether	













Table 5.12: Illustrative quotes from interviewees on the problematic nature of 
non-financial COIs 
Interviewee	 Quotes	 illustrating	 the	problematic	nature	of	 non-financial	
COIs	
A3	 ‘I	think	they	can	be	even	more	problematic.		So	for	example,	if	you	




there’s	 different	 types’.	 	 So	 that’s	 a	 non-financial	 conflict	 of	
interest,	but	definitely	a	conflict	of	interest.‘	





or	 wrong,	 life	 hereafter,	 are	 they	 actually	 more	 to	 do	 with	





what	 stance	 you’re	 going	 to	 take	 on	 a	 topic,	 than	 who	 has	
employed	you	in	the	past	and	what	you’ve	been	paid	for	it.		And	












interest	 that	 are	 less	 tangible,	 and	 some	 people	 have	 views	 on	
certain	medical	issues,	ethical	issues	even,	which	are	very	fixed,	















more	 potent	 than	 financial	 ones.	 …	 Non-financial	 conflict	 of	
















we	 have	 decided	 to	 restrict	 our	 request	 to	 financial	 interests.	 This	 is	
largely	a	tactical	move.	We	hope	that	it	will	increase	the	number	of	people	
who	 disclose	 competing	 interests.	 Our	 experience,	 supported	 by	 some	
research	 data,	 was	 that	 people	 often	 did	 not	 disclose	 them.’	 (British	
Medical	Journal,	n.d.)	
	
According	 to	 Smith’s	 editorial	 (Smith,	 1998),	 this	 policy	 is	 based	 upon	 two	
studies	which	found	that	authors	did	not	declare	COIs	to	journals	(Stelfox	et	al.,	
1998,	Barnes	and	Bero,	1998).		The	BMJ’s	guidance,	quoted	above,	implies	that	






and	 thus	 people	 may	 be	 better	 able	 to	 recognise	 that	 they	 have	 them.	 	 The	













actor	groups.	 	The	 focus	of	 journals’	 instructions	 for	authors	on	authors’	COIs	
may	be	because	 these	documents	are	aimed	at	 this	actor	group.	 	However,	as	
Table	5.3	shows,	some	of	the	journal	guidance/policies	also	refer	to	reviewers’	
and	editors’	COIs,	as	well	as	some	other	actors.		Tables	5.1,	and	5.2	demonstrate	
that	 guidance	 from	other	organisational	 actors	 (professional	 associations	and	
publishers)	 also	 refer	 to	 other	 actor	 groups.	 	 Table	 5.4	 shows	 that	 some	
interviewees	demonstrated	an	awareness	that	other	actors	besides	authors	may	
have	COIs.		The	following	section	analyses	the	data	to	explore	how,	and	to	what	




The	 professional	 associations	 representing	 publishers	 and	 journal	 editors	
(COPE,	CSE,	ICMJE	and	WAME)	offer	different	amounts	of	information	on	what	
editors’	 and	 reviewers’	 COIs	 might	 be,	 and	 such	 advice	 is	 not	 always	 easily	
located	in	their	guidance.		COPE’s	documents	state	only	that	editors’	conflicts	can	
be	 ‘financial,	 academic	 and	 other	 kinds’	 (COPE,	 2011).	 	 Examples	 given	 for	
reviewers	are	‘personal,	financial,	intellectual,	professional,	political	or	religious’	
(COPE,	2013).		CSE	offers	more	detailed	guidance	on	what	could	be	considered	










holding	 equity	 positions	 or	 stock	 options	 in	 a	 company	 whose	 product	 is	
discussed	 in	 the	 manuscript);	 gaining	 key	 knowledge	 about	 competitors’	
research	which	they	use	prior	to	publication,	but	without	citing;	having	a	study	
similar	to	that	which	they	are	reviewing,	tempting	them	to	delay	the	review	until	
their	 own	 article	 has	 been	 accepted	 for	 publication;	 or	 holding	 strong	 views	
regarding	 the	 topic	of	an	article	which	may	bias	 them	(ibid).	 	 ICMJE	does	not	
provide	any	examples	of	COIs	for	editors,	though	for	other	editorial	staff	it	states	










With	 regards	 to	 the	 journals,	 the	 information	 they	 offer	 on	 what	 can	














‘Editors	 and	 reviewers	 are	 also	 required	 to	 declare	 any	 competing	















in	 the	 form	of	 advertising,	 supplements	 and	 reprints.	 	 Five	 interviewees	 (see	
Table	5.13)	argued	that	these	constitute	significant	COIs	for	these	actor	groups:		
	
























































publishing	 industry-sponsored	 research,	 which	 may	 be	 critical	 to	 their	






do	all	 offer	 some	guidance	on	 these	 issues	 (ICMJE,	2009,	CSE	Editorial	Policy	






2012)	 (yet	 as	 Section	6.3.2	of	Chapter	 Six	 shows,	none	of	 the	websites	of	 the	










between	 editors	 and	 journal	 owners.	 	 COPE’s,	 CSE’s,	 ICMJE’s	 and	 WAME’s	




explain	 that	 the	 policies,	 politics	 and	 commercial	 motivations	 of	 a	 journal’s	
owner	–	including	managing	its	revenue	–	may	not	always	correspond	with	the	
publishing	decisions	of	editors,	whose	primary	interest	should	be	in	publishing	
articles	based	on	 their	quality	and	suitability	 for	 the	 journal.	 	 If	 there	are	not	
sufficient	mechanisms	in	place	to	protect	editorial	freedom,	then	the	owners	and	
editors	may	face	conflicts	between	the	commercial	needs	of	the	journal	and	what	

























concerned	 about	 the	 COIs	 of	 the	 authors	 (Salem	 and	 Boumil,	 2013).	 	 Four	
interviewees	(a	publisher	(P1),	Niall	Boyce	from	The	Lancet,	a	managing	editor	
(ME2)	and	an	author	(A2)),	echoed	this	concern:	
‘You’ve	 got	 the	 economy	 of	 the	 journal,	 potentially	 depending	 on	 the	
number	of	papers	 it	publishes.	 	So	that	 introduces	a	whole	new	potential	




said	 that,	 ‘We’d	 publish	mediocre	 stuff	 to	make	money.’	 	 This	 problem	 can	 be	









However,	 this	 safeguard	 does	 not	 work	 with	 fully	 OA	 journals.	 	 The	 only	
mechanism	 in	 place,	 according	 to	 the	 publisher	 quoted	 above,	 is	 a	 journal’s	
desire	 to	publish	only	good	quality	material	 to	maintain	a	high	 impact	 factor.		
However,	three	interviewees	(one	publisher,	one	editor	in	chief	and	one	author)	

















that	 if	 people	 want	 research	 to	 be	 made	 freely	 accessible,	 they	 have	 to	 be	
prepared	to	assess	them	more	for	bias:	












writers	 or	 other	 contributors.	 	 Similarly,	 only	 those	 professional	 associations	
specifically	aimed	at	medical	writers	(AMWA,	EMWA	and	ISMPP)	refer	to	them.		
EMWA	 only	 states	 that	medical	 writers	 should	 disclose	 relevant	 information	
about	funding	if	required	to	by	the	journal	(Jacobs	and	Wager,	2005).	 	AMWA	

















be	 given.	 	 JCP	 does	 require	 that	 their	 ‘pertinent	 professional	 or	 financial	
relationships	have	been	disclosed	in	the	Acknowledgment	section’.		However,	no	
examples	 of	 such	 ‘relationships’	 are	 given.	 	 JAACAP	mentions	 the	 ‘pertinent	
professional	 or	 financial	 relationships’	 of	 medical	 writers	 and	 other	
contributors.		CMAJ	states	that	contributors	must	disclose	competing	interests,	
financial	or	other;	as	with	JCP,	 it	does	not	provide	any	examples.	 	Thus,	 in	the	
limited	 instances	 where	 medical	 writers’	 and	 other	 contributors’	 COIs	 are	
mentioned,	the	existing	guidance	seems	to	be	limited	and	primarily	focuses	on	




The	 findings	 outlined	 in	 this	 chapter	 demonstrate	 how	 there	 is	 a	 narrow	
conceptualisation	of	COIs	in	medical	journal	publishing	industry,	both	in	terms	















most	 commonly	 the	 ICMJE’s	 authorship	 criteria	 (ICMJE,	 2015a)	 –	 with	 other	













development	 of	 an	 article;	 statisticians	 can	 likewise	 have	 influence	 over	 how	




















medical	 journal	 publishing	 industry	 consequently	 appears	 to	 shy	 away	 from	
them.		The	BMJ	states	that	it	only	asks	authors	and	reviewers	to	disclose	financial	
COIs	 in	 the	 hope	 that	 this	 will	 lead	 to	 greater	 disclosure	 of	 financial	 COIs.		
However,	 this	 is	 not	 a	 satisfactory	 solution.	 	 While	 it	 may	 lead	 to	 greater	
disclosure	 of	 financial	 conflicts	 (although	 there	 does	 not	 appear	 to	 be	 any	
evidence	 to	 prove	 this	 is	 the	 case),	 it	 does	 not	 solve	 the	 problem	 of	 how	 to	
manage	 non-financial/other	 COIs.	 	 COIs	 in	 medical	 journal	 publishing	 are	







While	 financial	 COIs	 (both	 personal	 and	 funding)	 were	 given	 more	
attention,	there	is	still	a	lack	of	detail	on	what	they	can	constitute,	such	as	with	
regards	to	the	time	period	in	which	they	may	have	occurred,	and	the	amounts.		
There	 also	 appears	 to	 be	 greater	 concentration	 given	 to	 funding	 from	
commercial	sources	rather	than	public	ones;	due	to	the	heavy	attention	that	the	
data	gives	to	the	former,	it	has	inevitably	been	of	principal	focus	to	the	discussion	
within	 this	 thesis.	 	 While	 the	 more	 egregious	 and	 publicised	 cases	 of	 ‘data-
spinning’	in	journals	has	arisen	from	research	sponsored	by	the	pharmaceutical	
and	 tobacco	 industries,	 as	 interviewees	 pointed	 out,	 public	 funding	 can	 itself	
entail	conflicts,	so	should	not	be	ignored.		Yet	the	ICMJE	disclosure	form,	which	
is	 the	 one	most	 commonly	 used	 by	 the	 journals,	 only	 requires	 funding	 from	
private	 sources	 to	 be	 disclosed;	 government	 and	 third-sector	 funding	 do	 not	
need	to	be.		This,	however,	is	at	odds	with	guidance	from	WAME	and	CSE,	which	
leads	 to	another	point:	 the	guidance	 from	the	various	associations	 is	at	 times	







Hence	 there	appears	 to	be	a	narrow	conceptualisation	of	COIs,	both	 in	
terms	of	who	it	is	that	has	conflicts	that	require	management,	and	the	types	of	
conflicts	that	need	to	be	managed.		The	ideas	surrounding	COIs	are	informed	by	
the	 thinking	 of	 actors	 working	 within	 medical	 journal	 publishing,	 who	 may	
themselves	 be	 conflicted	 and	 have	 their	 own	 agendas,	 as	 well	 as	 being	 so	
immersed	 within	 the	 institutional	 environment	 that	 they	 are	 unable	 to	 see	






to	 contemplate	 alternative	 ideas;	 when	 asking	 about	 non-financial	 COIs,	 for	
example,	the	topic	was	dismissed	by	the	majority	of	interviewees	as	being	too	
complicated,	while	confusion	was	frequently	expressed	when	I	tried	to	delve	into	




therefore	 certain	 types	 of	 interest,	 which	may	 pose	 a	 conflict,	 and	 particular	
groups	of	actors	who	may	be	conflicted,	may	escape	management.		For	example,	







group.	 	 Such	 potential	 conflicts,	 which	 could	 adversely	 affect	 medical/health	
publications,	may	therefore	escape	attention	and	potentially	bias	the	literature.		














Chapter	 Five	 examined	 the	 policies	 and	 guidance	 developed	 by	 the	 medical	
journal	 publishing	 industry,	 together	 with	 interviews	 conducted	 across	 the	
stakeholder	groups,	to	examine	how	COIs	are	conceptualised,	both	in	terms	of	
what	 they	 are	 and	which	 actors	 can	 have	 conflicts	 that	 require	management.		
This	chapter	now	examines,	through	the	data	(drawing	on	both	the	guidance	and	









Section	 6.2	 explores	 how	 the	 medical	 journal	 publishing	 industry	
presents,	and	the	actors	within	it	consequently	understand,	disclosure	to	be	the	
main	 and	 most	 effective	 mechanism	 for	 handling	 COIs.	 	 The	 chapter	 also	
considers,	 in	 Section	 6.3,	which	 groups	 of	 actors	 are	 in	 practice	 requested	 to	
disclose,	and	in	what	format.		This	work	demonstrates,	conversely,	which	actor	






The	 chapter	 also	 looks	 at	 what	 the	 data	 suggest	 is	 done	 with	 disclosures	 in	
practical	terms	–	if	and	how	they	are	presented	to	journals’	audiences	–	and	how	








In	 their	 guidance	 and	 policies,	 the	 professional	 associations	 that	 represent	
medical/health	journals	place	a	particularly	strong	emphasis	on	disclosure	as	a	
means	 of	 managing	 actors’	 COIs.	 	 The	 ICMJE	 states	 that	 those	 involved	 in	
publishing	(which	it	lists	as	being:	authors,	peer	reviewers,	journal	editors	and	
editorial	staff)	must	disclose	their	COIs:		
‘All	 participants	 in	 the	 peer-review	 and	 publication	 process	 …	 must	




in	 its	 document	 on	 COIs	 (WAME	 Editorial	 Policy	 and	 Publication	 Ethics	
Committees,	 2009).	 	 The	 section	 of	 this	 document	 that	 describes	 how	 COIs	
should	be	managed	is	entitled	‘Declaring	and	Managing	COIs’.		This	demonstrates	
that	disclosure	is	seen	as	the	way	in	which	COIs	should	be	managed:		
‘managing	 COI	 depends	 on	 disclosure	 because	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	
routinely	 monitor	 or	 investigate	 whether	 competing	 interests	 are	
present.’	 (WAME	 Editorial	 Policy	 and	 Publication	 Ethics	 Committees,	
2009)	
	
After	 defining	 COIs,	 CSE	 likewise,	 provides	 a	 section	 on	 disclosure,	 again	
highlighting	the	focus	placed	on	its	role	in	managing	conflicts.		CSE	states	that:	
‘Journals	 should	 require	 disclosure	 of	 all	 conflicts	 of	 interest	 from	
everyone	involved	in	the	publication	process:	editors,	reviewers,	editorial	




























Table 6.1: Extracts on the disclosure of COIs from publishers’ 
policies/guidance 
Publisher	 Extract	from	policy	on	COI	disclosure	
Wiley	 ‘Editors,	 authors,	 and	 peer	 reviewers	 should	 disclose	 interests	
that	might	appear	to	affect	their	ability	to	present	or	review	work	
objectively.’	(Deakin	et	al.,	2014)	




be	 reported	 to	 the	 institution's	 ethics	 group	and	 to	 the	 journal	
editor	 to	 which	 a	 paper	 is	 submitted.	 	 All	 publishers	 require	
disclosure	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 cover	 letter	 and/or	 footnote	 in	 the	
manuscript.’	(Elsevier,	n.d.)	
T&F	 ‘Authors	must	 declare	 any	 potential	 conflict	 of	 interest	 –	 be	 it	
professional	 or	 financial	 –	 which	 could	 be	 held	 to	 arise	 with	
respect	to	the	article.		Authors	must	disclose	all	sources	of	funding	
for	the	research	reported	in	the	paper’	(Taylor	&	Francis,	2014)	
OUP	 ‘How	 can	 I	 be	 sure	 if	 I	 should	 declare	 something?’	 (Oxford	
University	Press,	2014)	































in	 my	 sample	 (ICMJE,	 WAME,	 CSE	 and	 COPE)	 advise	 that	 authors	 disclose	
potential	COIs	(with	an	emphasis	on	financial	interests).		However,	the	amount	
of	guidance	they	offer	on	how	they	should	disclose	varies,	with	the	ICMJE	offering	







may	 request	 that	 authors	 of	 a	 study	 sponsored	 by	 a	 funder	 with	 a	
proprietary	or	financial	interest	in	the	outcome	sign	a	statement,	such	as	
“I	 had	 full	 access	 to	 all	 of	 the	 data	 in	 this	 study	 and	 I	 take	 complete	
responsibility	 for	 the	 integrity	of	 the	data	and	the	accuracy	of	 the	data	
analysis.”’	(ICMJE,	2014a)	
	
The	 organisation	 thus	 advises	 that	 either	 forms	 or	 statements	 disclosing	
conflicts	 should	 accompany	 published	 articles.	 	 WAME	 likewise	 says	 that	
conflicts	should	be	declared	in	writing	(by	authors	and	reviewers),	but	it	does	
not	 offer	 any	 further	 advice	 on	 the	 format	 through	 which	 these	 disclosures	











The	guidance	of	all	of	 the	publishers	 in	my	sample	states	 that	authors’	
conflicts	should	be	disclosed.	 	Other	 than	Springer,	 they	all	provide	advice	on	
how	 this	 can,	 or	 should,	 be	 achieved.	 	 Elsevier	 suggests	 that	 authors	 should	
disclose	 conflicts	 in	 a	 section	 of	 their	 articles,	which	means	 that	 they	will	 be	
available	 for	 readers	 to	 view.	 	Wiley	 says	 authors	 should	 provide	 disclosure	
statements	 and	 that	 editors	 should	 publish	 these,	 so	 again,	 readers	will	 have	
access	to	them.		T&F	and	OUP	both	say	that	authors	should	declare	their	COIs	
upon	 submission;	 however,	 neither	 of	 them	 advise	 on	 how	 this	 information	
should	 then	 be	 conveyed	 to	 the	 readership.	 	 For	 the	most	 part	 the	 journals’	







able	 to	 set	 their	own	policies,	which	are	not	necessarily	as	 stringent	as	 those	
recommended	by	their	publishers.		
	






Journal	 requirements	 for	 disclosing	 non-financial	 COIs	 are	 less	 common:	 see	






The	 format	 through	 which	 journals	 require	 disclosures	 to	 be	made	 is	
shown	in	Table	6.2.		(The	table	also	shows	what	journals	require	from	authors	if	
they	have	no	conflicts.)	 	Disclosure	by	authors	 is	generally	made	through:	 the	
completion	 of	 forms;	 statements	 in	 correspondence	 to	 the	 journal	 or	 on	 the	
manuscript;	or	answering	questions	in	the	submission	process	(it	is	most	often	
a	 combination	 of	 these).	 	 This	 table	 shows	 that	 each	 journal	 differs	 in	 its	
requirements	 on	 how	 disclosures	 should	 be	 made.	 	 One	 author	 felt	 that	 the	
requirements	depend	on	the	IF	of	the	journal:	the	higher	IF	journals	tend	to	be	
more	 rigorous	 and	 require	 the	 completion	 of	 forms,	while	 the	 lower	 IF	 ones	
generally	have	less	thorough	procedures,	relying	more	on	simple	summarising	
statements.		This	reflects	the	journals	in	my	sample:	as	the	table	shows,	all	but	
two	 (the	 two	 OA	 journals:	 BMC	 Medicine	 and	 PLoS	 Medicine)	 of	 the	 high	 IF	
journals	 ask	 authors	 to	 complete	 a	 disclosure	 form	 (either	 their	 own	 or	 the	




Clinical	 Therapeutics,	 IAOEH,	Environmental	Technology	 and	Birth	Defects	 say	
that	 authors	 should	 provide	 a	 statement	 in	 their	 manuscripts	 summarising	





also	 be	 helpful,	 as	 they	 enable	 readers	 to	 appropriately	 contextualise	 the	
content:	
‘At	least	with	a	statement	at	the	end	of	the	manuscript,	then	you	can	scan	
through	 it	 fairly	 quickly	 and	 see	 if	 anybody’s	 got	 any	major	 conflicts	 of	
interest.’	(SE1)	
	





































































































































































disclosures’	 (ICMJE,	 2015d,	 p.	 4),	 yet	 its	 success	 on	 this	 front	 appears	 to	 be	
limited.		Of	the	seven	journals	in	my	sample	that	are	members	of	the	ICMJE,	six	
require	authors	to	complete	the	ICMJE	disclosure	form	(PLoS	Medicine	does	not).		




















or	 statements	 accompanying	 them.	 	 Likewise,	 WAME	 suggests	 that	 ‘Journals	
should	 publish	 all	 relevant	 COI	 disclosures	 with	 the	 publication’	 (WAME	
Editorial	Policy	and	Publication	Ethics	Committees,	2009).		CSE	and	COPE	do	not	
advise	 on	 whether	 or	 not	 disclosures	 should	 be	 published.	 	 In	 terms	 of	 the	
publishers,	Elsevier	and	Wiley	advise	upon	publication	of	authors’	disclosures;	
the	other	publishers	in	my	sample	do	not	comment	on	what	should	be	done	with	

















some	will	 only	 publish	 funding	 sources.	 	 Two	 journals	 rely	 on	 the	 individual	
judgment	 of	 the	 editors,	 saying	 that	 disclosures	 will	 be	 published	 at	 their	
discretion.		There	is	a	lack	of	consistency	in	how	information	is	published,	even	
amongst	those	journals	that	use	the	ICMJE’s	disclosure	form.		While	some	ensure	
























While	disclosure	of	authors’	 conflicts,	 albeit	 through	varying	 formats,	 is	 fairly	
ubiquitous	 across	 my	 sample	 journals,	 this	 is	 not	 the	 case	 with	 other	 actor	
groups	 involved	 in	 medical/health	 journal	 publishing,	 such	 as	 editors	 and	
editorial	staff;	this	finding	is	similar	to	that	of	Haivas	et	al.’s	study	(Haivas	et	al.,	






have	 a	 conflict,	 the	 ICMJE	 says	 that	 they	 should	 publish	 regular	 disclosure	
statements	 of	 journal	 staff	 (ICMJE,	 2015d).	 	 COPE	 also	 suggests	 that	 editors	
should	publish:	




CSE	recommends	that	everyone	 involved	 in	the	publication	process,	 including	
editors	 and	 their	 staff,	 should	 disclose	 COIs,	 but	 does	 not	 provide	 any	more	






that	 this	 is	 not	 standard	 practice,	 and	 does	 not	 give	 advice	 either	way.	 	 The	
professional	 association	 that	 represents	 the	 pharmaceutical	 industry,	 ISMPP,	
and	 the	medical	writing	associations	EMWA	and	AMWA,	do	not	 remark	upon	










advise	 editors	 to	 disclose	 potential	 conflicts	 anywhere.	 	 Springer	 does	 not	
mention	editors’	COIs	in	its	guidance	for	editors	(it	only	refers	to	authors	and	











vary	 (with	 Table	 6.3	 showing	 that	 there	 are,	 notably,	 more	 disclosure	
requirements	for	editors	amongst	the	higher	IF	 journals	than	the	 ‘contentious	
cases’	 ones).	 	 Some	 journals	 ask	 that	 editors	 publicly	 disclose	 and	 recuse	
themselves	 from	 working	 on	 articles	 over	 which	 they	 may	 be	 conflicted,	
although	it	is	generally	not	made	clear	who	they	will	disclose	this	information	to	





stating	 that	 ‘Editors	 should	 publish	 regular	 disclosure	 statements	 about	
potential	 conflicts	 of	 interests	 related	 to	 the	 commitments	 of	 journal	 staff’	
(Davidoff	et	al.,	2001),	yet	of	 the	seven	 ICMJE	member	 journals	 in	my	sample	
(Annals	of	 Internal	Medicine,	 the	BMJ,	CMAJ,	 JAMA,	The	Lancet,	NEJM	and	PLoS	
Medicine),	 only	 four	 publicly	 declare	 their	 editors’	 COIs	 on	 their	 websites	
(Annals,	 the	BMJ,	CMAJ	 and	PLoS).	 	On	 the	basis	of	 the	policies	 that	 they	have	
made	publicly	available,	The	Lancet,	 JAMA	and	NEJM	do	not	appear	to	require	
editors	to	disclose	conflicts,	simply	stating	that	they	should	not	work	on	articles	
over	 which	 they	 may	 be	 conflicted.	 	 When	 asked	 whether	 the	 journals	 they	









had	 to	 openly	 declare	 them,	 but	 I	 wouldn’t	 handle	 my	 best	 friend’s	





the	need	 to	manage	 editors’	 COIs,	 they	do	not	 always	 appear	 to	put	 this	 into	










should	 have	 any	 financial	 relationship	 with	 any	 biomedical	 company’	 (New	
England	Journal	of	Medicine,	2016),	and	thus	it	may	be	assumed	that	none	of	its	
editors	 have	 any	 relevant	 financial	 COIs	 (although	 it	would	 appear	 from	 this	
statement	that	they	can	have	non-financial	ones).		However,	in	2000	Dr	Jeffrey	
Drazen	 was	 appointed	 EIC	 of	 the	 journal,	 despite	 having	 ties	 with	 the	
pharmaceutical	 industry,	 from	which	he	 received	 funding	 for	 his	 research	 on	
asthma.	 	 The	 year	 before	 he	 was	 appointed,	 he	 provided	 an	 overstated	














correspondent	 of	 the	NEJM	 (Steinbrook	 et	 al.,	 2015),	over	 a	 series	 of	 articles	
published	 that	 year	 in	 the	 journal,	 with	 a	 supporting	 editorial	 by	 Dr	 Drazen	


































































































disclosure	of	 conflicts,	 one	 interviewee,	 a	medical	publishing	 critic,	 suggested	
that	journals	should:	
‘Annually	 publish	 a	 financial	 statement	 indicating	 all	 of	 the	 revenue	
sources.		So,	“We	sold	X	number	of	reprints	and	made	so	many	millions	of	
dollars;	we	got	so	many	millions	of	dollars	from	advertising;	we	got	so	much	




Disclosing	 this	 information	 publicly	 would	 show	 how	much	 journals	 rely	 on	
revenue	 from	 manufacturing	 sector	 companies	 which	 in	 turn	 may	 influence	
editors’	publishing	decisions.	 	Of	 the	professional	associations,	only	COPE	and	
CSE	discuss	this	idea	in	their	guidance,	advising	that	journals	should	publish	the	




















approached	 to	 do	 a	 review.	 	 COPE	 says	 that	 if	 journals	 provide	 no	 guidance,	
reviewers	 should	 proactively	 inform	 them	 of	 any	 working	 or	 personal	
relationships	with	 the	authors.	 	CSE	 is	a	 little	more	helpful:	 it	also	states	 that	
reviewers	 should	 be	 asked,	 and	 further	 suggests	 that	 this	 question	 could	 be	
incorporated	 into	 forms	 in	 online	 submission	 systems,	 emails	 requesting	
reviews,	or	simply	be	included	in	the	journal’s	policy	on	its	website.		As	with	the	
guidance	 on	 editors’	 COIs,	 ISMPP,	 EMWA	 and	 AMWA	 do	 not	 comment	 on	







included	 in	my	sample	 lack	clear	policies	on	this	 topic.	 	Wiley	offers	 the	most	
useful	guidance,	saying	that	invitations	to	review	should:	







reviewed	 article	 which	 did	 not	 disclose	 financial	 support	 from	 the	 tobacco	
industry	(McDaniel	et	al.,	2005).		Elsevier,	T&F	and	Springer	have	guidance	for	
reviewers,	 which	 states	 that	 they	 should	 make	 journal	 editors	 aware	 of	 any	










policies.	 	 Likewise,	 while	 OUP’s	 ‘FAQs	 for	 authors’	 informs	 readers	 that	
reviewers	 will	 be	 asked	 to	 decline	 a	 review	 if	 they	 have	 a	 potential	 conflict	
(Oxford	University	Press,	2013),	again,	it	is	unlikely	that	reviewers	would	look	
here,	and	there	is	no	obvious	guidance	for	editors	on	how	they	might	develop	
their	 policies.	 	 JNCI	 –	 a	 ‘contentious	 cases’	 journal	 (which	 published	 ghost-












Yet	 in	contrast,	only	two	of	my	 ‘contentious	cases’	 journals	discuss	reviewers’	













to	 be	 a	 considerable	 amount	 of	 variability	 in	 their	 disclosure	 policies	 for	




different	 processes	 used	 to	 acquire	 reviewers’	 COI	 disclosures,	 and	 authors’	
comments	 portrayed	 an	 often	 informal	 system	which	 differs	 from	 journal	 to	
journal.		Thus,	while	it	is,	for	the	most	part,	acknowledged	that	reviewers	are	an	
actor	 group	who	may	be	 conflicted	and	 that	 this	 should	be	managed	 through	
disclosure,	limited	attention	is	given	as	to	how	this	should	be	done.		It	is	also	not	
always	 clear,	 from	 the	 guidance,	 what	 action	 is	 taken	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 these	
disclosures:	are	individuals	recused	from	reviewing,	or	do	editors	simply	take	
the	 disclosures	 into	 account	 when	 assessing	 their	 reviews	 (as	 suggested	 by	


































































advises	 that	 their	 involvement	on	a	paper	should	be	acknowledged,	with	their	
funding	 sources	 disclosed;	 there	 is	 no	 mention	 of	 other	 types	 of	 conflicts.		
However,	 it	 also	 says	 that	 they	 should	 follow	 the	 requirements	 of	 the	 journal	








funding	 (and	 sometimes	 other	 financial	 disclosures).	 	 Two	 interviewees	 (Jose	
Merino	(senior	editor,	the	BMJ)	and	Annette	Flanagin	(executive	editor,	JAMA))	
both	said	that	their	journals	have	policies	that	require	the	disclosure	of	medical	




By	 asking	 for	 the	 disclosures	 of	 contributors/medical	 writers,	 the	 six	
journals	listed	above	arguably	offer	more	transparency	than	those	that	do	not.		
However,	 what	 they	 ask	 for	 is	 often	 still	 limited,	 with	 only	 three	 asking	 for	
contributors	(specifically	also	including	medical	writers)	to	disclose	all	potential	
COIs.	 	The	other	three	ask	only	for	disclosure	of	contributors’/medical	writers’	











































conducted	 into	 the	 use	 of	 voluntary	 disclosure	 as	 a	way	 of	managing	 COIs	 in	
various	contexts.		There	are	arguments	advocating	the	benefits	of	disclosure	and	




affect	 the	 behaviour	 of	 those	 disclosing,	 causing	 them	 to	 exaggerate	 the	
information	they	give,	or	behave	in	a	self-serving	way	(Cain	and	Detsky,	2008,	
Cain	et	al.,	2005b,	Loewenstein	et	al.,	2012,	Jamal,	2012);	there	are	concerns	over	
how	disclosure	 influences	 the	 interpretations	by	 recipients	of	 the	 information	
(Ben-Shahar	and	Schneider,	2011,	Kassirer,	2009a,	Loewenstein	et	al.,	2012,	Sah	




As	 part	 of	 my	 interview	 schedule,	 interviewees	 were	 asked	 for	 their	




considering	 it	 to	 be	 a	 useful	 tool	 in	 managing	 COIs.	 	 When	 discussing	 its	







Box 6.2: Summary of interviewees’ perceptions of the strengths and 
































Four	 interviewees	 (working	 in	 editorial	 roles)	 considered	 that	 one	 of	 the	
strengths	entailed	in	the	completion	of	disclosure	forms	or	statements	(if	done	
honestly)	 is	 that	 it	 forces	 actors	 to	 actively	 provide	 a	 report	 about	 potential	
conflicts.	 	They	 felt	 that	most	people	would	honestly	disclose	potential	COIs	 if	




it	 does	 work	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	 authors	 are	 published	 and	 there	 is	 a	
statement	on	record	saying	what	they’re	competing	interests	are.		Because	











Thirteen	 interviewees,	 from	 across	 the	 interview	 groups,	 argued	 that	
author	 disclosures	 ‘empower’	 (David	 Moher,	 Author)	 editors,	 reviewers	 and	






This,	 however,	 depends	 upon	 these	 actors	 seeing	 the	 disclosures	 (see	 Section	
6.3.1).		One	senior	editor	from	a	high	IF	journal	in	my	sample	said	that	they	would	
weigh	up	disclosures	alongside	papers	‘and	evaluate	whether	there	are	any	issues	




conflicts	 of	 interest	 are	 not	 overstating	 the	 significance	 of	 the	 article,	 or	 selling	
anything	in	the	article.’	(EIC4)	
	









are	 forced	 to	be	 reflexive	 and	 consider	how	both	pecuniary	 and	non-financial	
relationships	may	have	biased	them,	or	how	others	may	perceive	them	to	have	








As	 Section	 6.3.1	 argued,	 disclosures	 are	 only	 useful	 if	 editors	 (and	 other	
recipients	 of	 them)	 check	 them	 adequately	 and	 take	 action	 if	 necessary.		
However,	my	 data	 showed	 that	 editors	 rarely	 have	 the	 resources	 and	 do	 not	
consider	it	to	be	their	job	to	check	the	disclosures	of	authors	and	reviewers.		Two	
interviewees	 argued,	 therefore,	 that	 disclosure	 is	 simply	 seen	 as	 a	 pro	 forma	
activity	by	both	those	disclosing	and	those	receiving	the	disclosures,	and	that	it	
is	 not	 adequately	 checked.	 	 While,	 as	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 section,	 two	
authors	 interviewed	 suggested	 that	 the	 process	 of	 disclosure	 forces	 actors	 to	
reflect	upon	their	subjectivities	and	consider	how	these	may	influence	their	work,	
two	other	 interviewees	 countered	 this	by	 suggesting	 that	 it	 can	be	difficult	 to	
judge	 one’s	 own	 conflicts,	 and	 that	 they	 felt	 that	 actors	 may	 fail	 to	 declare	
relevant	information	if	they	do	not	consider	themselves	to	be	conflicted	by	it:	





These	 interviewees	 therefore	 felt	 that	 requiring	 authors	 (and	other	 actors)	 to	
simply	 provide	 a	 disclosure	 statement	 is	 inadequate,	 and	 that	 a	 form	 which	










of	 the	 paper	 owns	 some	 stuff,	 got	 $5000	 in	 compensation	 in	 the	 last	 five	












One	 senior	 editor	 (SE2)	 said	 that	 if	 the	 interests	 disclosed	 are	 too	 great,	 they	
might	 reject	 a	 paper;	 however,	 this	 (along	 with	 concerns	 over	 readers	
disregarding	 information	 in	 their	 articles)	 may	 have	 an	 unintended	 negative	


















avoid	 involving	 actors	 on	papers	 for	which	 they	have	 a	potential	 conflict	 (see	
Chapter	 Seven	 Section	 7.2.2.1)	 or	 to	 try	 and	 limit	 the	 chances	 of	 conflicts	
occurring,	 for	 example	 through	 Journal	 Oversight	 Committees,	 or	 altering	 the	
way	 in	 which	 funding	 is	 distributed	 (see	 Chapter	 Seven,	 Sections	 7.2.2.3	 and	
7.3.3).	 	 Yet,	 despite	 acknowledging	 some	 weaknesses,	 the	 majority	 of	
interviewees	focused	upon	disclosure	as	being	the	system	through	which	COIs	








chapter	 examined	 how	 COIs	 are	 primarily	 managed	 in	 medical	 journal	
publishing.		This	data	showed	that	voluntary	disclosure	has	become	embedded	








The	 chapter	 examined	 which	 actor	 groups	 have	 their	 potential	 COIs	
managed	through	disclosure,	and	which	do	not	(and	which,	therefore,	possibly	
remain	 unmanaged).	 	 As	with	 Chapter	 Five,	which	 demonstrated	 the	ways	 in	
which	authors’	COIs	are	emphasised	while	other	actor	groups	are	omitted	from	
the	 discussion,	 this	 chapter	 showed	 that	 author	 disclosures	 were	 fairly	





for	 other	 actor	 groups,	 such	 as	 editors,	 journal	 owners,	 peer	 reviewers	 and	
contributors	(such	as	medical	writers).	 	While	the	professional	associations	do	




writers	 advise	 in	 their	 guidance/policies	 on	 the	 acknowledgement	 of	
contributors	such	as	medical	writers,	they	say	that	the	journals’	policies	should	







Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 professional	 associations	 do	 advise	 on	 the	
disclosure	 of	 editors’	 COIs,	 this	 does	 not	 appear	 to	 have	 trickled	 down	 to	 the	
majority	of	publishers	and	journals.		This	indicates,	perhaps,	that	the	professional	
associations	are	not	fully	utilised,	and	would	benefit	from	greater	promotion	to	
their	constituencies.	 	However,	even	some	of	 those	 journals	whose	editors	are	
members	of	these	organisations	do	not	follow	their	guidance	in	this	regard.		The	
attempts	 by	 the	 professional	 associations	 regarding	 reviewers’	 disclosures	
appear	to	be	tokenistic;	despite	advising	that	they	disclose,	the	associations	do	
not	 offer	 much	 practical	 advice	 on	 how	 journals	 could	 effectively	 solicit	 this	
information	 (and	 as	 such,	 journal	 requirements	 appear	 to	 be	 variable	 in	 this	
regard).	Requirements	for	disclosures	by	medical	writers	and	other	contributors	
are	 frequently	 absent;	 given	 the	 issues	 that	 have	 occurred	with	 this	 group	 of	
actors,	this	is	perhaps	surprising	(Bastian,	2006,	Lagnado,	2002,	Ross	et	al.,	2008,	
McHenry,	 2010).	 	 This	 calls	 into	 question	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 professional	
associations	and	their	guidance,	with	three	medical	publishing	critics	suggesting	
that	 they	exist	merely	 to	give	 the	 impression	of	 taking	such	matters	seriously,	
while	in	reality	they	are	not	as	effective	as	they	could	be.	
	






in	 the	 case	of	publishers	 such	as	Springer,	OUP	and	T&F,	 they	 should	actually	
provide	more	detailed	guidance).		It	would	also	help	if	the	owners	(publishers	or	














as	 argued	 by	 a	 number	 of	 interviewees,	 this	 form	 is	 somewhat	 cumbersome,	
unwieldy	 and	 too	 detailed;	 this	 has	 put	 a	 number	 of	 journals	 off	 using	 it.		






necessarily	 all	 be	 reproduced	 directly	 onto	 articles,	 in	 the	 interests	 of	
transparency	 it	 should	be	publicly	 available	 so	 that	 readers	 are	better	 able	 to	
contextualise	information	according	to	any	relevant	conflicts.		Therefore,	ideally	
the	in-article	statements	should	work	in	conjunction	with	more	detailed	forms,	
such	as	 the	 ICMJE’s,	 or	 a	database	 such	as	ORCID	 (see	Chapter	 Seven,	 Section	
7.3.1,	for	more	on	this),	which	readers	could	access	if	they	so	wished.	
	
While	 the	 previous	 chapter	 showed	 that	 conflicts	 can	 arise	 from	 both	
financial	and	non-financial	relationships,	it	demonstrated	an	emphasis	in	medical	
journal	publishing	on	the	former,	and	as	such	this	is	focused	on	in	the	disclosure	
requirements.	 	This	 is	perhaps	because	 they	are	easier	 to	define	and	quantify;	











made	 to,	 or	 how	 this	 information	will	 subsequently	 be	 used.	 	 Disclosure	 also	
relies	on	self-awareness:	people	have	to	realise	their	own	conflicts	and	potential	
to	 succumb	 to	 them.	 	 However,	 these	 processes	 are	 often	 unconscious	 and	
unintentional	 (Moore	 et	 al.,	 2005).	 The	 failure	 to	 disclose	 may	 therefore	 be	
unintentional,	 and	 this	 highlights	 one	 of	 the	 problems	 with	 relying	 on	 self-










conducting	 the	 research	 and	 writing	 the	 article.	 	 This	 could	 be	 achieved,	 for	
example,	by	requiring	them	to	include	a	reflexive	disclosure	section	within	their	






in	 the	 possibility	 of	 conflicts	 that	 could	 impact	 on	 the	 content	 of	 journals	
remaining	unmanaged.	 	My	 findings	 suggest	 that	 this	 is	 generally	 accepted	by	
those	within	the	medical	journal	publishing	industry	without	question,	and	with	







this	might	 allow	alternative	 solutions	 to	be	developed.	 	The	 following	 chapter	
looks	 both	 at	 existing	 mechanisms	 for	 managing	 COIs	 beyond	 disclosure,	 to	
examine	their	role	in	practice,	as	well	as	at	suggestions	of	alternatives	made	by	





















broader	 mechanisms	 were	 evident	 in	 the	 sample	 guidance/policies	 and	
interviews,	that	may	also	assist	in	the	management	of	COIs.		When	asked	about	
new	ideas	for	how	the	management	of	COIs	could	be	improved,	responses	from	
those	 working	 directly	 within	 the	 medical	 journal	 publishing	 industry	 were	
limited.		They	mainly	built	on	the	concept	of	disclosure.		However,	two	alternative	
suggestions	were	raised	(as	will	be	discussed	in	Section	7.3),	primarily	by	medical	
publishing	 critics.	 	 This	 demonstrates	 that	 change	 in	 thinking	 around	 COIs	 is	
perhaps	possible.	 	This	chapter	begins,	 in	Section	7.2,	by	analysing	the	sample	
documents	and	interviews	to	identify	those	existing	broader	mechanisms,	firstly	
looking	at	 those	 that	 assist	with	managing	COIs	 in	 research,	before	 looking	at	










As	 Chapter	 Six	 showed,	 in	 medical/health	 journal	 publishing,	 disclosure	 is	
portrayed	as	being	the	primary	mechanism	through	which	COIs	are	managed.		As	
part	of	my	interview	schedule,	participants	were	asked	whether	they	felt	there	
were	 any	 existing	 additional	 systems	beyond	disclosure	 to	 assist	 in	managing	
COIs.	 The	 following	 section	 explores	 their	 responses.	 	 Several	 supplementary	
mechanisms	 and	 policies	were	 identified.	 	 Along	with	 exploring	 interviewees’	
discussion	of	these,	this	section	also	analyses	my	sample	policies	and	guidance,	
to	 understand	 how	 much	 of	 a	 role	 they	 appear	 to	 play	 in	 managing	 COIs	 in	
practice.	 	 When	 asked	 about	 what	 methods	 exist	 beyond	 disclosure	 to	 help	








Interviewees	 identified	 Clinical	 Trial	 Registration	 (CTR)	 as	 a	 mechanism	 that	
helps	to	mitigate	selective	reporting	and	publication	bias,	with	one	of	its	purposes	
being	 to	 ‘prevent	 selective	 publication	 and	 selective	 reporting	 of	 research	
outcomes’	 (ICMJE,	2014b).	 	The	 ICMJE	declared	 in	2004	that	member	 journals	
would	no	longer	publish	trials	if	they	had	not	been	registered	on	a	public	registry	
that	 participates	 in	 the	 WHO	 International	 Clinical	 Trials	 Registry	 Platform	
(Council	of	Science	Editors,	2012b,	De	Angelis	et	al.,	2004),	and	encouraged	other	
journals	 to	 follow	 suit	 (see	De	Angelis	 et	 al.,	 2004).	 	 Registering	 clinical	 trials	
when	 they	 commence	 on	 a	 publicly	 available	 database	 reduces	 the	 chance	 of	
publication	bias	occurring,	by	allowing	editors	to	check	that	the	results	have	not	








CTR	 is	 endorsed	 by	 all	 the	 professional	 publishing	 associations	 in	 my	
sample.		CSE	backs	the	ICMJE’s	position	(CSE	Editorial	Policy	Committee,	2006)	
and	WAME	 likewise	 supports	 CTR,	 arguing	 that	 ‘When	 suitable	 registries	 are	
available,	editors	should	require	prior	registration	of	all	trials	published	in	their	
journals.’	(WAME	Editorial	Policy	Committee,	2005b)		ISMPP’s	GPP2	states	that:	
‘Research	 sponsors	 must	 register	 and	 post	 all	 applicable	 clinical	 trials	
according	 to	 the	definitions	and	timelines	required	of	 them	by	relevant	
legislation	and	guidance’	(Graf	et	al.,	2009).			
	







‘You	 could	 imagine	 registries	 doing	 a	 much	 better	 job	 of	 shaming	
investigators	or	sponsors	who	haven’t	published	their	research.		They	have	
a	reasonably	unbiased	dataset	of	trials	that	are	planned	or	already	started	














‘Medical	 journals	 that	 publish	 clinical	 trials	 should	 make	 prospective	




2014)	 –	 which	 calls	 for	 all	 past	 and	 present	 clinical	 trials	 to	 be	 registered,	
together	with	 the	 reporting	of	 their	 results	 –	 there	does	not	appear	 to	be	any	
mention	 of	 it	 in	 the	 guidance	 and	 policies	 available	 on	 its	 website	 for	 either	
authors	 or	 editors.	 	 At	 the	 time	 the	 analysis	 for	 this	 project	 was	 conducted,	
Springer,	OUP	and	T&F	also	did	not	refer	to	CTR	in	their	guidance	for	authors	or	
editors.		While	the	journals	in	my	high	impact	factor	(IF)	sample	do	all	provide	











Table 7.1: Reference to CTR in the guidance and/or submission processes of 























Table 7.2: Reference to CTR in the guidance and/or submission processes of 



























to	 enforce	 ICMJE	 criteria	 about	 registration	 of	 clinical	 trials	 …	 even	 the	









initiative	 in	 helping	 to	 prevent	 COIs	 and	 resulting	 bias	 from	 affecting	 the	
published	literature	on	clinical	trials,	it	would	appear	that	there	has	not	been	a	




Interviewees	referred	 to	 the	development	of	Clinical	Trial	Protocols	 (CTPs)	as	
another	initiative	that	has	the	potential,	where	used,	to	help	prevent	bias	from	
affecting	 the	 conduct	 of	 clinical	 trials,	 and	 consequently	 the	 medical	 journal	
literature.	 	 Drawn	 up	 at	 the	 commencement	 of	 a	 clinical	 trial,	 the	 protocol	
document	 provides	 details	 of	 how	 the	 trial	 will	 be	 conducted,	 including	 its	
objectives,	design,	methodology,	statistical	considerations	and	organisation	(UK	






‘It	helps	commit	people	 in	advance	 to	what	 they’re	gonna	do,	before	 they	
actually	do	it	…	It	means	people	are	gonna	be	held	accountable	for	what	they	




be	 explained’	 (David	 Moher,	 Author).	 	 CTPs	 allow	 editors	 to	 check	 for	 any	
‘massaging	and	spinning	which	can	move	towards	a	more	beneficial	picture’	(SE2).		
The	 SPIRIT	 Statement	 assists	 with	 the	 development	 of	 CTPs,	 with	 the	 aim	 of	
improving	 their	quality,	by	providing	 ‘recommendations	 for	a	minimum	set	of	








specifically	 state	 that	 CTPs	 should	 be	 supplied.	 	NEJM	 merely	 requires	 that	 a	





protocols	at	all.	 	None	of	my	sample	guidance	and	policies	refer	 to	 the	SPIRIT	
Statement.			
	
Perhaps	 reflecting	 this,	 none	 of	 the	 interviewees	 who	 discussed	 trial	
protocols	as	a	means	of	managing	bias	were	from	either	my	‘contentious	cases’	
journal	sample,	or	from	other	small,	speciality	journals.		Those	that	did	discuss	
trial	 protocols	were	 from	 the	 high	 IF	 journals,	medical	 publishing	 critics,	 and	
others	who	work	in	publication	ethics,	and	who	were	therefore	likely	to	have	an	






inadequate	 reporting	 of	 randomized	 controlled	 trials’	 (CONSORT	 Statement,	
n.d.).	 	 They	 provide	 checklists	 and	 flowcharts	 that	 set	 out	 the	 requisite	 items	
authors	 should	provide	 to	 journals.	 	Their	 aim	 is	 to	 enable	people	 to	perform	
research	robustly	from	the	start	of	the	process	through	to	publication:		
‘They	are	primarily	trying	to	get	people	to	do	research	in	the	right	way,	from	
the	 start	of	 the	process,	not	 just	 the	writing	up	of	 the	 research,	but	 right	











guidelines	 offer	 advice	 on	 a	 vast	 array	 of	 different	 types	 of	 research	 studies	
(EQUATOR	Network,	n.d.-c).		The	main	guidelines	are	listed	in	Table	7.3.		
	














Nineteen	 interviewees	 (publishers,	 managing	 and	 senior	 editors	 from	
high	IF	journals,	authors	and	medical	writers)	referred	to	reporting	guidelines,	
saying	that	they	are	useful	tools	and	that	they	improve	the	reporting	of	research:	
‘I	 think	 they	 actually	 make	 people’s	 lives	 easier,	 reporting	 guidelines	






None	 of	 the	 interviewees	 from	 my	 ‘contentious	 cases’	 journals,	 however,	
discussed	them.		As	with	CTR,	there	is	limited	reference	to	reporting	guidelines	
in	the	sample	publishers’	guidance:	only	Wiley	refers	to	the	EQUATOR	network	







guidance	 or	 submission	 processes	 (AJC,	 AJM,	 Birth	 Defects,	 Environmental	
Technology,	IAEOH,	JNCI,	JIM	and	Risk	Analysis).		As	one	publisher	acknowledged:	
‘the	reporting	guidelines	like	CONSORT,	I	don’t	know	how	often	they’re	really	
used	 properly,	 and	 I’m	 sure	 that	 they	 could	 be	 used	 better.’	 (Chris	 Graf,	
Publisher,	Wiley)			
	
According	 to	one	 interviewee	who	was	 involved	 in	 the	development	of	







good,	 and	maybe	we	don’t	want	 to	 encourage	our	authors	 to	use	 them.”’	
(David	Moher,	Author)			
	
Further,	while	 those	 interviewees	who	 discussed	 the	 reporting	 guidelines	 did	
speak	 positively	 of	 their	 intentions,	 two	 expressed	 concerns	 about	 their	
practicality.	 	One	managing	editor	argued	that,	while	he	 felt	 initiatives	such	as	




they	 may	 be	 unable	 to	 wait	 until	 authors	 have	 provided	 them	 with	 such	














everything	 else	 required.	 	 Overall	 editors	 gave	 the	 impression	 of	 being	 over-
stretched	 resource-wise,	 and	 as	 such	may	 also	 not	 have	 time	 to	 enforce	 such	
policies.	 	 	 Editors	 may	 request	 that	 authors	 provide	 the	 checklists,	 but	 this	







trials	 that	 don’t	 have	 all	 of	 the	 CONSORT	 elements	 in	 them.’	 (Tom	Lang,	
Medical	Writer)	
	
Thus,	 while	 reporting	 guidelines	 may	 in	 theory	 be	 a	 useful	 initiative,	 their	
practicability,	 and	 therefore	 effectiveness,	 has	 been	questioned.	 	David	Moher	







Five	 interviewees	 suggested	 that	 certain	 types	 of	 articles,	 such	 as	 editorials,	
commentaries	 and	 reviews,	 could	 potentially	 be	 at	 a	 greater	 risk	 of	 bias	 than	
others.		Six	journals	from	my	sample	–	five	high	IF	journals	(the	BMJ,	NEJM,	The	
Lancet,	PLoS	Medicine	 and	Annals)	and	one	 ‘contentious	cases’	 journal	 (AJM)	–	










Section	 7.2.1.2)	 and	 methodology	 sections	 which	 enable	 them	 to	 be	 judged	










articles	 if	 written	 by	 ‘industry’,	 unless	 they	 were	 specifically	 looking	 for	 an	
industry	perspective.		Another	EIC	of	a	high	IF	journal	(EIC6)	said	that	they	would	
not	publish	such	articles	if	the	author	had	any	competing	interests;	similarly,	a	









the	basis	of	 its	 authors	having	 conflicts	which	 they	have	disclosed,	 is	 itself	 an	












then	 readers	 should	 be	 able	 to	 assess	 them	 on	 that	 basis:	 one	 editor	 in	 chief	




Some	 journals	 have	 instigated	 policies	whereby	 they	 refuse	 to	 publish	
articles	resulting	from	research	funded	by	the	tobacco	industry.		The	American	
Journal	 of	 Respiratory	 Cell	 and	 Molecular	 Biology	 and	 American	 Journal	 of	
Respiratory	 and	 Critical	 Care	 Medicine	 have	 not	 published	 tobacco-funded	
research	 since	1995	 (Frankel,	 1995)	and	 their	 stance	 is	 clearly	 stated	 in	 their	
‘Instructions	for	Contributors’	(American	Journal	of	Respiratory	and	Critical	Care	
Medicine,	 2016,	 American	 Journal	 of	 Respiratory	 Cell	 and	 Molecular	 Biology,	
2016).	 	Tobacco	 Control,	 published	 by	 the	BMJ	Group,	 originally	 stated	 that	 it	
would	not	ban	 such	articles	 as	doing	 so	would	prevent	 ‘the	occasional	honest	




funded,	 in	whole	or	 in	part,	 by	a	 tobacco	 company	or	 tobacco	 industry	
organization.	Nor	will	the	journal	consider	papers	by	authors	who	accept	
tobacco	industry	funding,	including	funding	for	research	costs,	for	all	or	
part	 of	 any	 author’s	 salary,	 or	 other	 forms	 of	 personal	 remuneration.’	
(Tobacco	Control,	2016)	
	
In	 explaining	 the	 development	 of	 such	 practices,	 one	 former	 EIC	 for	 such	 a	
journal,	interviewed	in	the	capacity	of	a	medical	publishing	critic,	explained:	
‘The	 evidence	 accumulated	 that	 there	was	 so	much	 going	 on	 behind	 the	
scenes	at	some	of	 these	tobacco-related	publications,	 that	we	could	never	
actually	 trust	what	was	 in	 the	 article,	 because	 there	were	 lawyers	 being	















have	 any	 such	 published	 policies.	 	 Interviewees	 from	 the	 tobacco	 industry,	





















‘Pharma	 can	have	bad	press,	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time	 they’re	 producing	 the	
drugs	that	are	saving	the	lives.’	(Ann	Lloyd,	Publisher,	Elsevier)	
	
In	 a	 similar	 vein	 to	 the	 arguments	 made	 above	 in	 relation	 to	 tobacco	
funded	 research	by	Chris	Proctor	 and	Peter	Lee,	 another	 four	 interviewees	 (a	
publisher,	 two	senior	editors,	and	a	managing	editor)	also	expressed	concerns	





‘The	 study’s	 already	 happened.	 	 The	 participants	 have	 taken	 part	 in	 the	
study,	it’s	actually	data.		There’s	sort	of	an	ethical	argument	for	saying	that	






‘There’s	no	 justifiable	value	[research	funded	by	the	tobacco	 industry]	 ...	
pharmaceutical	treatments	do	generally	help	people.	 	Pharma	is	trying	to	




None	 of	 the	 journals	 in	 my	 sample	 refuse	 to	 publish	 research	 funded	 by	 the	
pharmaceutical	 industry.	 	 However,	 one	 interviewee,	 Richard	 Smith	 (former	




This	 is	 because	 it	 has	 been	 shown	 that	 some	pharmaceutical	 companies	 have	
employed	 many	 similar	 methods	 as	 the	 former	 to	 hide	 bias,	 both	 through	
controlling	the	research	and	resulting	publications	
‘If	you’re	going	to	follow	the	line	of	not	publishing	tobacco-funded	research	
because	a)	 there’s	 lots	of	evidence	of	 it	being	corrupted	and	b)	 there	was	
evidence	 of	 tobacco	 companies	 continuing	 using	 this	 as	 a	 way	 to	 ignore	
negative	 aspects	 of	 tobacco	 or	 continuing	 to	 publish	 things	 that	 can	 be	
positively	harmful.	 	Then	all	of	that	applies	to	drug	companies	on	a	much	




the	 research	 and	 resulting	 publications.	 	 Another	 interviewee	 (a	 medical	
publishing	critic	who	was	previously	a	senior	editor	of	a	journal	that	has	banned	
tobacco-funded	research),	did	not	agree.	 	S/he	argued	that	the	pharmaceutical	
industry	 has	 responded	 more	 positively	 to	 criticisms	 than	 its	 tobacco	












When	 asked	 about	 systems	 in	 place	 that	 can	 help	 to	 manage	 COIs,	 besides	
disclosure,	 12	 interviewees	 (editors	 and	 publishers)	 discussed	 peer	 review.		
These	 interviewees	suggested	several	ways	 in	which	reviewers	could	assist	 in	
preventing	COIs	from	having	an	impact	on	articles.		Firstly,	they	are	able	to	check	
that	the	methods	cited	are	suitable	and	that	the	conclusions	accurately	reflect	the	
data	 available;	 this,	 however,	 is	 dependent	 on	 the	 data	 being	 accessible	 to	
reviewers,	and	their	being	able	to	analyse	it.		Secondly,	they	can	assess	articles	
for	bias	in	the	context	of	any	disclosed	conflicts;	this,	however,	is	only	possible	if	
authors	 are	 named	 and	 have	 honestly	 declared	 any	 conflicts,	 and	 that	 this	
information	is	provided	to	the	reviewers	(as	shown	in	Chapter	Six,	from	analysis	
of	journal	policies,	it	is	not	clear	that	this	is	done).		Thirdly,	reviewers	can	alert	






























is	 turned	 up	 to	 its	 highest	 level.’		
	
This,	 however,	 depends	 on	 the	 involvement	 of	 such	 ‘commercial	 enterprises’	
being	declared.		Further,	raw	datasets	(particularly	from	large	clinical	trials)	are	
often	not	made	publicly	available	(see	Section	7.3.2	of	this	chapter	for	more	on	
this).	 	 In	such	cases,	peer	reviewers	would	not	be	able	 to	 truly	check	whether	




data	 are	made	 available,	 reviewers	will	 not	 necessarily	 have	 the	 expertise	 to	
analyse	 them;	 journals	 therefore	 need	 to	 have	 the	 resources	 to	 employ	
professional	statisticians	to	review	them	(although	as	discussed	in	Chapter	Five,	
Section	5.4.3,	JAMA,	which	did	previously	do	this,	reversed	its	policy	due	to	the	












and	may	 identify	 and	 contact	 journals	 about	 undisclosed	 conflicts.	 	 However,	
even	 if	 undisclosed	 conflicts	 are	 detected,	 and	 an	 amendment	 or	 retraction	
issued,	the	article	in	question	will	still	have	been	in	the	public	domain	for	a	period	
of	time,	and	may	itself	have	been	cited.		COPE	has	developed	two	flowcharts	that	
describe	 the	 processes	 journals	 should	 follow	 if	 either	 reviewers	 or	 readers	
contact	them	in	relation	to	undisclosed	conflicts	(Wager,	2013a,	Wager,	2013b).		
In	both	cases,	however,	the	charts	advise	that	if	authors	deny	a	claim,	the	journal	




the	 fear	 of	 being	 caught	 out	 by	 the	 scientific	 community,	 and	 the	 resulting	
embarrassment,	may	 alone	motivate	 authors	 to	 behave	honestly	 and	disclose.		
Five	senior/managing	editors	said	that	they	had	experiences	of	readers	getting	
in	 touch	when	 they	 spotted	undisclosed	conflicts,	but	 they	acknowledged	 that	
this	happens	rarely.	 	A	 long-term	consultant	for	the	tobacco	industry,	who	has	
authored	articles	for	it	(Peter	Lee)	hypothesised	that	this	may	be	because	readers	
are	fearful	of	 ‘rocking	the	boat’	and	being	 ‘accused	of	 libel	or	slander’.	 	Another	
author	said	that	unless	he	spotted	a	‘horrendously	egregious’	omission,	he	would	

























have	 a	 JOC,	 but	 does	 have	 a	 policy	 on	 editorial	 independence	 (NEJM	 Journal	




written	 controversial	 article	 Study	 329	 on	 Paxil	 (Keller	 et	 al.,	 2001),	 which	










While	 the	professional	publishing	associations	do	refer	 to	 the	COIs	that	
can	arise	between	editors	and	owners,	only	the	ICMJE	and	CSE	discuss	JOCs	as	a	
way	 of	 managing	 them.	 	 ICMJE	 advises	 on	 the	 establishment	 of	 independent	
editorial	 advisory	 boards	 ‘to	 support	 editorial	 decisions	 and	 potentially	
controversial	expressions	of	opinion’	(ICMJE,	2013,	p.	6).		CSE	recommends	that	





‘An	 independent	 and	 objective	 journal	 oversight	 committee	 for	









pressure	 from	 publishers	 and	 owners,	 my	 analysis	 of	 the	 interviews	 and	 the	
guidance	and	policies	indicates	that	they	do	not	appear	to	be	a	common	feature	
of	journals.		Further,	the	fact	that	the	CMA	set	up	a	JOC	in	2003	(Hoey	and	Todkill,	


























CSE	 and	 WAME	 state	 that	 policies	 and	 contracts	 on	 editorial	 independence	
should	be	made	public,	this	guidance	does	not	appear	to	be	widely	followed.		Only	
one	 interviewee	 (a	 publisher)	 made	 reference	 to	 contracts	 as	 a	 means	 for	
managing	COIs:	when	I	asked	about	editors’	disclosure	of	COIs	to	their	publishers,	













Medical	 Publishing	 Critic),	 aimed	 at	 improving	 the	 image	 of	 medical	 journal	




following	 section	 now	 presents	 further	 suggestions	 made	 by	 interviewees	 of	





central	 repository	 of	 disclosures	 was	 the	 most	 frequent	 suggestion	 made	 by	




pharmaceutical	 company	 representative,	 a	 medical	 publishing	 critic	 and	 an	
author).		The	suggestions	that	follow	this	propose	more	fundamental	alterations	
to	 the	 process	 of	 both	 medical	 research	 and	 publishing.	 	 Those	 interviewees	
(primarily	medical	publishing	critics	who	provided	a	more	critical	voice	than	the	











of	 researchers	 (ideally	 including	 authors,	 reviewers	 and	 editors).	 	 This	would	
offer	 a	 way	 of	 storing	 and	 accessing	 actors’	 COIs,	 which	 would	 improve	
transparency	 further.	 	 Jason	 Roberts	 (managing	 editor)	 also	 suggested	 that	 a	
central	repository	could	be	used	to	store	information	on	clinical	trials,	rather	than	


















While	 some	 interviewees	 complained	 that	 detailed	 disclosure	 forms	 are	 often	
impractical	–	for	example,	it	can	be	hard	for	editors	to	get	authors	to	submit	them,	
and	 readers	 may	 not	 actually	 read	 them	 –	 a	 frequent	 criticism	 raised	 by	
interviewees	of	current	disclosure	policies	was	that	they	do	not	offer	sufficient	
detail.	 	 Two	 interviewees	 suggested	 that	 a	 central	 repository	would	 allow	 the	
disclosure	 of	 a	 greater	 level	 of	 detail	 regarding	 funding	 and	 other	 financial	















indirect	 influence.	 	 Such	 a	 repository,	 therefore,	would	 offer	 a	more	 complete	
picture	of	actors’	potential	COIs.	
	
Potential	 problems	 that	 may	 emerge	 when	 trying	 to	 establish	 such	 a	







area	 of	 research.	 	 Additionally,	 they	 felt	 that	 such	 a	 database	 would	 offer	




actors	may	not	 consider	 immediately	 relevant	 to	a	 current	piece	of	work,	 and	














and	 COPE	 supported	 such	 an	 incentive,	 especially	 if	 they	 then	 encouraged	
journals	to	adopt	a	stance	whereby	they	would	only	publish	registered	authors.		
However,	as	shown	in	Section	7.2.1.1,	such	endorsement	has	not	been	entirely	
successful	 with	 regards	 to	 CTR,	 and	 therefore	 could	 not	 be	 relied	 on	 to	







	 There	 have	 been	 moves	 towards	 developing	 such	 repositories.	 	 The	
Physicians	 Sunshine	 Act,	 introduced	 in	 the	 US	 in	 2010,	 requires	 the	
manufacturers	 of	 drugs,	 medical	 devices	 and	 biologicals	 that	 take	 part	 in	 US	
federal	health	care	programmes	to	report	consulting	fees,	research	grants,	travel	
reimbursements,	 and	 other	 gifts	 that	 are	 given	 to	 physicians	 and	 teaching	
hospitals		(cms.gov,	2014,	American	Medical	Association,	n.d.).	These	are	stored	
















by	 a	 variety	 of	 publishing	 organisations,	 is	 a	 database	 that	 links	 research	
activities	and	outputs	to	researchers.	 	Researchers	who	sign	up	to	 it	can	 input	
details	 of	 their	 research	 activities	 (such	 as	 manuscript	 submissions,	 grant	
applications	and	patent	applications),	which	are	linked	to	their	unique	personal	
identifier	numbers.	 	ORCID	was	the	subject	of	seminars	at	a	Council	of	Science	






even	 ask	 them	 to	 give	me	a	 conflict	 in	 future,	 I’ll	 just	 literally	 have	 their	
ORCID	number	and	I’ll	just	key	in	the	number.		Boom,	it’ll	pull	it	out.’	(Jason	
Roberts,	Managing	Editor)	
They	 suggested	 that	 ORCID	 could	 act	 as	 the	 central	 repository	 and	 contain	
relevant	 financial	 information	 which	 could	 then	 be	 accessed	 by	 other	 actors.		
Another	interviewee	(an	executive	editor)	referred	to	other	existing	databases	













2011,	 Godlee,	 2011a,	 Jefferson	 et	 al.,	 2011,	 Ebrahim	 et	 al.,	 2014,	 Henry	 and	
Fitzpatrick,	2015).		Eleven	interviewees	from	across	the	actor	groups	argued	that	






















and	 JNCI	 state	 that	 the	 raw	 data	must	 be	made	 available	 to	 the	 journal	 upon	
request.		One	interviewee	(a	medical	writer)	suggested	that	‘most	journals	don’t	
have	 the	 resources	 to	 actually	 do	 that’	 (Tom	 Lang)	 –	 that	 is,	 have	 statistical	




Section	 7.2.2.2,	many	 reviewers	may	 not	 actually	 have	 the	 statistical	 analysis	
abilities	 to	 be	 able	 to	 interpret	 it	 sufficiently).	 	 Further,	 Jose	 Merino	 (Senior	
Editor,	 the	 BMJ)	 argued	 that	 such	 requests	 are	 ‘not	 enforceable’	 unless	 all	
journals	make	them,	as	authors	and	companies	could	simply	publish	elsewhere.		
In	order	 to	encourage	 journals	 to	 require	 copies	of	 the	 raw	data,	 one	medical	
writer	 (MW1)	 suggested	 that,	 as	 with	 CTR,	 organisations	 such	 as	 the	 ICMJE	
should	 endorse	 it	 and	 insist	 that	 their	 member	 journals	 do	 so.	 	 However,	 as	
discussed	 in	Section	7.2.1,	 the	success	of	 this	 in	other	areas	 like	CTR	has	been	





Five	medical	 publishing	 critics	who	were	 interviewed	 argued	 that	 data	
from	trials	should	be	made	publicly	available,	rather	than	only	to	the	journals,	so	
that	 others	 are	 able	 to	 reanalyse	 it	 and	 produce	 additional	 (and	 potentially	
alternative)	 interpretations	of	 it	 (also,	as	discussed	 in	Section	7.2.2.2,	 it	would	
help	peer	reviewers	when	reviewing	papers,	providing	they	have	the	appropriate	
statistical	 analysis	 skills).	 	 One	 such	 interviewee	 (MPC3)	 explained	 that	
replication	is	the	cornerstone	of	science;	David	Healy	(a	medical	publishing	critic)	
concurred,	stating	that	to	refuse	to	allow	outside	analysis	is	‘plain	not	scientific’.		
Further,	 it	 would	 provide	 the	 opportunity,	 in	 cases	 where	 a	 study	 has	 been	
controversial,	for	it	to	be	re-examined:	making	the	data	publicly	available	 ‘does	
allow	that	opportunity,	if	there	is	a	lot	of	criticism	of	a	study,	then	go	back	and	see	











change	 in	 the	 model	 of	 research	 and	 publishing,	 arguing	 that,	 rather	 than	
conducting	the	analysis	and	producing	articles	themselves,	companies	should	put	
the	raw	data	from	trials	on	their	websites,	enabling	others	who	are	external	to	










When	 considering	 alternative	 ways	 to	 manage	 COIs,	 the	 medical	 publishing	
critics	I	interviewed	moved	beyond	disclosure	and	made	suggestions	involving	
more	deep-seated	changes	in	the	processes	of	both	medical/health	research	and	
publishing.	 	 They	 argued	 that	 simply	 declaring	 interests	 is	 not	 sufficient	 for	
managing	 COIs,	 and	 felt	 that,	 rather	 than	 improving	 disclosure	 policies,	 the	
current	system	of	funding	and	publishing	needs	to	fundamentally	alter,	in	order	






However,	 other	 interviewees	 from	 other	 areas	 of	 medical	 journal	 publishing	
expressed	 concern	 that	 without	 pharmaceutical	 industry	 funding,	 much	
important	 research	would	not	 be	done.	 	 Acknowledging	 this	 (and	 rather	 than	
advocating	 an	 outright	 ban	 on	 the	 publication	 of	 such	 research),	 Juredini	
suggested	 that	 industry	 funding	 should	 be	 either	 routed	 through	 public	













of	 COIs	 in	 medical	 journal	 publishing,	 by	 those	 working	 within	 the	 field,	 is	
somewhat	static.		The	interview	data	showed	that	actors,	embedded	as	they	are	
within	 the	 institutional	 environment	 of	 medical	 journal	 publishing	 (they	 are	
themselves	an	integral	part	of	it),	tend	to	focus	on	the	accepted	understandings	
of	what	 comprises	 COIs	 and	 how	 they	 should	 be	managed.	 	 However,	 as	 this	
chapter	has	shown,	analysis	of	the	data	did	identify	several	existing	mechanisms	




A	number	of	 journals	refuse	to	publish	particular	 types	of	articles	 from	
authors	with	conflicts.		The	argument	for	this	seems	to	be	that	bias	is	more	likely	















some	 interviewees	 queried	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 this	 process	 in	 general,	 and	
consequently	whether	it	can	be	considered	an	effective	way	of	picking	up	on	bias	
in	articles	and	undisclosed	conflicts.		Further,	reviewers	themselves,	as	an	actor	
group,	 can	 be	 conflicted,	 and	 their	 own	 biases	 may	 affect	 their	 treatment	 of	
articles.	 	For	reviewers	 to	effectively	assist	with	 the	management	of	COIs,	and	









them	 to	 undisclosed	 conflicts.	 	 COPE	 offers	 flowcharts	 of	 how	 editors	 should	
respond	to	claims	of	undisclosed	conflicts	by	reviewers	or	readers;	however,	if	
authors	deny	such	accusations,	COPE’s	advice	appears	to	be	to	simply	take	their	
word	 for	 it.	 	 It	 does	 not	 advise	 on	 any	 further	 investigations	 that	 should	 be	
undertaken.	 	None	of	 the	 journals	 in	my	sample	currently	offer	 information	to	
readers	on	what	to	do	if	they	know	or	suspect	there	to	be	undisclosed	conflicts.		
If	readers	are	to	play	a	role	in	managing	authors’	COIs,	after	articles	have	been	
published,	 then	 journals	 should	 actively	 call	 on	 readers	 (on	 their	websites,	 or	
articles	themselves)	to	report	any	known,	undeclared	conflicts,	instigate	an	easily	
used	 reporting	 mechanism,	 and	 provide	 information	 on	 what	 the	 journal’s	
procedure	is	for	investigating	them.	
	
Many	 of	 the	 additional	 mechanisms	 identified	 in	 the	 data	 specifically	
relate	 to	 authors,	with	 less	 focus	 on	 other	 actor	 groups.	 	 The	 only	 additional	






JOCs	 and	 contracts	 between	 editors	 and	 journal	 owners.	 	 If	 journals	 have	
provisions	in	place	to	protect	editorial	freedom,	editors	may	be	more	willing	to	
question	 decisions	 they	 are	 uncomfortable	 with.	 	 However,	 there	 is	 limited	
promotion	by	the	professional	publishing	associations	of	initiatives	such	as	JOCs.		









While	 some	 interviewees	 cited	 CTR	 as	 being	 a	 mechanism	 that	 had	
alleviated	problems	of	publication	bias	and	inaccurate	reporting	of	trials,	the	fact	
that	not	all	journals	(including	four	in	my	sample)	or	publishers	refer	to	it	in	their	
guidance/policies	 and	 submission	 systems	 suggests	 that	 it	 is	 not	 currently	
ubiquitous	enough	to	act	as	a	means	of	managing	COIs	at	an	industry	level.		It	is	
unfortunate	that	many	journals	do	not	check	whether	clinical	trials	are	registered	
or	 not,	 as	 it	 is	 a	 potentially	 useful	 tool	 in	 the	 reduction	 of	 publication	 bias.		
Similarly,	 not	many	 journals	 appear	 to	 employ	 other	 processes	 that	 have	 the	
potential	 to	 help	 reduce	 conflicts	 and	 resulting	 bias	 from	 impacting	 on	 the	
published	 literature,	 such	 as	CTP.	 	 The	 reporting	 guidelines	 also	 appear	 to	be	





















suggested	 by	 Jason	 Roberts	 (managing	 editor)	 a	 place	 where	 information	 on	
clinical	 trials	 could	 be	 stored	 and	 accessed,	 thereby	 taking	 the	 onus	 of	
responsibility	 for	collecting	this	off	 journal	editors.	 	However,	such	a	database	
would	still	rely	on	the	honesty	of	individuals,	and	their	ability	to	keep	it	up-to-





regards	 to	 altering	 the	 fundamental	 models	 of	 both	 medical	 research	 and	
publishing:	 alternative	 funding	 models	 and	 open	 data.	 	 However,	 these	
interviewees	acknowledged	that	such	changes	are	unlikely	to	occur	in	reality.		For	
example,	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	 pharmaceutical	 companies	would	 agree	 to	 pay	 for	
research	over	which	they	had	no	control.		With	regards	to	the	debate	over	making	
raw	 data	 publicly	 available,	 this	 would	 allow	 controversial	 studies	 to	 be	
reanalysed.		However,	many	researchers	may	be	unwilling	to	be	involved	in	such	
work:	they	may	find	it	hard	to	get	funding	for	it,	and	journals	that	are	willing	to	












This	 chapter,	 however,	 identified	 several	 existing	 additional	 processes,	
examining	how	effective	 they	are.	 	Yet	while	 in	 theory	 these	may	be	useful	 in	
assisting	 in	 the	 management	 of	 COIs,	 in	 practice	 they	 are	 not	 effectively	
employed,	with	limited	uptake	and	enforcement.		Some	medical	publishing	critics	






















The	 aim	 of	 this	 qualitative	 research	 thesis	 was	 to	 explore	 both	 the	
conceptualisation	of	COIs	in	medical	journal	publishing	and	the	impact	this	has	
on	their	management,	and	to	consider	how	this	might	be	improved.		The	primary	
research	 question	 was:	 To	 what	 extent	 does	 the	 institutional	 environment	 of	






regulation,	 and	 how	 they	 should	 be	 handled.	 	 However,	 as	 Chapter	 Two	
demonstrated,	other	actor	groups	can	have	conflicts	that	can	affect	the	journal	
literature;	 they	 can	 be	 caused	 by	 a	 range	 of	 interests	 beyond	 financial;	 and	







explores	 several	 theories	 of	 institutionalism	 (e.g.	 Mahoney	 and	 Thelen,	 2010,	





relatively	 narrow	 conceptualisation	 of	 COIs.	 	 It	 explores	 how	 particular	 ideas	
regarding	COIs	(what	they	are,	who	can	have	potential	relevant	conflicts,	and	how	
they	should	be	managed)	can	be	understood	as	having	become	institutionalised	
within	medical	 journal	publishing.	 	Section	8.4	draws	 further	upon	theories	of	
















explored	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 COIs	 are	 conceptualised	 in	 medical	 journal	
publishing,	in	terms	of	both	understandings	of	who	it	is	that	can	be	conflicted	and	
of	 what	 types	 of	 interests	 can	 pose	 conflicts.	 	 Analysis	 of	 the	 sample	
policies/guidance	and	 interviews,	 in	Section	5.2,	 showed	 that	a	heavy	 focus	 is	
placed	on	the	conflicts	of	named	authors,	while	other	actors	such	as	reviewers	
and	 editors	 are	 discussed	 less,	 and	 journal	 owners	 and	 contributors	 (such	 as	
medical	 writers	 and	 statisticians)	 are	 given	 very	 limited	 attention.	 	 The	
interviews	further	demonstrate	that	the	range	of	actors	beyond	authors	who	are	
perceived	as	possibly	having	conflicts	that	require	management	is	rather	narrow.		




groups	 of	 actors	 involved	 in	 medical	 journal	 publishing	 have	 may	 remain	







or	 religious	 beliefs,	 institutional	 affiliations	 and	 career	 advancement)	 are	
marginalised,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 they	 can	 also	 pose	
problematic	 conflicts	 that	 can	 have	 an	 impact	 on	 studies	 and	 the	 resulting	
literature	 (PLoS	Medicine	Editors,	2008,	Marcovitch	et	 al.,	 2010,	 Saver,	2012).		
The	 findings	 of	 this	 chapter	 therefore	 indicate	 that	 publishing	 guidance	 and	
policies	should	be	broadened	so	that	they	capture	a	wider	range	of	actor	groups	
and	 interests	 that	 could	 have	 an	 impact	 on	 medical/health	 journals,	 thus	
ensuring	that	they	are	managed.	
	
The	 thesis	 continued,	 in	 Chapter	 Six,	 by	 examining	 the	primary	way	 in	
which	COIs	are	managed	in	medical	journal	publishing.		It	demonstrated	that	the	
majority	 of	 guidance	 and	 policies	 from	 across	 the	 range	 of	 organisations	
emphasises	self-disclosure	as	the	principal	mechanism	for	managing	COIs	(and	
often	offers	no	other	specific	suggestions).		The	reliance	on	disclosure	was	also	
echoed	 in	 interviews	when	discussing	how	 conflicting	 interests	 are	 regulated.		
Reflecting	 the	 findings	 in	 Chapter	 Five,	 Chapter	 Six	 shows	 that	 the	 practice	
focuses	on	the	actor	group	most	widely	identified	as	being	significant	–	authors	–		
with	 the	 requirements	 for	other	 groups	of	 actors	being	 far	more	variable	 and	
vague;	where	 advice	 on	 the	management	 of	 their	 COIs	 is	 provided,	 it	 is	 again	
based	on	disclosure.		The	lack	of	attention	given	to	these	actors	was	reflected	in	
interviews,	with	only	 limited	discussion	on	editors,	 reviewers,	 journal	owners	
and	medical	 writers.	 	 Thus,	 this	 chapter	 shows	 that	 the	main	mechanism	 for	

















for	 this	 purpose	 has	 been,	 to	 varying	 degrees,	 limited,	 and	 thus	 they	 do	 not	
currently	in	practice	play	a	substantive	role	in	managing	COIs	in	medical	journal	
publishing.	 	When	asked	about	other	mechanisms,	beyond	self-disclosure,	 that	
could	 assist	 in	 improving	 the	 management	 of	 COIs,	 interviewees	 frequently	






















as	 well	 as	 the	 wider	 ‘institutional	 environment’	 (Furusten,	 2013)	 of	
medical/health	 journal	 publishing	 within	 which	 these	 journals	 operate	 (as	
mapped	out	in	Chapter	Three).		This	section	examines	how	ideas	regarding	COIs	
and	 their	 management	 within	 the	 medical	 journal	 publishing	 industry	 are	





have	 taken	 hold	 and	 are	 maintained	 within	 the	 institutional	 environment	 of	
medical	 journal	publishing.	 	As	demonstrated	in	Chapters	Five	and	Six,	certain	
actor	 groups’	 COIs,	 and	 particular	 types	 of	 interest,	 are	 focused	 on,	 and	 the	
management	of	 these	 through	 the	process	of	disclosure	 is	 emphasised.	 	Other	
actor	groups,	and	other	 forms	of	 interest,	are	marginalised	and	even	excluded	
from	 the	 debate.	 	 Drawing	 on	 theories	 of	 institutionalism	 (e.g.	 Mahoney	 and	
Thelen,	 2010,	 Scott,	 2014,	 Peters,	 2012,	 Tolbert	 and	 Zucker,	 1996,	 Furusten,	
2013),	this	research	explores	how	certain	ideas	regarding	COIs	in	medical	journal	
publishing	 appear	 to	 have	 become	 widely	 established	 as	 norms,	 and	 thus	













habitualised	 that	 they	 are	 evoked	 in	 response	 to	 certain	 stimuli	 with	 little	
decision-making	effort	by	actors	(Tolbert	and	Zucker,	1996).		For	example,	most	
of	 my	 sample	 guidance	 emphasises	 disclosure	 in	 their	 sections	 on	 COI	
management,	and	when	interviewees	were	questioned	about	how	COIs	should	be	






taken	 for	 granted	 (Furusten,	 2013).	 	 However,	 Tolbert	 and	 Zucker	 (1996)	
developed	a	framework	of	‘increasing	objectification’	to	explain	the	mechanisms	
that	lead	to	institutionalisation.	 	This	builds	on	Berger	and	Luckmann’s	(1966)	
discussion	 of	 ‘objectification’,	 whereby	 ideas	 or	 behaviours	 are	 presented	 to	
actors	(who	had	no	part	in	constructing	them)	as	facts,	and	thus	become	the	norm	
and	are	embedded	in	a	particular	social	system.		Tolbert	and	Zucker	(1996)	argue	
that	 institutionalisation	 involves	 three	 sequential	 processes:	 ‘habitualisation’,	




of	 the	 specific	 individuals	 who	 utilise	 them,	 and	 this	 is	 the	 process	 of	
‘objectification’.	 	A	 later	 stage	 is	 ‘sedimentation’,	which	 is	 the	process	 through	
which	 these	 objectified	 ideas	 become	 embedded	 in	 the	 material	 world,	 with	







Figure 8.1: Component processes of institutionalisation 
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policies,	 regarding	 what	 COIs	 are,	 who	 might	 have	 COIs	 that	 require	
management,	and	how	they	should	be	dealt	with.		Tolbert	and	Zucker	argue	that	






In	 1997,	 the	 ICMJE	 revised	 its	 Uniform	 Requirements	 for	 Manuscripts	
Submitted	 to	 Biomedical	 Journals	 Studies,	 stating	 that	 authors	 should	
acknowledge	financial	and	material	support,	and	disclose	relationships	that	may	
pose	 a	 COI	 (ICMJE,	 1997).	 	 This	 perhaps	 signalled	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	




show,	 from	 1997	 onwards,	 the	 number	 of	 journals	 that	 had	 such	 policies	
increased.	 	 The	 ICMJE	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 particularly	 influential	 organisation,	
playing	a	key	role	in	determining	what	it	is	that	gets	classified	as	an	ethical	issue	

















will	 follow	 the	 same	 course	 of	 action	 as	 others	 have	 done,	 adopting	 similar	
structures/ideas	 (in	 this	 case,	 COI	 policies).	 	 As	 they	 became	 increasingly	
widespread,	it	is	harder	for	different	choices	to	be	considered:	this	is	the	stage	of	
semi-institutionalisation.	 	 ‘Champions’	 of	 COI	 disclosure	 policies	 –	 those	
individuals	‘with	a	material	stake	in	the	promotion	of	the	structure’	(Tolbert	and	
Zucker,	 1996,	 p.	 183)	 –	 will	 also	 push	 objectification	 through	 the	 process	 of	










within	 medical	 journal	 publishing	 as	 objective	 facts	 –	 for	 example,	 that	
disclosure	is	the	method	through	which	COIs	should	be	managed	–	thus	limiting	








For	full	 institutionalisation	to	occur,	sedimentation	is	required.	 	This	 is	
the	spread	of	structures	across	almost	the	whole	group	of	actors	considered	to	
be	potential	adopters,	and	their	continuing	over	a	 long	period	of	 time.	 	 In	 the	
absence	of	alternatives	or	resistance	by	actors	who	oppose	it,	and	the	continued	
promotion	by	the	‘champions’,	the	structure	is	likely	to	perpetuate	and	become	
institutionalised.	 	 Furusten	 (2013)	 argues	 that,	 as	 new	 actors	 enter	 the	
institutional	environment,	they	will	for	the	most	part	automatically	subscribe	to	
these	 pre-existing	 ideas	 as	 they	 have	 become	 the	 norm.	 	 My	 data	 analysis	
demonstrates	 that	 the	 way	 COIs	 are	 conceptualised,	 and	 their	 management	










Figure 8.2: Tolbert and Zucker’s processes of institutionalisation (1996) applied to ideas regarding COIs in medical journal 
publishing 
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working	 within	 the	 institutional	 environment	 of	 medical	 journal	 publishing	
appear	 to	 have	 difficulty	 in	 conceiving	 alternative	 ideas	 to	 those	 that	 have	
become	 institutionalised.	 	 The	 sample	 documents	 and	 interview	 data	 all	
demonstrate	 to	 a	 large	degree	 this	 institutionalisation	 and	 limitation	of	 ideas	








ideas	 to	 enter	 the	 institutional	 environment	 and	 for	 change	 to	 occur.	 	 This	 is	






























in	 the	 first	 place,	 and	 the	 interests	 of	 those	 involved	 in	 the	development	 and	
maintenance	of	these	ideas,	is	also	important	to	consider.		As	demonstrated	in	
the	results	chapters,	 the	 journals	and	 their	owners	are	 themselves	 faced	with	









Chapter	Two,	Section	2.2,	 financial	 interests	are	not	 the	only	 type	of	 interests	
that	can	cause	conflicts,	and	are	also	not	the	only	ones	that	motivate	actors	(Woll,	
2008,	 Schmidt,	2008b,	Gieyrn,	1983).	 	Actors	are	 socially	embedded	and	may	
have	a	plurality	of	interests	besides	economic	ones.		For	example,	while	editors	
will	want	their	journal	to	be	profitable,	it	is	also	reasonable	to	assume	that	they	
will	want	 to	 publish	 research	 that	 has	 been	 conducted	 ethically	 and	 furthers	
knowledge	 in	 their	 field.	 	 It	 is	 thus	probable	 that	while	 some	 editors	may	be	
influenced	 by	 financial	 interests	 when	 developing	 policies,	 they	 also	 do	
genuinely	wish	to	limit	the	problems	caused	by	COIs	and	improve	the	integrity	
of	 the	 medical	 journal	 literature.	 	 Therefore,	 while	 their	 own	 potential	 COIs	
should	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 when	 considering	 the	 ideas	 that	 they	 have	
developed	 surrounding	 COIs,	 these	 actors	 could	 play	 a	 valuable	 role	 in	
















ideas	 can	 potentially	 enter	 an	 institutional	 environment,	 causing	 existing	
established	ones	to	break	down	or	become	amalgamated	with	emerging	ones.		
Alternative	suggestions	identified	in	the	data	(such	as	journals	that	offer	wider	
definitions	 of	 COIs,	 or	 interviewees	who	 provided	 alternative	 suggestions	 for	
their	management)	are	explored	in	order	to	examine	the	possibility	of	changing	
established	 ideas	 surrounding	COIs.	 	 Sections	8.4.1	 and	8.4.2	discuss	 theories	
based	 on	 more	 gradual,	 incremental	 change	 (Mahoney	 and	 Thelen,	 2010),	
adjusting	concepts	already	established,	such	as	the	understanding	of	COIs	and	
their	management.		These	can	be	achieved,	for	example,	through	the	interaction	
of	 actors	 using	 their	 ‘foreground	 discursive	 abilities’	 (their	 ability	 to	 think	
critically	outside	their	institutions)		(Schmidt,	2008b,	2010c,	2008a,	2010a)	and	






Institutional	 theories	 have	 in	 general	 developed	 to	 try	 to	 understand	
empirically	 observed	 stability	 and	 inertia,	 and	 are	 therefore	 less	 useful	 in	
explaining	 change.	 	 Some	 institutional	 theorists	 assume	 that	 once	 ideas	 have	
become	 institutionalised,	 this	 stability	or	 inertia	 (resulting,	 for	example,	 from	
habitualised	 behaviour,	 as	 discussed	 in	 Section	 8.3)	 means	 that	 change	 is	






(1991,	 p.	 197).	 	 As	 this	 chapter	 has	 shown,	 through	 the	 use	 of	 Tolbert	 and	
Zucker’s	 (1996)	 framework,	 we	 are	 able	 to	 understand	 how	 certain	 ideas	
regarding	 COIs	 within	 medical	 journal	 publishing	 –	 as	 demonstrated	 in	 the	
results	chapters	–	have	become	institutionalised.		This	institutionalisation	limits	
imaginative	 thinking	 and	 the	 development	 of	 new	 ideas,	which	 consequently	
restricts	changes	that	could	improve	the	management	of	conflicts.		For	instance,	
Scott	 (2014)	 argues	 that	 actors	 who	 are	 embedded	 within	 institutions	 have	
difficulty	in	changing	them	because	they	are,	to	some	degree,	 institutionalised	
themselves.		As	Figure	8.3	demonstrated,	the	actors	responsible	for	developing	




understandings	 of	 COIs	 (such	 as	what	 type	 of	 COIs	 are	 problematic	 and	 thus	













as	 a	 lack	 of	 demonstrable	 results	 associated	 with	 a	 structure	 (Tolbert	 and	
Zucker,	 1996).	 	 Oliver	 (1992)	 offers	 a	 framework	 (see	 Figure	 8.4)	 for	 the	
predictive	and	moderating	factors	that	can	cause	institutionalised	practices	to	
become	 deinstitutionalised:	 political,	 functional	 and	 social	 pressures	 are	






















actors	within	 an	 institution	 finds	 that	 their	 interests	 are	 not	 being	 advanced	
through	their	participation	in	the	institution,	and	therefore	opens	themselves	up	
to	the	possibility	of	change.		Scott	(2014)	suggests	that	change	might	not	only	be	
achieved	 by	 those	 actors	 within	 the	 institutional	 environment	 recognising	
weaknesses	with	existing	rules,	norms	and	procedures,	but	that	 it	can	also	be	
triggered	by	new	actors	entering	the	scene.		Furusten	(2013)	agrees,	and	further	



















in	 turn	 shape	 the	 definitions	 of	 actors’	 interests	 and	 behaviour,	 and	 thus	











of	 these	 institutions:	 their	 ‘background	 ideational	 abilities’	 (their	 internal	
knowledge	of	how	the	world	works)	explain	how	they	create	and	maintain	those	





members	 within	 an	 institution	 as	 they	 develop	 ideas;	 these	 are	 open	 and	




While	 Schmidt	 acknowledges	 that	 most	 ideas	 and	 discourse	 tend	 to	
















elements	 that	 constitutes	 a	 new	 way	 of	 configuring	 organizations,	 social	
movements,	institutions,	and	other	forms	of	social	activity’	(Campbell,	2005,	p.	
56).	
Schmidt’s	work	applies	DI	 in	a	political	science	context.	 	However,	 this	
theory	 can	 also	 be	 employed	 in	 the	 context	 of	 this	 thesis,	 to	 explore	 the	
possibility	(or	 failure)	of	changing	 the	ways	 in	which	COIs	are	conceptualised	
and	managed	in	medical	journal	publishing.			While	Chapters	Five,	Six	and	Seven	
demonstrated	 an	 institutionalisation	 regarding	 this	 topic	 in	 medical	 journal	
publishing	 (with	 a	 narrow	 understanding	 that	 focused	 on	 authors’	 conflicts,	
financial	interests	and	disclosure),	as	discussed	in	this	section,	it	is	possible	for	
institutionalised	 ideas	 to	 change.	 	 Currently,	 those	 involved	 with	 the	
development	 of	 new	 policies	 and	 guidance	 on	 COIs	 are	 part	 of	 the	 existing	















assist	 in	 the	management	of	COIs	 in	medical	research	and	publishing,	such	as	






































The	 following	 section	 looks	 at	 some	 suggestions	 that	 emerged	 through	 this	
research,	which	could	result	in	smaller,	more	incremental	changes,	as	described	
by	 Mahoney	 and	 Thelen	 (2010)	 in	 the	 conceptualisation	 of	 COIs	 and	 their	
management.		It	focuses	on	redefining	and	broadening	understandings	of	COIs.		
As	discussed	in	Chapter	Five,	the	current	conceptualisation	of	COIs	is	fairly	basic	
and	 narrow.	 	 There	 is	 currently	 a	 focus	 on	 financial	 interests,	 commercial	
funding,	and	on	authors	as	a	conflicted	actor	group,	with	little	attention	given	to	
other	types	of	interest	and	actor	groups.		As	previously	mentioned,	the	latter	may	
consequently	 remain	 unregulated,	 despite	 potentially	 having	 an	 effect	 on	
medical/health	research	and	resulting	articles.		A	wider	understanding	–	both	of	











what	 constitutes	non-financial	COIs,	 and	 for	 journal	 editors	 to	 check	whether	
authors	 (and	reviewers)	have	 fully	disclosed	 these	kinds	of	 interests	 (and	 for	
journal	owners	to	investigate	their	editors’	non-financial	 interests).	 	However,	
this	 does	not	mean	 that	 they	do	not	 potentially	 have	 an	 influence	 on	 articles	
(Marcovitch	et	al.,	2010,	PLoS	Medicine	Editors,	2008)	and	that	they	should	not	
be	considered	in	understandings	of	COIs.		This	narrow	focus	is	one	characteristic	
of	 the	 institutionalization	 of	 understandings	 of	 COIs,	 which	 has	 perhaps	
developed	because	non-financial	interests	are	harder	to	define	and	quantify	than	





Section	 2.2),	 other	 interests	 besides	 pecuniary	 can	 affect	 people’s	 judgement.		




and	 simply	 ignoring	 them,	 as	 per	 the	 BMJ’s	 policy,	 means	 that	 they	 will	 go	






There	 is	 some	debate	 in	 the	medical/health	 literature	on	non-financial	
COIs	 (Levinsky	2002,	PLoS	Medicine	Editors,	2008),	 and	 limited	 research	has	
been	conducted	 into	 them	 in	relation	 to	medical	 journals	 (Viswanathan	et	al.,	
2013).	 	 While	 some	 interviewees	 were	 dismissive	 of,	 or	 unsure	 about,	 non-
financial	COIs,	others	did	acknowledge	that	they	too	can	be	problematic.	 	This	
demonstrates	 that	 there	 are	 actors	 within	 the	 institutional	 environment	 of	
medical	journal	publishing	who	are	alert	to	the	problems	that	they	can	pose,	and	
therefore	offer	the	possibility	of	change.		Viswanathan	et	al.	(2013)	conducted	a	
study	 on	 non-financial	 COIs,	 focusing	 specifically	 on	 systematic	 reviews,	 and	





publishers	and	professional	associations	could	 learn	 from.	 	As	a	relative	new-
comer	to	medical	 journal	publishing,	and	with	a	different	funding	model	 from	


















journals’	 ‘Instructions	 for	Authors’	 and	 submission	 processes	 understandably	






whose	 conflicts	 might	 affect	 articles.	 	 The	 sample	 journals’	 websites	 were	
analysed	for	policy	documents	on	other	actors’	COIs,	and	as	Table	5.3	in	Chapter	
Five	 showed,	 while	 the	 majority	 of	 high	 IF	 journals	 do	 have	 information	 on	
editors’	and	reviewers’	COIs,	only	 five	of	my	 ‘contentious	cases’	 journals	have	
any	 on	 reviewers,	 and	 only	 two	 on	 editors.	 	 After	 authors,	 the	 actors	 most	
focused	 on	 in	 the	 professional	 associations’	 and	 publishers’	 guidance	 were	
reviewers	and	editors,	although	there	was	variety	in	the	quantity	of	information	
provided,	and	it	was	not	always	easy	to	locate.		Of	the	professional	associations,	
the	 publishing	 ones	 (CSE,	 COPE,	 ICMJE	 and	 WAME)	 discuss	 editorial	
independence,	but	do	not	provide	any	detail	of	why	and	how	journal	owners	may	
be	conflicted.		Similarly,	of	the	publishers,	only	Wiley	and	Elsevier	have	sections	





and	several	highly	publicised	 incidents	where	editors	were	 fired	 from	high	 IF	
journals	due	 to	conflicting	 interests	between	them	and	their	 journals’	owners	
(see	Chapter	Two,	Section	2.3.1.2,	and	Chapter	Seven,	Section	7.2.2.3).		There	was	
also	an	absence	in	the	guidance	and	policies	of	publishers’	on	medical	writers’	
potential	 COIs,	 and	 of	 the	 professional	 associations,	 only	 AMWA,	 EMWA	 and	
ISMPP	(specifically	targeted	at	medical	writers)	mentioned	them.		There	was	a	
notable	lack	of	discussion	in	journals’	guidance	and	policies	regarding	medical	
writers,	 even	 amongst	 those	 that	 have	 been	 involved	 in	 high	 profile	 cases	
involving	them	(see	Chapter	Two,	section	2.4).		This	is	surprising,	as	one	might	
expect	that	journals	that	have	been	criticised	for	their	employment	of	medical	
writers	 would	 ensure	 that	 they	 have	 robust	 policies	 surrounding	 this	 actor	













Section	 2.2),	 and	 is	 concerning	 as	 it	 that	means	 any	 conflicts	 they	 have	may	
remain	unmanaged.		This	limited	focus	was	also	shown	in	interviews	with	those	
categorised	as	 ‘medical	publishing	critics’:	all	six	mentioned	authors,	and	four	
talked	 about	 editors,	 but	 only	 one	 referred	 to	 reviewers	 and	 one	 to	medical	
writers.		This	interview	data	reflects	an	institutionalised	way	of	thinking	about	
COIs	that	is	resistant	to	change,	as	referred	to	by	Powell	and	DiMaggio	(1991)	
(see	 Section	8.3),	 so	much	 so	 that	 even	 those	 representing	 critical	 voices	 are	






Given	 the	 fact	 that	 understandings	 remain	 limited,	 despite	 there	 being	










Chapter	 Six	 shows	 that	 disclosure	 is	 currently	 the	main	mechanism	 through	






possibly	 improves	 honesty	 and	 trustworthiness	 (Church	 and	 Kuang,	 2009,	
Fontanarosa	 et	 al.,	 2005).	 	 Loewenstein,	 Sah	 and	 Cain	 (2012)	 argue	 that	 the	
question	should	not	be	as	to	whether	or	not	to	disclose,	but	rather	how	to	ensure	





















they	 have	 to	 affect	 their	 behaviour.	 	 Yet	 authors	 (and	 other	 actors)	 may	 be	
reluctant	to	disclose	for	various	reasons,	not	all	of	which	are	necessarily	suspect.		
As	Thompson	(1993)	argues,	having	COIs	is	purely	situational	and	they	are	not	
in	 themselves	 an	 ethical	 failing:	 COIs,	 while	 universal,	 have	 a	 pejorative	






authors	 to	 simply	 hide	 their	 conflicts.	 	 However,	 such	 conflicts	 are	 still	
problematic	as	they	pose	the	risk	of	bias	(Carson,	1994,	Friedman,	1992,	Luebke,	
1987),	and	therefore	require	effective	management.		Smith	(1998)	suggests	that	
rather	 than	 attempting	 prohibition,	 the	 focus	 should	 be	 on	 adequate	
transparency.	 	 Linking	 back	 to	 Section	 8.4.1,	 in	 order	 to	make	 the	 process	 of	
















do	 many	 publish	 their	 COIs.	 	 All	 of	 the	 professional	 associations	 say	 that	




on	 these	 actor	 groups	 in	 all	 the	 sample	 policies/guidance	 demonstrates	 an	
institutionalised	way	of	thinking	which	focuses	on	authors’	disclosure.	 	This	is	
despite	 the	 fact	 that,	 as	 shown	 in	 Chapter	 Two,	 Section	 2.3.1,	 editors’	 and	
reviewers’	COIs	can	impact	on	the	content	of	journals.			
	
Ideally,	 recognition	 of	 the	 need	 for	 editors	 and	 reviewers	 to	 disclose	
should	become	common	practice	 throughout	medical	 journal	publishing,	with	
formal	 policies	 developed	 that	 will	 ensure	 their	 conflicts	 are	 effectively	 and	







Jeffrey	Drazen,	 editor	 in	 chief	of	 the	NEJM,	 the	 journal	did	not	 follow	 its	own	








policies,	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	 they	 can	 be	 relied	 on	 to	 encourage	 and	 instigate	








as	 contributors,	 they	 may	 have	 had	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	 research	 or	
development	of	an	article	(such	as	medical	writers	and	statisticians),	and	may	
have	conflicts	 that	could	have	affected	 it.	 	 Ideally,	 the	potential	conflicts	of	all	
those	 involved	 in	an	article	should	be	disclosed.	 	To	capture	this,	perhaps	the	
definition	of	authorship	needs	to	be	widened.	 	Yet	despite	on-going	criticisms	
that	 have	 been	made	 of	 the	 ICMJE’s	 authorship	 criteria	 (e.g.	Matheson,	 2011,	
Moffatt,	2013,	Helgesson,	2015,	Bennett	and	Taylor,	2003),	they	are	still	the	most	
commonly	used	by	medical	 journals.	 	The	 ICMJE,	as	was	discussed	 in	Chapter	
Three,	Section	3.3.1,	 is	made	up	of	only	a	small	number	of	high	 IF,	 influential	
journals,	and	is	a	powerful	organisation	within	the	institutional	environment	of	
medical	 journal	publishing.	 	 Its	general	 rejection	of	criticism	of	 its	authorship	
criteria,	and	their	continued	use	by	the	majority	of	medical	journals,	reflects	the	







(see	 also	Yank	 and	Rennie,	 1999,	Davidoff,	 2000,	 Smith,	 2012).	 	 The	 BMJ	 has	
followed	 these	 recommendations:	 along	 with	 listing	 authors	 who	 meet	 the	





not),	and	a	guarantor	who	accepts	 full	 responsibility	 for	 the	work	and/or	 the	
conduct	 of	 the	 study,	 had	 access	 to	 the	 data,	 and	 controlled	 the	 decision	 to	
publish	 (British	 Medical	 Journal,	 2016a).	 	 Requiring	 disclosures	 from	 all	
contributors	to	a	manuscript	(including	what	their	role	was,	who	funded	them,	
and	 any	 other	 potential	 conflicts)	would	 offer	 readers	more	 information	 and	
allow	 them	 to	 assess	 the	 articles	within	 this	 context.	 	 Only	 six	 of	my	 sample	
journals	state	that	contributors	(and/or	medical	writers)	should	be	listed	in	the	
acknowledgements	 of	 an	 article,	 with	 their	 funding	 (and	 sometimes	 other	
financial	 disclosures)	 listed;	 only	 three	 journals	 ask	 for	 all	 of	 contributors’	
potential	COIs.		Medical	writers	interviewed	argued	that	they	should	not	have	to	
disclose	 their	 COIs	 as	 they	work	 only	 with	what	 is	 provided	 to	 them	 by	 the	
authors,	 and	 they	 therefore	 are	 not	 in	 a	 position	 to	 introduce	 bias	 into	 a	
manuscript.	 	This	may	be	true	if	they	are	simply	editing	an	article;	however,	if	
they	have	any	influence	over	how	content	is	structured	and	framed,	then	they	
are	 in	 a	 position	 to	 introduce	 bias,	 and	 evidence	 shows	 that	 some	 (industry-
funded)	medical	writers	have	previously	behaved	unethically	and	been	involved	
in	 developing	 articles	 that	 misrepresent	 the	 products	 under	 discussion	 (see	
Chapter	Two,	Section	2.4).	 	 It	 therefore	seems	that	requiring	disclosures	from	
these	actors	can	only	be	beneficial	 in	attempts	 to	provide	more	transparency.		
However,	while	the	idea	of	a	contributorship	model	was	first	suggested	almost	






The	 requirements	 for	 authors’	 disclosure	 vary	 across	 journals,	 both	 in	
terms	 of	 what	 they	 should	 disclose,	 and	 how	 they	 should	 do	 so.	 	 Of	 the	
professional	associations,	only	the	ICMJE	provides	advice	on	how	this	should	be	
done.		Journals	appear	to	have	autonomy	in	terms	of	setting	their	policies,	and	






part	 of	 the	 condition	 for	 publication	 (and	 in	 the	 case	 of	 publishers	 such	 as	
Springer,	Oxford	University	Press	and	Taylor	and	Francis,	they	should	actually	
provide	more	detailed	advice).	 	The	data	analysed	suggests	 that	 it	would	also	






universal	 online	 disclosure	 form,	 by	 storing	 and	 making	 available	 detailed	
explanations	 about	 payments	 received	 …	 More	 comprehensive	 and	 uniform	
disclosure	should	make	it	more	likely	that	physicians	will	be	discouraged	from	
entering	 into	 problematic	 conflicts	 because	 of	 the	 threat	 of	 having	 to	 clearly	
disclose	 them’	 (p.	 670).	 	 Chapter	 Seven,	 Section	 7.3.1	 looked	 at	 the	 idea	 of	 a	
central	 repository,	 as	 raised	 by	 11	 interviewees,	 where	 disclosures	 could	 be	
stored.		This	is	an	example	of	actors	using	their	‘foreground	discursive	abilities’	
(Schmidt,	 2008b,	 2010b,	 2010c,	 2010a)	 to	 develop	 new	 ideas	 based	 upon	
existing	ones,	through	the	process	of	bricolage:	the	idea	of	disclosure	and	central	
repositories	containing	information	is	combined	to	produce	an	alternative	to	the	
current	 system	 whereby	 journals	 request	 and	 manage	 disclosures.	 	 These	
interviewees	 argued	 that	 a	 central	 repository	which	 contains	 information	 on	
actors’	interests,	working	in	conjunction	with	statements	on	manuscripts,	would	
have	many	 benefits.	 	 It	would	 save	 journals	 time,	 as	 they	would	 not	 have	 to	
request	 disclosure	 forms	 from	 each	 author:	 they	 could	 simply	 ask	 for	 their	
database	IDs,	although	ideally	they	would	still	check	the	database	entries	against	














Five	 interviewees	 (a	 publisher,	 a	 medical	 writer	 and	 three	 managing	
editors)	suggested	that	ORCID,	a	database	launched	in	October	2012	that	links	
research	activities	and	outputs	to	researchers	(see	Chapter	Seven,	Section	7.3.1),	
could	perhaps	be	expanded	 to	 fulfil	 the	role	of	 such	a	COI	database.	 	Another	
interviewee	referred	to	databases	such	as	PubMed	(managed	by	the	U.S.	National	
Library	 of	 Medicine,	 and	 specific	 to	 medical	 literature),	 Scopus	 (owned	 by	
Elsevier)	 and	Web	 of	 Science	 (owned	 by	 Thomson	 Reuters).	 	 Regarding	 the	
financing	 of	 such	 an	 initiative,	 if	 a	 standalone	 repository	 for	 COI	 data	 was	
developed,	 interviewees	 suggested	 that	 it	 could	 perhaps	 be	 paid	 for	 by	
publishers,	 funders	 (both	 commercial	 and	 public),	 researchers’	 institutions	
and/or	 companies	 such	 as	 those	 employing	medical	writers.	 	 Another	 option	
would	be	to	charge	an	annual	fee	from	users	to	have	a	profile	(with	discounts	
given,	for	example,	to	independent	researchers	or	those	in	developing	nations).		
Professional	 bodies/societies	 and	 employers	 could	 insist	 that	 their	
members/employees	sign	up.		It	would	be	possible	to	have	legal	policies	in	place	
that	 require	researchers	 to	 join,	but	 this	could	only	be	done	on	a	country-by-
country	basis.		Perhaps	the	most	effective	means	of	ensuring	up-take	would	be	
for	journals	to	insist	on	users	having	profiles	as	a	condition	for	publication,	and	
publishers	 could	 require	 their	 editors	 to	 have	 them.	 	 The	 professional	

















the	 data	 from	 submitting	 authors;	 if	 professional	 associations	 and	 publishers	
insisted	on	it,	it	may	become	more	common	and	therefore	effective	(though,	as	
discussed	 in	 Chapter	 Seven,	 in	 relation	 to	 CTR	 and	 CTP,	 endorsement	 by	
professional	associations	does	not	always	result	in	this).		This	would	only	work,	
however,	if	there	was	a	unified	approach	by	the	journals;	as	discussed	in	Chapter	
Five,	 JAMA	 has	 ceased	 to	 independently	 analyse	 data	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	
(according	to	an	interviewee	from	the	journal)	they	were	losing	commercially-
funded	 papers.	 	 Further,	 it	 would	 depend	 on	 journals	 having	 the	 resources	





re-author	 papers,	 and	 again	 make	 authors	 more	 careful	 about	 how	 they	
represent	their	data.			
	
Some	 initiatives	 do	 already	 exist	 in	 this	 area.	 	 For	 example,	
ClinicalStudyDataRequest.com	 is	 a	 collaborative	 effort,	 started	 initially	 by	
GlaxoSmithKline	 and	 now	 supported	 by	 13	 pharmaceutical	 companies	
(ClinicalStudyDataRequest.com,	 2016c).	 	 Through	 it,	 researchers	 can	 request	
access	to	data	and	perform	further	studies	on	it	(ClinicalStudyDataRequest.com,	
2016a).	 	 In	 2016,	 the	 ICMJE	 published	 proposals	 for	 journals	 to	 require	
anonymised	 data	 no	 later	 than	 six	months	 after	 publication	 (Taichman	 et	 al.,	









European	Medicines	Agency,	2015b).	 	The	BMJ	 runs	an	 ‘Open	Data’	campaign,	
documenting	its	coverage	of	adverse	outcomes	associated	with	hidden	clinical	








The	EMA	addresses	 the	 issue	of	participant	confidentiality	 in	clinical	 trials	by	
stating	 that	 it	 will	 not	 make	 personal	 trial	 data	 public	 or	 include	 it	 in	 the	
database,	 and	 will	 respect	 patients’	 informed	 consent	 (European	 Medicines	











2010).	 	 It	 is	also	questionable	as	 to	whether	manufacturing	sector	companies	
would	be	truly	willing	to	render	their	data	public.		While	some	pharmaceutical	








from	 trials	 before	 this	 will	 not	 be	 given	 (Silverman,	 2014).	 	 There	 are	 also	
concerns	 about	 patient	 data	 owned	 by	 the	 government	 –	 such	 as	 ‘real-world	
data’	 gathered	 by	 the	 NHS	 –	 being	 made	 available	 to	 manufacturing	 sector	




11	of	my	 interviewees	discussed	 it,	demonstrates	at	 least	a	partial	awareness	
amongst	institutional	actors	of	the	weaknesses	of	existing	processes	(Mahoney	
and	Thelen,	2010).	 	These	initiatives	demonstrate	the	possibility	of	new	ideas	







analytical	 opinions,	 suggested	 alterations	 to	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 medical	 and	
health	 research	 funding	 is	 managed	 and	 distributed.	 	 They	 argued	 that	 for	
effective	improvements	to	be	made	in	the	management	of	COIs	in	medical/health	
journals,	 fundamental	 alterations	 to	 the	models	 of	 publishing	 and	 funding	 of	
research	are	required.		One	idea	proposed	was	that,	rather	than	manufacturing	
sector	 companies	directly	hiring	 researchers	 to	 conduct	 the	work,	 the	money	
could	 instead	 be	 paid	 to	 independent	 funding	 bodies,	 which	 would	 then	
distribute	the	funds.	 	This	would	require	measures	to	ensure	that	the	funding	


















have	 succeeded	 in	 remaining	 independent,	 their	 work	 would	 be	 subject	 to	
concerns	about	bias;	indeed,	one	Professor,	Hilary	Rose,	returned	£30,000	to	the	
trust	 after	 considering	 the	 implications	 of	 how	 his	 research,	 funded	 in	 this	
manner,	 would	 be	 perceived	 (ibid).	 	 Furthermore,	 the	 Trust	 specified	 that	
research	funded	by	the	trust	should	not	include	studies	that	directly	or	indirectly	
examined	the	use	and	effects	of	tobacco	products,	thus	indicating	that	the	trust	
itself	 was	 not	 truly	 independent	 (Chapman,	 1987).	 	 In	 the	 US,	 the	 Master	
Settlement	Agreement	(MSA)	of	1998	(U.S.	Government,	1998)	required	that	key	
tobacco-funded	 initiatives	 ceased	 (The	 Center	 for	 Indoor	 Air	 Research,	 The	
Tobacco	 institute	 and	 The	 Council	 for	 Tobacco	 Research),	 resulting	 in	 the	
tobacco	 industry’s	 loss	 of	 a	 crucial	 connection	 to	 academics	 and	 the	 private	





associated	with	 the	 use	 of	 Tobacco	 Products	 in	 the	 States’	 (U.S.	 Government,	
1998,	section	VI).		The	MSA	had	some	success	in	tobacco-control	efforts,	such	as	
the	disclosure	on	the	internet	of	previously	secret	tobacco	industry	documents	













These	 experiences	 from	 the	 tobacco	 industry	 thus	 demonstrate	 that	 if	
such	 a	 scheme	were	 to	 be	 implemented	 to	 channel	medical	 research	 funding	













certain	 types	 of	 interests	 by	 particular	 actors	 are	 being	 actively	 managed,	
through	 the	 process	 of	 voluntary	 disclosure	 (not	 necessarily	 the	most	 robust	
means	of	managing	COIs).		The	institutionalisation	of	this	narrow	way	of	thinking	
about	COIs	makes	it	difficult	for	alternative	approaches	to	gain	traction.		Through	
analysis	of	 the	data,	 several	 ideas	have	been	proposed	 in	 this	 chapter	of	how	






The	 following	 section	 looks	 at	 several	 areas	 identified	 in	 this	 research	
that	warrant	further	research.		The	first	suggestion	is	for	more	research	into	non-







alternative	 funding	models	 (Sections	 8.5.3	 and	 8.5.4)	 –	 are	more	 radical,	 and	
challenge	 current	 institutionalised	 thinking.	 	 These	 suggestions	 would	 not	
prevent	all	types	of	COIs	from	potentially	affecting	research	(such	as	individual	
researchers’	personal	COIs,	or	editors’	and	reviewers’	COIs),	but	may	assist	with	
those	 that	 arise	 from	 funders’	 influence	over	 research.	 	 For	 these	 ideas	 to	be	








The	 principal	 focus	 regarding	 COIs	 in	 medical/health	 research	 and	 journal	




(Levinsky	 2002,	 Saver,	 2012,	Marcovitch	 et	 al.,	 2010,	 PLoS	Medicine	 Editors,	





financial	 COIs.	 	 Currently,	 only	 limited	 research	 on	 this	 issue	 within	
medical/health	 journal	 publishing	 appears	 to	 have	 been	 done,	 and	 more	




be	 undertaken.	 	 Viswanathan	 et	 al.’s	 study	 (2013)	 does	 look	 at	 non-financial	
interests,	but	it	focuses	specifically	on	how	they	could	be	managed	in	systematic	





investigation	 into	 how	 potential	 COIs	 in	 medical	 research	 could	 be	 more	
effectively	 handled,	 to	 limit	 their	 impact	 on	 decisions	 (such	 as	 policy	 and	
prescribing	ones)	based	upon	publications.		For	example,	as	discussed	in	section	
8.4.2,	 one	 suggestion	 that	 emerged	 from	 interviews	 regarding	 how	 COI	
disclosures	could	be	more	effectively	managed	was	the	development	of	a	secure,	
online,	central	database	where	 information	on	researchers’	 interests	could	be	




Publishers	 could	 request	 this	 information	 from	 editorial	 staff	 and	 make	 it	
accessible	 on	 their	 websites.	 	 Existing	 databases	 containing	 information	 on	












institutional	 environment	 of	 medical	 journal	 publishing	 (such	 as	 editors	 and	






in	 medical/health	 research	 and	 publishing	 (with	 regards	 to	 the	 COIs	 of	





guidance	 demonstrated	 that,	 to	 date,	 only	 JAMA,	 the	 BMJ,	 The	 Lancet,	 PLoS	
Medicine	 and	 JNCI	 require	 raw	data	 to	be	made	available	 to	 the	 journal	upon	
request.		While	initiatives	such	as	ICMJE’s	proposal	for	data	sharing	(Taichman	
et	 al.,	 2016)	 are	 encouraging,	 as	 shown	 in	 Chapter	 Seven,	 Section	 7.3.2,	 their	
support	of	other	initiatives	such	as	Clinical	Trial	Registration	has	not	been	that	
effective	 so	 far.	 	 Although	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 have	 the	 buy-in	 of	 influential	
professional	 associations	 such	 as	 ICMJE,	 on	 its	 own	 it	 does	 not	 appear	 to	 be	
enough.	 	As	discussed,	there	are	issues	surrounding	journals’	resources:	many	
would	not	be	able	to	employ	independent	statisticians	to	analyse	the	raw	data	of	
every	 study	 they	 publish.	 	 And	 journals	 that	 do	 so	may	 experience	 resulting	
pressure	from	manufacturing	sector	companies.		In	2013,	JAMA,	a	well-resourced	
journal,	 ceased	 to	 use	 independent	 statisticians	 (Bauchner,	 2013,	 McCarthy,	







losing	 industry-funded	papers.	 	Further,	 the	 fact	 that	 there	are	campaigns	 for	
greater	data	access,	such	as	the	BMJ’s	(2016b),	indicates	that	these	mechanisms	







arise,	 they	would	 be	 able	 to	 conduct	 investigations	 (Steinbrook	 and	Kassirer,	
2010).		The	practicalities	of	how	to	implement	such	a	system	–	for	example,	how	
to	get	journals	universally	to	agree	to	participate,	how	to	finance	it,	and	how	to	
manage	 the	 data	 and	 ensure	 confidentiality	 is	 maintained	 –	 appears	 to	 be	 a	





COIs	 in	 medical	 and	 health	 research:	 collaborations	 between	 the	 tobacco	
industry	and	researchers	have	been	a	concern	since	the	1950s;	more	recently	
(since	 the	1980s),	 such	 relationships	between	pharmaceutical	 companies	and	
scientists	have	led	to	unease	regarding	the	independence	of	ensuing	publications	
(see	 Korn,	 2000,	 Sharpe,	 2002,	 Resnik,	 2000,	 Warner	 and	 Gluck,	 2003,	
Thompson,	1993,	Healy,	2004,	Etzkowitz,	1990,	Etzkowitz,	1989).		In	the	U.K.	the	
Robbins	 Report	 of	 1963	 demonstrated	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	 need	 for	 a	
protective	 barrier	 between	 funders	 and	 researchers	 to	 prevent	 political	
considerations	and	pressures	from	affecting	research,	stating,	for	example,	that	
government	funding	to	universities	should	be	provided	through	an	independent	
body	 	 (Committee	on	Higher	Education,	 1963).	 	As	 in	 the	U.S.,	 however,	 such	





industry	can	now	provide	funding	without	an	 independent	 intermediary,	 thus	
giving	them	the	potential	ability	to	control	the	research	(Evans,	2001).		
	
As	 explored	 in	 Section	 8.4.4,	 one	 proposal	 made	 by	 two	 medical	













such	 a	 system,	 and	 the	 difficulties	 in	 successfully	 placing	 a	 barrier	 between	
companies	 and	 researchers	 to	 prevent	 influence	 from	 the	 former	 over	 data.		
Future	research	might	usefully	explore,	through	for	example,	the	examination	of	
funding	 in	 other	 fields	 and	 discussions	 with	 key	 stakeholders	 such	 as	
commercial	and	public	funders,	how	a	new	funding	model	might	practically	be	
developed,	whereby	funds	are	fed	through	non-commercial,	independent	bodies,	





One	 of	 the	main	 findings	 of	 this	 research	 is	 that	 there	 exists	 within	medical	







on	 the	 literature.	 	 For	 this	 to	 change,	 there	 is	 firstly,	 therefore,	 a	 need	 for	
institutional	understandings	to	be	broadened	so	that	a	wider	range	of	COIs	may	
be	captured	and	successfully	managed.		There	needs	to	be	greater	education	of	
actors	 working	 within	 the	 institutional	 environment	 of	 medical	 journal	
publishing	on	 the	 topic,	 so	 that	 they	become	aware	of	 how	different	 types	of	
interest	 can	 constitute	 a	 conflict,	 and	 the	ways	 in	which	 a	 plurality	 of	 actors	
(including	themselves)	might	have	conflicts	that	require	management.		While	the	
heavily-relied-upon	process	of	 voluntary	disclosure	 gives	 the	 impression	 that	
organisational	actors	are	dealing	with	COIs,	it	is	not	in	reality	as	effective	as	is	
required;	 for	 COIs	 to	 be	 more	 effectively	 managed,	 there	 also	 needs	 to	 be	 a	
recognition	by	those	within	the	institutional	environment	of	this,	and	the	need	
for	more	successful	methods	to	be	developed.		For	this	to	happen,	a	discussion	is	
required	 within	 medical	 journal	 publishing	 on	 the	 weaknesses	 of	 current	
disclosure	practices	is	required,	as	well	as	regarding	what	alternatives	could	be	
developed.		This	should	include	consideration	of	what	else	could	practically,	but	
more	 fundamentally,	 be	 done	 to	 limit	 the	 impact	 of	 COIs	 on	 the	 literature,	
including	how	the	current	processes	of	medical	research	and	publishing,	with	
often	 close	 involvement	 of	 commercial	 companies,	 could	 be	 restructured	 to	
provide	 more	 distance	 between	 corporate	 funders	 and	 the	 output	 of	 their	
sponsored	research.		As	influential	actors	within	the	institutional	environment,	
organisations	 such	 as	 COPE,	 ICMJE,	 CSE	 and	WAME	 could	 help	 to	 begin	 this	















will	 arise	 from	 corporate	 involvement	 in	 medical/health	 research	 and	 their	
consequent	 impact	 on	 health	 policy.	 	 How	 the	 ever-growing	 involvement	 of	












in	 the	 empirical	 data,	 in	 particular,	 the	 48	 original	 interviews	 that	 were	
conducted	with	actors	working	 in	a	wide	 range	of	 roles	across	 the	 field.	 	The	
author’s	 own	 professional	 experience,	 acquired	 from	working	 in	 the	medical	
publishing	industry,	both	prior	to	and	while	undertaking	the	research	(discussed	
in	 Chapter	 Four,	 Section	 4.2),	 helped	 her	 to	 gain	 access	 to	 these	 interview	











conceptualised	 in	 the	 field,	 and	 why	 such	 understandings	 surrounding	 them	
have	developed	and	become	institutionalised.		As	such,	this	study	offers	a	new	
and	 important	 contribution	 to	 the	public	health	 literature.	 	By	demonstrating	
that	an	institutionalisation	of	ideas	around	COIs	has	formed	in	medical	journal	
publishing,	policy-makers	will	be	better	able	to	grasp	the	nature	of	the	problem	
confronting	 them	when	making	 decisions	 based	 on	 the	 supposedly	 evidence-






with	 participants	 out-with	 the	 institutional	 environment	 of	 medical	 journal	
publishing,	so	that	an	insight	might	be	gained	into	how	the	issues	uncovered	in	
this	 research	 affects	 them	and	 their	 trust	 in	 the	medical/health	 research	 and	
publishing	 enterprise.	 	 For	 example,	 interviews	 could	 have	 been	 sought	with	
those	who	use	such	journals	to	make	decisions	(such	as	doctors,	policy-makers,	
or	 members	 of	 the	 public).	 	 This	 would	 have	 helped	 in	 developing	 an	
understanding	 of	 the	 further	 implications	 of	 the	 institutionalisation	 of	 ideas	
regarding	 COIs.	 	 However,	 the	 focus	 of	 this	 study,	 as	 stated	 in	 the	 primary	
research	question	(see	Chapter	One,	Section	1.3),	was	on	how	the	institutional	
environment	 of	medical	 journal	 publishing	 informs	 actors’	 understandings	 of	












offers	readers	an	insight	 into	the	 institutional	environment	of	medical	 journal	
publishing,	the	actors	within	which	have	developed	particular	understandings	of	
what	COIs	are,	who	might	have	conflicts	and	how	they	should	be	managed.		These	
interpretations	 have	 developed	 over	 time	 and	 have	 gradually	 become	
institutionalised,	 understood	 as	 the	 ‘external	 reality’,	 making	 current	
approaches	difficult	 to	alter,	despite	some	recognised	weaknesses	such	as	the	
fact	that	voluntary	disclosure	is	dependent	on	the	honesty	of	those	disclosing.		






The	 suggestion	most	 often	made	 for	 an	 alternative	method	 to	manage	






despite	 various	 initiatives	 to	 encourage	 this,	 including	 ostensibly	 by	 the	
pharmaceutical	 industry,	as	shown	by	 the	BMJ’s	campaign	 focusing	on	Statins	




(Hannan	and	Freeman,	1984,	 1989,	 Jepperson,	 1991)	 amongst	 the	key	 actors	







acts	 as	 a	 barrier	 to	 change,	making	 it	 difficult	 for	 new	 ideas	 to	 enter	 and	 be	
considered.			
	
However,	 as	 this	 thesis	 shows,	 some	 actors	 within	 medical	 journal	
publishing	 are	 considering	 alternatives,	 and	 therefore	 the	 possibility	 for	
processes	 to	 adjust	 does	 exist.	 	 While	 exogenous	 shocks	 may	 upset	 the	
equilibrium,	 it	 seems	more	 likely	 that	 if	 change	 is	 to	occur	 in	medical	 journal	
publishing,	 it	 will	 be	 gradually	 and	 cumulatively	 over	 time,	 via	 endogenous	
elements	 (Mahoney	 and	 Thelen,	 2010).	 	 This	 could	 occur	 through	 the	
encouragement	 of	 analytical	 reflection	 on	 existing	 understandings	 by	 actors	
within	the	institutional	environment,	as	well	as	discussions	with	critical	thinkers	
external	 to	 it	 (Furusten,	 2013,	 Scott,	 2014,	 Schmidt,	 2008b,	 2010b,	 2010c,	
2008a).	 	 Actors’	 ‘foreground	discursive	 abilities’	 and	 the	 process	 of	 bricolage	
may	 elicit	 new	 discourse	 and	 ideas	 (Schmidt,	 2008b,	 2010b,	 2010c,	 2008a).		
Examples	 where	 the	 critical	 thinking	 of	 actors	 has	 led	 to	 incremental	 steps	
towards	changes	 in	processes	within	medical	research	and	publishing	are	 the	
BMJ’s	Open	Data	 campaign	 (British	Medical	 Journal,	 2016b)	 and	 the	AllTrials	
movement	 (AllTrials,	 2014).	 	 In	 such	 a	 way,	 change	 and	 improvements	 to	























disclosure	 policies	 in	medical	 journals,	which	were	 discussed	 in	 this	 chapter.		
These	quantitative	studies	are	valuable	 in	offering	insights	 into	these	policies,	
such	as	who	they	target,	how	many	journals	have	these	policies	in	place,	and	how	
successful	 they	 are.	 	 However,	 they	 do	 not	 offer	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	
underlying	context:	of	how	the	policies	were	constructed	in	this	way	and	have	
come	 to	 be	 relied	 so	 heavily	 upon.	 	 Chapter	 Three	 provided	 a	 map	 of	 the	
institutional	environment	of	medical	journal	publishing,	thus	offering	a	context	
through	which	 to	 read	 the	 rest	of	 the	 thesis,	 and	 to	clarify	 the	different	 actor	
groups	that	are	referred	to	throughout	it.		Chapter	Four	reflexively	discussed	the	
qualitative	 methodological	 approach	 that	 was	 taken,	 including	 the	 research	
strategy,	data	sampling	and	analytical	methods.	 	The	 following	three	chapters	










are	 considered	 far	 less.	 	 Chapter	 Six	 explored	 actors’	 understandings	
surrounding	the	management	of	COIs,	and	found	that	the	process	of	voluntary	
disclosure	 is	 concentrated	 upon,	 with	 limited	 consideration	 given	 to	 other	
potential	methods.		Despite	the	reliance	on	this	practice,	it	was	acknowledged	by	
some	 interviewees	 that	 there	 are	 inherent	 and	 serious	weaknesses	 to	 it	 (the	
primary	one	being	that	it	is	reliant	on	the	honesty	of	those	disclosing);	these,	as	
well	 as	 interviewees’	 thoughts	 on	 disclosure’s	 strengths,	 were	 examined.		
Chapter	Seven	investigated	alternative	methods	of	COI	regulation.		While	some	












The	 aim	 of	 this	 thesis	 was	 to	 examine	 how	 COIs	 and	 their	 management	 are	
conceptualised	by	actors	within	the	institutional	environment	of	medical	journal	
publishing.		This	required	interrogating	existing	ideas	and	understandings	that	
have	 been	 developed	 regarding	 whose	 COIs	 are	 perceived	 to	 require	
management	 in	 medical	 publishing,	 what	 types	 of	 interest	 can	 (and	 are	
perceived	to)	lead	to	COIs,	how	effectively	COIs	are	currently	managed	and	what	










institutional	 environment	 of	 medical	 journal	 publishing,	 were	 thematically	
analysed.			
	
	 The	 thesis	 argues	 that	 a	 particular	way	 of	 thinking	 about	 COIs	 –	who	
might	 have	 COIs	 that	 require	 management,	 what	 interests	 are	 particularly	
problematic,	and	how	they	should	be	handled	–	has	become	institutionalised	and	
objectified	within	medical	 journal	publishing.	 	 In	other	words,	 it	 is	commonly	







these	 are	 undoubtedly	 relevant	 (authors’	 COIs,	 and	 financial	 interests,	 do,	 of	
course,	 need	 to	 be	 effectively	 managed,	 and	 disclosure	 is	 a	 helpful	 tool	 in	
achieving	 this),	 there	 are	 also	 other	 actor	 groups	 (such	 as	 journal	 editors	 or	
medical	writers)	and	types	of	relationships	(for	example,	non-financial),	which	
can	also	result	in	conflicts	that	may	affect	medical/health	journals.		The	ways	in	












Circulation,	 who	 was	 the	 recipient	 of	 tobacco	 industry	 funds,	 and	 published	
letters	 criticising	 research	 on	 deaths	 caused	 by	 second-hand	 tobacco	 smoke.		
Another	obvious	actor	group	 that	 is	 absent	 from	 the	debate	over	who	can	be	
conflicted	are	medical	writers.		Given	the	controversy	that	has	surrounded	the	
use	 of	 undisclosed	 medical	 writers	 in	 producing	 medical	 publications	 (see	
Chapter	 Two,	 Section	 2.4),	 it	 might	 have	 been	 expected	 that	 their	 potential	
conflicts	would	be	discussed	in	more	detail	within	COI	policies	and	guidance,	and	




Similarly,	 the	 focus	 in	 both	 the	 literature	 and	 the	 data	 is	 primarily	 on	
financial	 interests,	 while	 other,	 non-financial	 ones	 receive	 limited	 attention.		








and	 this	 was	 therefore	 reflected	 in	 the	 research	 findings.	 	 In	 particular,	 the	
literature	and	data	focuses	on	the	influence	of	private	companies,	such	as	those	
from	the	pharmaceutical	and	tobacco	industries,	on	research	and	publications;	
this	 thesis	 has	 therefore	 similarly	 looked	 in	more	 depth	 at	 the	 conflicts	 that	




deal	 with	 conflicts,	 as	 discussed	 in	 Chapters	 Six	 and	 Eight,	 also	 means	 that	





As	 shown	 in	 Chapter	 Two,	 Section	 2.5.1,	 the	 process	 has	 various	 inherent	
limitations.	 	Most	 fundamentally,	 it	 is	reliant	on	the	honesty	of	 those	who	are	
disclosing.	 	 It	also	depends	on	them	having	an	awareness	of	what	might	have	
caused	them	to	be	biased	(Cain	and	Detsky,	2008,	Dana	and	Loewenstein,	2003,	
Pronin	 et	 al.,	 2004).	 	 There	 are	 also	 risks	 that	 disclosure	 may	 lead	 to	 the	
strengthening	of	conflicts	(Cain	et	al.,	2005b,	Kassirer,	2009a).		As	such,	relying	
solely	on	this	system	is	problematic,	as	this	thesis	demonstrates	is	the	case	in	










and	 representing	 an	 incremental	 change	 to	 the	 system,	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 central	
repository	 to	 store	 COI	 information	 was	 also	 raised;	 while	 this	 would	 not	
necessarily	 avoid	 some	 of	 the	 more	 fundamental	 problems	 associated	 with	
disclosure	as	discussed	above,	it	would	help	to	streamline	the	process	and	make	
it	 easier	 for	 actors	 to	 manage.	 	 More	 radical	 changes	 to	 the	 processes	 of	
publishing	and	funding,	as	mooted	by	several	interviewees,	were	also	examined.			
All	of	these	ideas	suggest	that	the	possibility	for	change	and	improvement	in	the	
management	 of	 COIs	 within	 medical	 journal	 publishing	 exists;	 however,	 as	
Chapter	 Eight	 suggested,	 for	 these	 to	 be	 considered,	 actors	 within	 the	









of	 organisational	 actors,	 and	 48	 original	 interviews	 with	 individual	 actors	
working	 in	a	variety	of	 job	roles	 from	across	 the	 institutional	environment	of	
medical	journal	publishing	–	this	study	offers	an	original,	empirical	insight	into	
medical	 journal	 publishing	 and	 the	 topic	 of	 COIs	 within	 it.	 	 The	 research	
demonstrates	that,	despite	existing	evidence	of	how	a	range	of	actor	groups	can	
have	COIs	that	could	potentially	impact	on	the	medical/health	journal	literature,	
the	 focus	 of	 key	 organisational	 and	 individual	 actors	 remains	 on	 the	 COIs	 of	
authors	(Chapter	Five).	 	Thus,	the	COIs	of	other	actor	groups	may	continue	to	
have	 an	 affect	 the	 content	 of	 journals.	 	 This	 research	 has	 also	 shown	 that	
attention	is	given	to	financial	COIs,	with	limited	discussion	of	other,	non-financial	
types	 (for	 example,	 employment,	 political	 ideologies,	 family	 relationships):	
because	 these	 types	 of	 interest	 are	 less	 tangible,	 they	 appear	 to	 be	 largely	
ignored.		This	is	despite	the	fact	that,	as	shown	in	Chapter	Two	and	the	results	
chapters,	 they	 can	 also	 be	 problematic	 and	 therefore	 do	 require	 effective	
management;	more	research	could	usefully	be	done	into	this	area	(see	Chapter	
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publishing	 ethics	 in	 medical	 journals,	 and	 am	 interested	 in	 investigating	 the	












































4)	 The	 funding	 of	 research	 by	 commercial	 companies	 potentially	 increases	
conflicts	of	interest	and	therefore	the	potential	for	bias	in	research	and	resulting	
articles.		I’d	like	to	ask	a	couple	of	questions	about	your	thoughts	on	this.	









a) What	 guidance	 do	 you	 provide	 authors	 [and	 editors]	 on	 conflicts	 of	
interest?	
















































j) Do	 you	 feel	 current	 guidelines	 and	 policies	 on	 conflicts	 of	 interest	 are	

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































The	Lancet	 None	 	 	 None	



















































































































































































































IAOEH	 None	 	 None	
JAACAP	 None	 	 None	
JCP	 None	 	 None	







































































































































































































































































































































Risk	Analysis	 None	 	 None	
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(R.Hendrick@sms.ed.ac.uk).	It	is	being	supervised	by	Professor	Jeff	Collin	and	Dr	
Katherine	Smith	at	the	University	of	Edinburgh.	It	is	funded	by	the	Economic	and	




Various	 areas	 of	 concern	 exist	 regarding	 the	 publication	 of	 medical	 journal	
articles.	This	project	aims	to	investigate	the	ethical	issues	surrounding	conflicts	
of	 interest	 in	 articles,	 and	 how	 the	 challenges	 they	 pose	 are	 currently	 being	






working	 in	 the	 field	 (for	 example,	 publishers,	 journal	 editors,	 authors,	


















































and	 only	 anonymised	 versions	 of	 the	 transcripts/interview	 notes	 will	 be	





Office	 who	 implements	 the	 Data	 Protection	 Act	 1998.	 All	 personal	 data	 on	











This	 investigation	 has	 been	 granted	 ethical	 approval	 by	 the	 University	 of	
Edinburgh	School	of	Social	and	Political	Science’s	Ethics	Committee.	
If	you	have	any	questions	or	concerns,	during	or	after	the	investigation,	or	wish	
























I	understand	that	 I	have	the	right	 to	request	 that	 information	recorded	 in	the	













I	 consent	 to	 having	 anonymised	 copies	 of	 the	 interview	 transcript/notes	
archived	 in	 the	 UK	 Data	 Archive	 (http://data-archive.ac.uk/)	 as	 part	 of	 the	
ESRC’s	efforts	to	promote	data	archiving	and	data	sharing:	
Yes	 	
No	 	
	
	
	
	
	
I	hereby	agree	to	take	part	in	the	above	project	(PRINT	NAME)	
Signature	of	Participant	 Date	
